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Executive Summary of  Findings   iii 
Executive Summary of Findings
This report is the outcome of a yearlong inquiry 
by the University of Denver John Evans Study 
Committee, a volunteer group of faculty, outside 
historians, descendant community representatives, 
and students and alumni representing the DU 
Native American community, into the role of 
the University of Denver’s founder in the Sand 
Creek Massacre of November 29, 1864. The 
findings are offered, in part, as a supplement, but 
also a response to a similar inquiry conducted by 
Northwestern University, also founded by John 
Evans. We submit the present document not as an 
academic trial of Evans in absentia according to 
today’s legal standards and conceptions of human 
rights, but rather in the spirit of an effort to assess 
a legacy that neither university has, until this year, 
made the effort to understand. Such a task requires 
that the decisions and actions that John Evans 
undertook be situated in the context of the ideas, 
policies, expectations, and principles of territorial 
leadership evident in the mid-nineteenth century 
American West. 
In his role as territorial governor from 1862 
until his forced resignation in the summer of 
1865 John Evans held the position as the top civil 
and political official in Colorado Territory. This 
position was coterminous with the assignment as 
Ex Officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs. After 
a review of the roles and duties and responsibilities 
attendant to the superintendency, we compare the 
circumstances Evans faced and the leadership he 
evinced with that of contemporaneous officials in 
two adjacent territories, Nevada and Utah. This 
is followed by an analysis of Evans’s leadership in 
the crucial period of late-1863 until the massacre 
in November 1864. We attend in particular to the 
nature and direct impact of the two proclamations 
he issued as governor; his actions at the Camp 
Weld Council in September, wherein Native leaders 
attempted to broker a peace; and his decisions to 
surrender territorial authority to the military in the 
late summer of 1864.
We conclude that John Evans’s pattern of 
neglect of his treaty-negotiating duties, his 
leadership failures, and his reckless decision-
making in 1864 combine to clearly demonstrate 
a significant level of culpability for the Sand 
Creek Massacre. While not of the same character, 
Evans’s culpability is comparable in degree to 
that of Colonel John Chivington, the military 
commander who personally planned and carried 
out the massacre. Evans’s actions and influence, 
more than those of any other political official in 
Colorado Territory, created the conditions in which 
the massacre was highly likely. Evans abrogated his 
duties as superintendent, fanned the flames of war 
when he could have dampened them, cultivated 
an unusually interdependent relationship with the 
military, and rejected clear opportunities to engage 
in peaceful negotiations with the Native peoples 
under his jurisdiction. Furthermore, he successfully 
lobbied the War Department for the deployment 
of a federalized regiment, consisting largely of 
undertrained, undisciplined volunteer soldiers 
who executed the worst of the atrocities during the 
massacre. 
It is certainly difficult for the University of 
Denver and the surrounding Colorado community 
to confront this history. John Evans was a man 
of many proud accomplishments, a visionary 
leader whose influence shaped the university, the 
city of Denver, and the state of Colorado. This 
committee’s hope is that by understanding our 
founder’s role in this catastrophic event we can 
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unite as a community and begin to forge a new 
relationship to the past for the benefit of the public 
good. We offer this report as an initial step to 
promote empathy and healing, not only for those 
of us who have inherited this complex legacy, but 
also for the Arapaho and Cheyenne people, who 
have displayed an active sense of presence in the 
face of victimization and, lest we forget, on whose 
ancestral lands our campus sits.
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Committee Charge and Context
John Evans (1814-1897) was a man of many 
talents and an important figure in the histories 
of Euro-American settlement in Illinois and 
Colorado. A physician by training, over the 
course of his lifetime he was also a professor of 
medicine, a founder of hospitals and medical 
societies, an innovative businessman, a tireless 
institution builder, and a passionate advocate of 
general public education and higher learning. He 
was a central figure in the founding of two private 
universities: Northwestern University in Evanston, 
Illinois (1851), and the Colorado Seminary, which 
later became the University of Denver (1864). 
He served as the first board president of both 
universities, and chaired the Colorado Seminary 
Board of Trustees until his death. 
Evans devoted significant time and resources 
to public service, as an alderman in Chicago, a 
delegate to the 1860 Illinois state Republican 
convention, and an acquaintance and appointee 
of President Abraham Lincoln. In 1862, Evans 
was sworn in as the second Governor of Colorado 
Territory, which also came with the position 
of ex officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs. 
Evans’s many achievements garnered him great 
respect and admiration—which is reflected by the 
honorary names of Evanston, Illinois, and Evans, 
Colorado, the 14,000-foot Mt. Evans in the Rocky 
Mountains, and the numerous streets and parks 
that also bear his name.
After his political career in Colorado, Evans 
became an influential figure in the development 
of Colorado’s railroads. Envisioning Denver as 
the future hub of this new and speedy form of 
transportation, Evans secured the federal land 
grants and county bonds necessary to the creation 
of the Union Pacific railway line connecting 
Cheyenne to Denver, a route that opened on 
June 24, 1870. Evans continued to be the main 
financier of Colorado’s railroad empire, a project 
he was to which he was deeply devoted for 
the rest of his life. The Denver & South Park, 
Denver & New Orleans, Denver Texas & Gulf, 
Union Pacific, and Boulder Valley lines were 
all made possible by John Evans’s vision and 
capital investments. Denver’s claim to be the 
commercial capital of the Rocky Mountain Empire 
could finally be substantiated by the end of the 
nineteenth century, due in large part to the efforts 
of Evans.
Report Context
Although much has been written about the details 
noted above, this report concentrates instead on 
the fateful decisions and events that took place 
over a mere span of four years that mark some of 
the darkest moments in American frontier history. 
On November 29th, 1864, just two weeks after 
the Colorado Seminary opened its doors, an 
infamous event that became known as the Sand 
Creek Massacre occurred, resulting in the deaths 
of an estimated two hundred peaceful Cheyenne 
and Arapaho people who believed they were safely 
camped under protection of the American flag.1 
Many of the dead left strewn upon the land that 
day were women, children, and the infirm. As 
a direct result of the findings of a congressional 
inquiry into the leadership and decision making 
that preceded the massacre, Evans was forced 
to resign from his governorship less than eight 
months later. Although Evans went on to lead 
many successful business and civic initiatives, he  
 
1  http://www.nps.gov/sand/historyculture/index.htm 
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was never able to revive his political career out of 
the pall cast by the massacre at Sand Creek.
John Evans’s influence has long been 
maintained as a vital element of our institutional 
memory and sense of identity here at the 
University of Denver. Given that the information 
assembled in this report will necessitate a 
reevaluation, or at the least a more complex 
understanding, of Evans’s legacy, it is incumbent 
upon us to contextualize the necessity and timing 
for such an inquiry.
Until last year neither of the universities 
John Evans was instrumental in founding had 
taken a systematic look at his role in the Sand 
Creek Massacre or his handling, as the appointed 
governor, of settler-Indian relations in the years 
leading to this horrific event. Nor had these events 
been the subject of much critical examination by 
historians. Beginning in 2013, on the eve of the 
150th anniversary of this event, both universities 
finally decided that the time had come. The 
effort got its initial start in the fall of 2012 when 
students at Northwestern urged their university 
leaders to frankly and honestly address the role 
that John Evans had played in the Sand Creek 
Massacre and the process of Indian removal more 
broadly. (Such histories were understandably 
obscure as they were much further removed from 
the Northwestern community’s public discourse 
than they have been in Colorado, where the events 
occurred.) In February of 2013, Northwestern 
University Provost Daniel Linzer appointed an 
interdisciplinary committee of senior scholars 
consisting of four from within Northwestern and 
three (initially; later four) from other universities, 
to examine in detail Evans’s relationship to the 
massacre.2  (At the time of this group’s  
 
2 Report of  the John Evans Study Committee, North-
western University (RJESCNU), 10; Alan K. Cubbage, 
“John Evans Study Committee Formed,” Northwestern 
University website, February 14, 2013. http://www.
northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2013/02/john-
evans-study-committee-formed.html.
constitution, Northwestern did not have any 
specialists in Native American history or culture.)
Shortly after the John Evans Study Committee 
at Northwestern was formed, a faculty member 
contacted a colleague at the University of Denver 
to see if a similar effort was planned at DU. 
None was at the time, but in February, 2013, 
Dr. Dean Saitta, Chair of the Department of 
Anthropology at DU, reached out to other faculty 
with interests and expertise in Native American 
culture and history. By early April, several faculty 
had met with Provost Gregg Kvistad and then-
Chancellor Robert Coombe to discuss conducting 
a similar faculty-led inquiry at DU. The provost 
and chancellor met the proposal with somber 
enthusiasm. It was agreed that such an inquiry 
would be of significant value and interest to 
the University of Denver community as the 
institution’s sesquicentennial celebration also 
coincided with this event.  It was also suggested 
that others be invited, some of whom were 
able to join the committee. The University of 
Denver’s John Evans Study Committee was not 
directly appointed by the provost, but rather 
comprised of faculty from departments across 
the university who offered to contribute research, 
scholarship, and time investigating Evans’s role in 
the massacre, while also being charged with the 
responsibility to author a set of recommendations 
to the administration on how our community 
can respond this history in a positive, honest, 
and inclusive way. The provost and chancellor 
agreed to provide financial support for some of 
committee’s activities, but as a whole the group has 
conducted its research and writing independently 
of administrative oversight. Consequently, this 
report represents the findings and critical insights 
of the committee itself, and not the University of 
Denver writ large, though we hope that our words 
will contribute to and encourage important intra- 
and cross-university conversations. 
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Composition and Charge
Some differences in the organization and objectives 
of the university committees are worth noting.
At Northwestern, the eight appointed scholars 
were charged with conducting research and 
reporting their findings regarding Evans’s role in 
the events surrounding and consequences of the 
massacre.3 The committee conducted research over 
the 2013-14 year and released their “Report of the 
John Evans Study Committee” in May 2014. 
A second committee was originally to be 
appointed after the report came out, to make 
recommendations on the basis of the report’s 
conclusions. However, a surge of campus 
and public interest in the report process and 
other issues of concern to Native American 
communities, students, and scholars led to an 
open forum at the university in October 2013. 
In the wake of that conversation, Northwestern’s 
president decided to fast-track the “task 
force” committee, with the goal of “making 
recommendations for ways that Northwestern can 
define more clearly the University’s relationships 
with Native Americans in the areas of academic 
programs, admissions, support services, and 
civic engagement and partnerships, as well as 
respond to the recommendations of the study 
committee.”4 The Native American Outreach and 
Inclusion Task Force, comprised of 19 students, 
faculty, and members from other universities 
and organizations, is expected to release its 
recommendations in the fall of 2014.5
At the University of Denver, the 
sesquicentennial (150th) anniversary of the 
university occurs in the same year as the 150th 
anniversary of the Sand Creek Massacre. Therefore, 
 
3 RJESCNU, 9.
4 President Martin Schapiro, “Second John Evans Com-
mittee to Be Formed,” The Daily Northwestern, Novem-
ber 1, 2013.
5 Tyler Pager, “Task force to study Native American com-
munity, make recommendations,” The Daily North-
western, April 22, 2014.
with less than eighteen months to research the 
role of Evans and prepare for commemoration of 
both events, the DU John Evans Study Committee 
created an organizational structure with the aim 
of addressing several simultaneous challenges 
related to commemorating our founding history. 
This resulted in three subcommittees, one to 
conduct research and report on Evans’s role in 
the massacre; another to organize events and 
exhibits related to our institutional history, in 
preparation for the commemorations; and a third 
to review how other universities have engaged in 
similar efforts and consider how to productively 
address troubling historical events as part of an 
educational process within our community. As of 
today, the DU committee consists of eleven faculty 
members, two outside historians, six Sand Creek 
Massacre descendant community representatives, 
and a group of undergraduate, graduate, and 
alumni representatives of the DU Native American 
community. (See http://portfolio.du.edu/evcomm, 
as well as the John Evans Study Committee 
Recommendations document for members list.)
The interdisciplinary research subcommittee 
has produced this report. The umbrella 
group of faculty, students, and Sand Creek 
Massacre descendants has contributed to the 
recommendations. The recommendations are 
based on the findings of the report as well as 
the conversations our entire group had over the 
yearlong sequence of meetings from September 
2013 to October 2014.
Aside from a shared visit to the Sand Creek 
Massacre National Historic Site and related 
historical sites in Denver in August 2013, as well 
as some mutual updates along the way, the two 
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Participation of  Descendant 
Communities
Another unique feature of the University of 
Denver is its historical relationship with the 
United Methodist Church. John Evans, Colonel 
John Chivington, and many of the founding 
board members of the Colorado Seminary were 
ardent Methodists and lay leaders in the church 
in Denver. (Chivington was also a Methodist 
minister.) Since the mid-1990s, the Methodist 
Church has sponsored a series of initiatives aimed 
to increase understanding of the involvement 
of their members in events related to the Sand 
Creek Massacre and the Church’s relationships 
with American Indians more broadly. These 
efforts have resulted in a number of formal 
actions, including an expression of regret at 
the United Methodist General Conference in 
1996; a substantial monetary contribution to 
the National Park Service in 2011, earmarked 
for a research center at the Massacre National 
Historic Site; the commission in September 
2013 of a comprehensive report on the role of 
the United Methodist Church in the Sand Creek 
Massacre, to be released in 2015;6 and a two-
day spiritual pilgrimage and teach-in at the Sand 
Creek Massacre National Historic Site in July 
2014. Furthermore, the Iliff School of Theology, 
a United Methodist Church education institution 
with several graduate programs and a seminary 
component, has also begun inquiries into its 
connection with Sand Creek Massacre history.
Through these substantial institutional 
initiatives, the administration and faculty of Iliff  
 
6  Chris Herlinger, “Methodists express repentance for 
massacre of  Native Americans,” Ecumenical News 
International, May 13, 2011, on PCUSA website. 
https://www.pcusa.org/news/2011/5/13/method-
ists-express-repentance-massacre-native-amer/. Ac-
cessed September 27, 2014; Colleen O’Connor, “Bish-
op Explores role of  United Methodist Church in Sand 
Creek Massacre,” The Denver Post, June 18, 2014. 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25983903/bish-
op-explores-role-united-methodist-church-massacre 
Accessed September 27, 2014.
and the University of Denver, as well as officials 
with the United Methodist Church, have been 
made aware of the importance of including the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho Sand Creek Massacre 
descendant communities in any efforts to 
address or represent this history. The nations 
of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Montana, 
the Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming, and 
the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of 
Oklahoma each have formal representatives who 
are direct descendants of those who perished at 
or survived the massacre. As with any community 
that has survived genocidal campaigns against 
them, Arapaho and Cheyenne descendants have 
vital concerns about how their history, images, 
artifacts, and perspectives are represented by 
outsiders through inquiries, memorials, official 
commemorations, and the like.
When the John Evans Study Committee 
was established at DU, our members supported 
the direct input and involvement of descendant 
representatives in our discussions about how to 
address our institution’s role in these historical 
events, and how to productively move forward. 
(NU’s committee solicited input from the tribes 
in writing, but did not work directly with the 
massacre descendant representatives.) Chancellor 
Coombe and Provost Kvistad agreed that tribal 
consultation was important and provided travel 
funding to enable descendant representatives 
to attend one meeting per quarter during the 
2013-14 academic year. While the tribes were not 
directly involved in the writing of the research 
report, their feedback has been solicited regarding 
the events, activities, and the process of developing 
recommendations for our campus community. In 
short, they have been consistently apprised of our 
efforts every step of the way and their perspectives 
on the process have been valued. The stories they 
have shared of their ancestors’ experiences and 
their perspectives on memory, trauma, and cultural 
persistence have been indispensable to our work.
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The DU Report and its 
Contribution to Increased 
Dialogue and Inclusiveness
After the Northwestern committee released its 
findings in May, the John Evans Study Committee 
at DU decided that the most productive of all 
options was to design our report as a contribution 
that could function in dialogue with the NU 
report, such that interested readers could read the 
two documents side by side and come to their own 
conclusions. We hope that the totality of the two 
reports will generate courageous conversations 
between our two universities that are imperative 
for greater understanding about this chapter in 
our shared history. More importantly, however, we 
hope that from our modest efforts we can forge 
a new relationship with Arapaho and Cheyenne 
people, and Native people in general, that is based 
up on the principles of mutual respect, healing, 
and peace. 
The Northwestern scholars produced a rigorous 
and systematic study of John Evans’s actions as a 
government official during the time surrounding 
the Sand Creek Massacre. The report provides 
a robust analysis of Evans’s responsibilities and 
failures during the critical period and, perhaps 
most significantly, contextualizes his leadership 
in light of the complex array of political and 
economic circumstances, shifting policies, 
relationships with diverse leaders, unpredictable 
events, and cultural factors facing him. In these 
ways the report offers a critical contribution to 
the academic knowledge not just of Colorado 
territorial history and the place of the Sand Creek 
Massacre within it, but also to our understanding 
of U.S.-Native relations7 in the mid-nineteenth  
 
7 Indigenous people in what is now called the United 
States were not granted citizenship until The Indian 
Citizenship Act of  1924, so the term Native-American 
is not quite fitting for the nineteenth century context. 
We mostly use the term Native peoples, Cheyenne and 
Arapaho (for the specific tribes on which we focus), 
tribes, or nations.
century. Contrary to many media accounts, 
the NU report does not “exonerate” Evans, but 
rather identifies many of the key errors, disastrous 
decisions, confusions, and moral lapses, which 
our committee agrees are crucial to understanding 
Evans’s role in Sand Creek Massacre history. We 
are grateful for the hard efforts of our fellow 
scholars.
The DU committee members agree with much 
of the content of the Northwestern report; thus, 
there is no reason to produce a similar account 
of the events covered in their report. Instead, we 
decided to focus our analysis on the reasoning and 
conclusions with which we differ. All efforts to 
understand human history entail interpretations 
of complex information and thereby require 
humility before a task that will necessarily 
produce imperfect results. What matters most is 
whether the research and analysis were conducted 
responsibly and according to the highest standards 
of academic research and scholarly production. 
Even renowned experts can have profound 
disagreements about what the facts of a given 
event reveal. Our overall assessment is that while 
many of the NU report’s major conclusions point 
to Evans’s culpability in the massacre, they stop 
short of directly stating as much and, indeed, leave 
openings through which ambiguous conclusions 
are made possible. We believe that further close 
analysis of Evans’s duties as Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, of events in 1863-64 in which he 
was the primary decision maker, and a comparison 
of his and adjacent territorial executives’ leadership 
reveal more distinctly the unfortunate nature of his 
failings and ultimate culpability. 
As will be evident, we do not argue that 
Evans co-conspired with Colonel Chivington 
to massacre the Arapaho and Cheyenne bands 
camped outside Fort Lyon in 1864, nor that he 
anticipated what would eventually happen. No 
known evidence exists to suggest this. However, 
given the responsibilities, power, and influence 
Evans had in the offices and positions he held, 
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culpability for the fact that the massacre occurred 
does not depend upon his having direct knowledge 
of the military plans or having had to order the 
assault directly. The federal investigations into the 
Sand Creek Massacre came to similar conclusions 
in 1865, less than a year following the event. After 
careful review of the archives, our assessment does 
not differ greatly from theirs, though hopefully 
we have provided a deeper degree of analysis and a 
more nuanced understanding of the cultural, social 
and historical contexts out of which the Sand 
Creek massacre materialized.
If both university committees accomplished 
their tasks, these reports will raise more questions 
for consideration than either can possibly hope to 
answer. The story of the Sand Creek Massacre goes 
far beyond any single individual or group who may 
be responsible in one way or another. Although the 
Sand Creek Massacre is unique in ways all of us 
must understand, it is only one among dozens of 
other massacres perpetrated against Native peoples 
by American settlers over the centuries, which 
were justified by many, according to the driving 
imperatives of progress and civilization that took 
the form of Manifest Destiny. These events as well 
as less directly violent forms of attack, removal, 
and erasure of indigenous peoples in the United 
States and other nations settled by Europeans are 
reflective of a worldview and attendant policies 
that were systematically instituted to diminish 
the ways of life of another. In the context of this 
deeply fraught history—the larger history with 
which all Americans born of settler generations 
must contend, because we have benefitted directly 
and indirectly from it—John Evans was no 
more to blame than many other leaders who saw 
no place for Native people to be integrated in 
American culture. But as the leader who founded 
our universities and who played a pivotal role 
with regard to this massacre, we must face our 
responsibility to the past so that an understanding 
of the totality of our shared history (and not just 
the best and brightest of Evans’s contributions) 
can lead us to a better and more inclusive 
understanding of the past and present by which we 
can actualize a more just future.
The Sand Creek Massacre   1 
Massacre At Sand Creek
The United States government has never denied 
responsibility for the massacre committed by 
U.S. Volunteer troops on peaceful Cheyenne and 
Arapaho encamped at Sand Creek, Colorado 
Territory, on November 29, 1864. By Article 6 of 
the Treaty of the Little Arkansas, negotiated on 
October 14, 1865, ratified May 22, 1866, and 
proclaimed February 2, 1867:
The United States being desirous to express its 
condemnation of, and, as far As may be, repudiate 
the gross and wanton out-rages perpetrated against 
certain Bands of Cheyenne and Arrapahoe Indians, 
on the twenty-ninth day of November, A.D. 1864, 
at Sand Creek, in Colorado Territory, while the said 
Indians were at peace with the United States, and 
under its flag, whose Protection they had by lawful 
authority been promised and induced to seek, and 
the Government being desirous to make some suit-
able reparation for the injuries then done, will grant 
three hundred and twenty acres of land by patent to 
each of the following-named chiefs of said bands, 
viz: Moke-ta-to, or Black Kettle; Oh-tah-ha-ne-so-
weel, or Seven Bulls; Alik-ke-home-ma, or Little 
Robe; Moke-tah-vo-ve-hoe, or Black White Man; 
and will in like manner grant to each other person 
or said bands made a widow, or who lost a parent 
upon that occasion, one hundred and sixty acres of 
land, the names of such persons to be ascertained 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior; 
Provided, That said grants shall be conditioned that 
all devises, grants, alienations, leases, and contracts 
relative to said lands, made or entered into during 
the period of fifty years from the date of such pat-
ents, shall be unlawful and void. Said lands shall be 
selected under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior within the limits of country hereby set apart 
as a reservation for the Indians parties to this treaty, 
and shall be free from assessment and taxation so 
long as they remain inalienable. The United States 
will also pay in United States securities, animals, 
goods, provisions, or such other useful articles as 
may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interi-
or, be deemed best adapted to the respective wants 
and conditions of the persons named in the schedule 
hereto annexed, they being present and members of 
the bands who suffered at Sand Creek, upon the oc-
casion aforesaid, the sums set opposite their names, 
respectively, as a compensation for property belong-
ing to them, and then and there destroyed or taken 
from them by the United States troops aforesaid.1
1 Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 
vol II, Treaties, “Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, 
1865” (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 
1904): 889.
Treaty of Little Arkansas River, October 14, 1865 (Ratified Indi-
an Treaties #341, 14 STAT 703) between the U.S. and Arapahoe 
and Cheyenne Indians (Black Kettle Band) granting lands in 
reparation for the Sand Creek Massacre, November 29, 1864., 
11/29/1864 - 10/14/1865  |  research.archives.gov
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At the treaty camp on the Little Arkansas, 
October 12, 1865, General J.B. Sanborn, 
president of the peace commission addressed the 
assembled chiefs in that condescending language 
that always infuriated Indian leaders: 
Chiefs and headmen of the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
nations: I desire, as president of this commission, 
to express our gratification in meeting you in a 
friendly manner at this time. Your Great Father 
at Washington has heard bad rumors concerning 
your treatment. He has chosen and appointed us 
as his representatives to come and confer with you 
as to your condition in future. From rumors that 
have reached his ears, he has become satisfied that 
great wrongs have been committed without his 
knowledge at the time. He has heard that you have 
been attacked by his soldiers, while you have been 
at peace with his government; that by this you 
have met great losses in lives and property, and by 
this you have been forced to make war. All this he 
disapproves of, and the people of the whole nation 
agree with him. He has sent out his commissioners 
to make reparation as far as we can, to make good 
this bad treatment; also to establish terms of peace 
in future, by which you can live in the future in 
peace with all the whites. We wish, therefore, in the 
first instance, to agree that we may always live in 
peace. We are willing, as representatives  of the Presi-
dent, to restore all the property lost at Sand Creek, 
or its value. So heartily do we repudiate the actions 
of our soldiers, that we are willing to give to the 
chiefs in their own right three hundred and twenty 
acres of land, to hold as his own forever, and to each 
of the children and squaws, who lost husbands or 
parents, we are also willing to give one hundred and 
sixty acres of land, as their own, to keep as long as 
they live. We are also willing that they receive all 
money and annuities that are due them, although 
they have been at war with the United States. We 
have come to do that which will result in their great 
good. Our nation has become great and our people 
are as numerous as the stars. We all feel disgraced 
and ashamed when we see our officers or soldiers 
oppressing the weak, or making war on those that 
are at peace with us.2
In addition to the Treaty of the Little 
Arkansas, two congressional committees and a 
military commission investigated Sand Creek and 
pronounced it an unprovoked massacre of mostly 
women, children, babies, and the elderly.3 The 
powerful Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the [Civil] War, chaired by Sen. Benjamin Wade, 
acknowledged that the Cheyennes and Arapahos 
gathered at Sand Creek were under the protection 
of the U.S. flag, and that when the soldiers 
attacked Cheyenne chief Black Kettle “ran up to 
the top of his lodge an American flag. . .with a 
small white flag under it, as he had been advised 
to in case he met with any troops on the prairie.”4
Yet the troops attacked: “From the sucking 
babe to the old warrior, all who were overtaken 
were deliberately murdered. Not content with 
killing women and children, who were incapable 
of offering any resistance, the soldiers indulged in 
acts of barbarity of the most revolting character; 
such, it is hoped, as never before disgraced the acts 
of men claiming to be civilized.”5 The committee 
concluded that “for the purpose of vindicating the 
cause of justice and upholding the honor of the 
nation, prompt and energetic measure should be at 
once taken to remove from office those who have 
thus disgraced the government by whom they are 
employed, and to punish, as their crimes deserve, 
those who have been guilty of these brutal and 
cowardly acts.”6  
 
2 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 
1865 (Washington: Government Printing Office): 517.
3 For a convenient compilation of  these investigations, 
see John M. Carroll, The Sand Creek Massacre: A Docu-
mentary History (New York: Sol Lewis, 1973).
4 Senate Report No. 142, “Massacre of  Cheyenne 
Indians,” 38th Cong., 2nd Session, Report of the Joint 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, 3 vols, Washing-
ton D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1865 in Carroll, 
The Sand Creek Massacre, 5.
5 Ibid., 5-6.
6 Ibid., 8.
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Most recently, in September 2014, in a decision 
rendered by Justice Philip A. Brimmer in the 
United States District Court For the District of 
Colorado, the United States, the Department 
of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
acknowledged that “in all of American history 
there is no episode more contemptible nor more 
abhorrent than the depredations of the United 
States cavalry on the banks of Sand Creek in 
Colorado Territory during the early morning hours 
of November 29, 1864. The Sand Creek Massacre 
was a tragedy and a disgrace.”7
Strong words, certainly. Yet, the reparations 
promised by the Treaty of the Little Arkansas 
remain unpaid. Today, Sand Creek remains an 
open wound for the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
peoples. Since 1999, the Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe of Montana, the Northern Arapaho Tribe 
of Wyoming, and the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
Tribes of Oklahoma participate in the Sand Creek 
Massacre Spiritual Healing Run/Walk, a running 
relay from the Sand Creek Massacre National  
 
7 Civil Action No. 13-cv-01836-PAB-CBS in the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado, by Judge 
Philip A. Brimmer, September 4, 2014.
Historic Site, near Eads, Colorado, to the west 
capitol steps in Denver, a distance of 187 miles 
that approximates the route taken by the plunder-
laden soldiers on their return to Denver following 
the massacre.
To fully understand the culpability of 
Territorial Governor John Evans it is necessary to 
know what happened on November 29, 1864.
November 29, 1864
The day dawned clear and cold. The encampment 
of about 750 Cheyennes and Arapahos spread 
out in family and clan groups along the east bank 
of the Big Sandy—Sand Creek to history.8 This 
was a chiefs’ camp. Present were at least fourteen 
chiefs of the Cheyenne Council of Forty-Four, 
the governing body of the Cheyenne nation, but 
with sub-chiefs and society headmen, the total of 
Cheyenne leaders present in the village probably 
reached over thirty. In addition, two Arapaho 
chiefs with their bands had joined the Cheyennes. 
Because it was a chiefs’ camp, very few men of 
fighting age were in the village, certainly not over 
two hundred. Women and children, orphans and 
the elderly—these attached themselves to the 
chiefs, who, as chiefs always did, provided them 
food and protection.
The village was already alive. Women moved 
over cook-fires and fed their babies, boys tended 
the large pony herds grazing to the west and south 
of the village, girls sought fresh water and wood, 
men looked after their favored split-eared ponies 
hobbled near their lodges or busied themselves 
with daily ceremonial rituals, still others slept 
in their buffalo robes. Although attacks from 
traditional enemies always threatened, no one 
expected an attack from the U.S. army. Weeks 
earlier Cheyenne council chief Black Kettle and 
Arapaho chief Left Hand had negotiated a truce  
 
8 George E. Hyde to George Bird Grinnell, 11/10/1914, 
1/22/1915 [enclosure], Folder 51A, George Bird Grinnell 
Papers, Southwest Museum [now housed at the Autry 
Museum of  Western History].
Following orders  |  Original painting, Brent Learned, Cheyenne 
and Arapaho descendant.
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arrangement with Major Edward W. Wynkoop 
and his replacement, Major Scott J. Anthony, 
commanders at nearby Fort Lyon. Anthony told 
them “they might go back on Sand Creek…and 
remain there until I received instructions from the 
department headquarters, from General Curtis…
They went away with that understanding, that 
in case I received instructions from department 
headquarters I was to let them know it.”9 Sand 
Creek was a safe place.
Then, suddenly, between first light and 
daybreak, came a heavy rumbling sound. Some 
women joyously cried out, “Buffalo!”, for the 
camp badly needed fresh meat. Buffalo had not be 
sighted or hunted for weeks, not since the village 
had moved over from the Smoky Hill River to 
the bleak, sandy plains of Sand Creek; and the 
“prisoner rations,” issued by the army earlier, never 
more than moldy hardtack and wormy bacon, had 
long run out. 
But quickly the people identified the sound 
as approaching horse soldiers. Rifle fire cracked. 
Panic erupted as women, children, mothers with 
babes in arms, the old and infirm began to flee 
northward upstream away from the charging 
9 Carroll, Massacre of Cheyenne Indians, 4-5.
troopers. In the middle of the encampment, Chief 
Black Kettle raised an American flag, a white 
cloth beneath it, shouting for the people not to 
be afraid. A small group gathered around him, 
but as the firing increased it was plain the soldiers 
had come not in peace but to kill them. Men of 
fighting age scrambled for their weapons, a few 
rifles and pistols, but mostly bows and arrows, 
shields, and lances. Little Bear, a twenty-year-old 
Cheyenne, had been out to the herds looking 
for his horses when he heard the firing. As he 
ran back toward the village, he saw “a long black 
line” of soldiers. He heard women and children 
screaming, saw them running up the creek bed, 
saw many falling, some stopping and frantically 
digging pits into the banks and bed of Sand 
Creek. When he finally reached the encampment, 
bullets were striking all around him; those that hit 
against the buffalo-hide lodges sounded like “like 
hail stones.” He managed to reach his own lodge, 
where “I found my War Bonnet, shield and my 
quiver full of arrows.” Then he joined the crowds 
running up the creek, trying to run behind the 
lodges “as much as I could so the soldiers couldn’t 
shoot at me good.” But even so, “the feathers of 
my war bonnet were shot away and my shield 
was shot several times. As I was running I seen 
lots of women and children that had been killed 
[and] some were not dead yet.” Soldiers already 
had broken ranks, and some stood “over the 
dead, I suppose scalping them. I came across Owl 
Woman10 that had been scalped and was walking 
around but could not see. She had very long hair. 
The whole scalp had been taken.”11 
The troops then opened up with four 
12-pounder mountain howitzers, fearful weapons 
that fired spherical case shot, hollow iron balls 
filled with lead musket balls and a bursting charge 
10 Not to be confused with the first wife of  trader William 
Bent, builder of  Bent’s Fort.
11 George Bent to George E. Hyde, 4/14/1906, George 
Bent Letters, Coe Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale 
University.
A typical Arapaho campsite  |  Denver Public Library
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Let Me Try The Son Of A Bitch, I CAN HIT HIM!!  |  Original artwork, George Curtis Levi, S. Cheyenne and Arapaho descendant.
of gunpowder.12 Taking aim at the fleeing women 
and children, the artillerymen fired the balls 
directly above their targets, showering death below. 
Only the hastily dug pits against the banks and in 
the dry creek offered any semblance of protection. 
But these quickly became death traps. Women 
with babes and the elderly who could not run far 
began digging just yards from the village itself, easy 
targets for musketry and canister—tin cans filled 
with more than a hundred lead musket balls. 
Meanwhile, seventeen of the thirty chiefs in the 
camp already had been gunned or shelled down. 
Cheyenne chief White Antelope, age seventy-five, 
was the first to fall. At opening fire, he advanced 
unarmed toward the troops making peace signs, 
12 For a full description of  the 12-pounder mountain 
howitzer see Ordnance Manual for the Use of the Officers 
of the United States Army, 1860 (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott & Co., 1860), passim.
his arms outstretched, and then began singing his 
death song:
Nothing Lives forever, 
Only the Earth and the Mountains13
Ignoring his obvious peaceful intent, a band 
of soldiers let loose a deafening volley. White 
Antelope, a chief who had visited Washington, 
D.C., in 1851, where he received a peace medal 
and ever after had sought accommodation with 
13 Translation by George Bent. Other translations are: 
“Nothing Lives Long Except the Mountains and the 
Earth”; and “Death is upon us and Nothing Exists but 
the Rocks and the Mountains.” See Jeff  C. Campbell 
(Interpretive Division Sand Creek National Historic 
Site), “An Informational Pamphlet with Facts and 
Baseline Information about the Sand Creek Massacre 
National Historic Site for the 150th year of  Commem-
oration,” May 4, 2014, Sand Creek Massacre National 
Historic Site Headquarters, Eads, Colorado. 
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encroaching settler colonists,14 fell dead. Troopers 
immediately set upon his body, stripping him, 
then slashing off his private parts.15
The attackers now resembled more a mob 
than an organized body of troops. They were in 
fact soldiers of the 1st and 3rd regiments of U.S. 
Colorado Volunteers. The 250 men of the 1st 
Regiment were seasoned veterans who had signed 
on for three-year enlistments. Most of them had 
fought at the decisive 1862 Battle of Glorieta Pass, 
just south of Santa Fe, New Mexico Territory, an 
engagement that halted a Confederate advance 
on the Colorado goldfields. These men were well 
trained and well equipped. 
But the 425 men of the 3rd Regiment were 
not. The War Department had only authorized 
the unit on August 11, 1864, and it had done so 
only at the shrill urgings of Colorado territorial 
governor John Evans. As early as April 1863, Evans 
had convinced himself that the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho were conspiring with the Sioux and other 
plains tribes to open a general war against  
 
14 A “settler-colonial society” describes a political order 
based on a particular (usually European) definition of  
sovereignty that serves a population of  immigrants 
who plan to stay in the land they have entered. Within 
settler colonialism, immigrant values and rights 
are superimposed over those of  existing indigenous 
communities. Settler colonial societies are distinct 
from colonialism in that they do not merely exploit 
the natural and human resources of  an area under 
a territorial administration, but rather aim for the 
ultimate disappearance of  indigenous cultures as part 
of  the new immigrant political order. However, it may 
be intertwined with colonial administrations. Settler 
colonialism is a global phenomenon of  both past and 
present. See Edward Cavanaugh and Lorenzo Veracini, 
“Editors Statement,” Settler Colonial Studies Vol. 3:1, 1.
15 George Bent to George E. Hyde, 4/25/1906, George 
Bent Letters, Coe Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale 
University; Robert Bent sworn statement [n.d.] Carroll, 
Sand Creek Massacre, 185. See also George E. Hyde, 
Life of George Bent Written from his Letters, Savoie Lot-
tinville, ed. (Norman: University of  Oklahoma Press, 
1968), 55; and George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting 
Cheyennes (Norman: University of  Oklahoma Press, 
1956; originally published 1915), 172.
Colorado settlers. Writing to William P. Dole, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, 
D.C., Evans made plain his conviction—and 
hysteria: “I beseech you, in the name of humanity, 
and of our dearest interests, to give us authority to 
avert this threatened repetition of the Minnesota 
War, it may be, on a larger and more destructive 
scale.”16 Evans had continued to shotgun similar 
letters to army and civilian officials for well over 
a year, all proclaiming the existence of a general 
Indian war, and all calling for a military solution.17 
Evans finally received his authorization for the 
3rd Regiment, but the term of enlistment was only 
for 100 days, prompting the Rocky Mountain 
News to hail the 3rd as the “Hundredazers.”18 
And some “Hundredazers” had received almost no 
training; instead, they lay about Denver and other 
places unsupervised, waiting for equipment and 
commanding officers to appear.19
Now they were in the field at Sand Creek, 
killing everyone they ran across, obeying the 
orders of their commanding officer Col. John 
M. Chivington to take no prisoners.20 From the 
opening of the attack, all command and control 
had been lost. Men fought in groups, each on its 
own hook.21 Robert Bent, the mixed  
blood son of William Bent and his Cheyenne 
wife Owl Woman, had been forced to guide 
16 Evans released for publication his correspondence 
with various officials. See Rocky Mountain News, August 
25, 1864. 
17 See Gary L. Roberts, “Sand Creek: Tragedy and 
Symbol” (Ph.D. diss., University of  Oklahoma, 1984), 
173-298.
18 See for example, Rocky Mountain News, August 24, 
1864.
19 Raymond G. Carey, “The ‘Bloodless Third’ Regiment, 
Colorado Volunteer Cavalry,” Colorado Magazine, 38 
(October 1961), 275-300.
20 See Chivington’s second Sand Creek report dated 
12/16/1864 in Carroll, The Sand Creek Massacre, 55.
21 Capt. Silas S. Soule sworn statement, 2/20/1865 in 
Carroll, The Sand Creek Massacre, 212, 214.
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Chivington and his command to Sand Creek.22 
Sitting his horse next to Chivington, Bent saw 
unspeakable atrocities everywhere he looked. 
When a gathering of Thirdsters approached five 
women who had taken shelter in a pit, the women 
“showed their persons to let the soldiers know 
they were women and begged for mercy, but the 
soldiers shot them all.”23 He saw another group 
of thirty or forty women, who had collected in a 
pit, send out a six-year-old girl with a white flag. 
She had just climbed out of the pit when she was  
 
22 F.W. Cragin to George Bent, 9/23/1910, F.W. Cragin 
Notebooks, Denver Public Library, Western History 
Department.
23 Robert Bent sworn statement, [n.d.], in Carroll, The 
Sand Creek Massacre, 185.
shot and killed. Then the troops advanced 
on the women—who were not armed—
and killed them all. He saw a little girl 
about five years of age, whose mother 
had hidden her in the sand, discovered by 
two soldiers, who drew their pistols and 
shot her. He saw the body of Chief White 
Antelope with the privates cut off and 
heard a soldier say “he was going to make 
a tobacco-pouch out of them.”24 
The killing frenzy moved upstream, 
pit by pit, until the soldiers encountered 
larger pits against the high banks some 
two miles above the village. Here, 
determined warriors fought desperately 
to protect the women and children who 
had thus far managed to escape the 
carnage. But they fought with bows and 
arrows against an enemy armed with rifles 
and cannon. And they fought against 
impossible odds, ten to one in some 
instances. George Bent, another son of 
William Bent and Owl Woman, was in  
one of these pits with a family group of 
twenty Cheyennes. The father of one of 
the girls heard the cannon fire and warned 
that the pit was now a death trap and they 
should find a safer place. Bent agreed and 
with two others jumped out, suffering a gunshot 
wound to his hip, but he managed to clamor over 
to a larger hole that offered better protection. As 
he looked back toward the pit he had just vacated, 
he saw those who remained killed by point-blank 
canister fire.25 
The killing went on for nine hours. When 
darkness fell, over two hundred Cheyennes and 
24 Ibid.
25 George Bent to Samuel F. Tappan, 2/23/1889, Samuel 
F. Tappan Papers, History Colorado; Bent to George 
E. Hyde, 3/15/1905, 4/30/1913, George Bent Letters, 
Coe Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale. See also, David 
Fridtjof  Halaas and Andrew E. Masich, Halfbreed: 
The Remarkable True Story of George Bent (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 143-153.
I Will See You Soon  |  Original painting, Brent Learned, Cheyenne and 
Arapaho descendant.
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Arapahos lay dead, and a like number wounded.26 
The soldiers spent the night in the village, while 
the surviving Cheyennes and Arapahos suffered 
terribly from the cold as they moved toward the 
Smoky Hill villages some fifty miles away. Bent 
remembered that night as the worst night he 
ever went through. “Most of us were wounded 
and half naked; even those who had had time to 
dress when the attack came, had lost their buffalo 
robes and blankets during the fight. The men 
and women who were not wounded worked all 
through the night, trying to keep the children and 
the wounded from freezing to death.”27 When the 
survivors reached the Smoky Hill and rode into 
camp, “everyone was crying, even the warriors and 
the women and children screaming and wailing. 
Nearly everyone present had lost some relations or 
friends, many of them in their grief were gashing 
themselves with their knives until the blood flowed 
in streams.”28
Chivington and the troops returned to Denver 
on December 22, 1864, to a hero’s welcome. 
As the “bold sojer boys” paraded through the 
streets, tumultuous crowds jammed the sidewalks, 
cheering and saluting their boys in blue for their 
great victorious battle.29 A week later, the Denver 
Theater presented a play in front of a “full and 
fashionable audience,” featuring “novel trappings, 
trophies of the big fight at Sand Creek.”30 But on 
the same day, the Rocky Mountain News carried 
a small clip, dated Washington, D.C., December 
28: “The affair at Fort Lyon, Colorado, in which 
Colonel Chivington destroyed a large Indian 
village, and all its inhabitants, is to be made the  
 
26 http://www.nps.gov/sand/historyculture/index.htm 
27 Hyde, Life of George Bent, 157-158; Grinnell, Fighting 
Cheyennes, 179-180; George Bent to George E. Hyde, 
12/21/1905, George Bent Letters, Coe Collection, 
Beinecke Library, Yale.
28 Hyde, The Life of George Bent, 158-159; Bent to Hyde, 
12/21/1905, George Bent Letters, Coe Collection, 
Beinecke Library, Yale. 
29 Rocky Mountain News, December 22, 1864.
30 Ibid., December 29, 1864.
subject of Congressional investigation. Letters 
received from high officials in Colorado say that 
the Indians were killed after surrendering, and 
that a large proportion of them were women and 
children.”31
In fact, the letters from “high officials” were 
written by two company commanders of the 1st 
Regiment, Capt. Silas S. Soule and Lt. Joseph A. 
Cramer. Both officers were present at Sand Creek; 
both ordered their companies to stand down and 
not fire; and both were so outraged by what they 
witnessed that they wrote impassioned letters 
to their commanding officer, Maj.Edward E. 
Wynkoop, which described Sand Creek not as a 
battle, but as a massacre of defenseless women and 
children. They meant for Wynkoop to circulate 
their letters with officials in Washington, so they 
made copies. They wanted Chivington punished, 
and they wanted the nation to know that what 
actually occurred on November 29 at Sand Creek 
was murder. Soule wrote his letter only two weeks  
 
31 Ibid.
Captain Silas Soule  |  Undated photograph. Anne E. Hemphill 
Collection
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after the massacre. He said he refused to fire 
“and none but a coward would, for by this time 
hundreds of women and children were coming 
towards us, and getting on their knees for mercy.” 
He wrote that the “massacre lasted six or eight 
hours” and that it was hard “to see little children 
on their knees, have their brains beat out by men 
professing to be civilized.” He saw “two Indians 
[take] hold of one another’s hands, chased until 
they were exhausted, when they kneeled down, 
and clasped each other around the neck and were 
both shot together, they were all scalped, and as 
high as half a dozen taken from one head. They 
were all horribly mutilated. One woman was cut 
open, and a child taken out of her, and scalped.”32
Cramer wrote his letter four days after Soule’s 
on December 19, 1864. He opened it by declaring 
that he was ashamed of being at Sand Creek, of 
being a part of it, for he witnessed atrocities there  
 
32 Gary L. Roberts and David Fridtjof  Halaas, “Written 
in Blood: The Soule-Cramer Sand Creek Massacre 
Letters,” in Steve Grinstead and Ben Fogelberg, eds., 
Western Voices: 125 Years of Western Writing/Colorado 
Historical Society (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 
2004), 325-326. The letters are reproduced in full.
that he hoped he would “never see again. [Men], 
women and children were scalped, fingers cut off 
to get the rings on them…a [woman] ripped open 
and a child taken from her, little children shot, 
while begging for their lives, women shot while on 
their knees, and with their arms around soldiers a 
begging for their lives… ” He ended his letter by 
pleading with Wynkoop to keep Chivington from 
being promoted to brigadier general “which he 
[Chivington] expects.”33
Wynkoop circulated the Soule-Cramer letters 
in Washington among leading political officials. 
They had immediate and decisive impact. As stated 
earlier, the powerful Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the [Civil] War, the Joint Committee 
on the Conduct of the Tribes, and an army 
commission all initiated hearings, and all came to 
the same conclusion: Sand Creek was a massacre 
of Indians who were under the protection of the 
U.S. government. As we will see, the commissions 
did not have kind words for Evans and in the end 
he lost his governorship over it, though he was 
never prosecuted. Both Soule and Cramer testified 
at these hearings, repeating the descriptions of 
Sand Creek they had detailed in their letters. Soule 
appeared before the military commission as its 
first witness, followed by Cramer. On April 23, 
1865, two months after his testimony while acting 
as Denver Provost Marshal, Capt. Silas Soule was 
gunned down by two blue-clad soldiers. Though 
known, his two killers were never brought to 
justice.
After the congressional committees and the 
Judge Advocate General’s Office released their 
reports, the Soule-Cramer letters, which had 
initiated the investigations, disappeared to history. 
Historians had no idea of their content.
But 136 years later, in the year 2000, just 
when the bill to create the Sand Creek Massacre 
National Historic Site was stalled in committee,  
 
33 Ibid., 329-330.
Who’s the Real Savage  |  Original painting, Brent Learned. Used 
with permission of  the artist.
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the letters reappeared. A Colorado citizen 
brought an old trunk found in her attic to the 
Colorado Historical Society, where the letters were 
discovered within a sheaf of nineteenth-century 
documents. U.S. Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell 
read portions of the letters before the Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic 
Preservation, and Recreation and entered their 
full contents into the Congressional Record. The 
impact was immediate. Newspapers across the 




Rocky Mountain News, ran front-page stories on 
the Sand Creek letters. On November 7, 2000, 
President William Jefferson Clinton signed Public 
Law 106-465 creating the Sand Creek Massacre 
National Historic Site.34
The Sand Creek Massacre National Historic 
Site is the only unit of the National Park Service 
that commemorates a site of shame for the United 
States government. It unequivocally declares Sand 
Creek a massacre. It exits to teach the public the 
awful and lasting effects of genocide committed on 
peoples struggling to preserve their freedom and 
way of life. 
34  Ibid., 336.
Sand Creek Massacre site overlook.   |  Original photograph by Paula Bard.
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Introduction
John Evans was not a witness to the Sand Creek 
Massacre. When the Cheyenne and Arapaho men, 
women, and children camped at the bend of Big 
Sandy that November morning were murdered 
and then mutilated by Chivington’s men, Evans 
was in Washington, D.C. on official business. 
Commenting to the editor of a Methodist journal 
a few days before the news of the massacre 
broke, the governor said he believed all Indians 
in Colorado were hostile to settlers, except “that 
one little band of friendlies down at Fort Lyon” 
which was “faithful to the government.”1 Evans 
personally knew that Black Kettle and White 
Antelope’s people were acting in abidance of his 
instructions to all “peaceful Indians” to report to 
military outposts such as Fort Lyon; indeed he had 
directed them there after they and several others 
had attempted, unsuccessfully, to broker a peace 
agreement with him in late September of 1864. 
Though he was well aware of Colonel John 
Chivington’s tendencies toward free-lance 
campaigns and hair-trigger violence, from what 
we know Evans did not suspect Chivington would 
have turned his forces on that particular village. 
Chivington’s stated plan, in consultation with other 
Colorado military officials, had been to lead a 
campaign against the villages of so-called “hostiles” 
on the Smoky Hill and Republican 
rivers further east. Instead, Chivington and his 
troops nearly disappeared two weeks prior to the 
massacre, and did not move on the village near  
 
1  Gary Roberts, “Thoughts on Evans and Sand Creek,” 
Appendix C, 31. Evans had also communicated to 
Agent Colley after the Camp Weld Council that these 
Indians had “surrendered,” and noted in his superin-
tendent’s report that the leaders were “earnest in their 
peace.” Northwestern Report, 86.
Fort Lyon until the last possible moment. Working 
in utmost secrecy, Chivington concealed his 
intentions from the generals and other superior 
officers, and even deceived the outpost commander 
Major Scott Anthony on the details of his planned 
attack until the last moment. His own troops were 
not told whom they would be attacking until the 
night before.2
In these ways and others, the Sand Creek 
Massacre was a result of John Chivington’s design 
and execution. It was a product of elaborate 
planning on the one hand, and his refusal to 
set any moral or ethical parameters on the 
comportment of the undertrained, undisciplined 
volunteer troops that made up the 3rd Regiment. 
While Evans never condemned the massacre—
indeed, with decades of hindsight he explicitly 
2  Roberts, Dissertation, 446.
Territorial Governor John Evans, circa 1860-1870   
|  Colorado State Archives
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defended it in 1889 as having had a “very great 
benefit” to Colorado in the long-run—he did try 
to maintain plausible deniability for “what they 
call Chivington’s massacre” for the remainder of his 
life.3  
With an unrepentant Chivington as the 
admitted orchestrator of the massacre and Evans 
having been absent and unaware of the details, 
the story of Evans’s role in the events leading up 
to the attack has survived to the present primarily 
as a set of muted annotations, as if his leadership 
was only peripheral to this catastrophic episode 
of settler colonial violence. Even in the report 
on the topic by Northwestern University, based 
upon their careful contextual study of Evans’s 
decisions and actions, the governor emerges as 
inept, “simplistic,” “uncomprehending,” “hostile to 
Indians,” “reprehensibly obtuse and self-interested,” 
an official who committed deep “moral failure[s]” 
and who exhibited “deplorable” behavior, “even 
by the standards of his time.” While this is hardly 
an exoneration of Evans, they do not find him 
culpable for the massacre, at least not according 
to a narrowly-defined culpability (as knowing 
about, premeditating, or conspiring to execute a 
massacre).4
The research assembled here maintains that 
this evaluation is simply inadequate. We can only 
discharge the recognition of culpability if we fail 
to understand the specific responsibilities, power, 
and influence John Evans held as the highest-
ranking civil authority in Colorado Territory in 
3 “So the benefit to Colorado, of  that massacre, as they 
call it, was very great, for it ridded the plains of  the 
Indians, for there was a sentiment that the Indians 
ought not to be left in the midst of  the community.  It 
relieved us very much of  the roaming tribes of  Indi-
ans.” Bancroft Interview, 1884, 21-22.
4 The closest the Report comes is this statement in 
the third conclusion in Chapter Six: “Regardless of  
Evans’s degree of  culpability in failing to make every 
possible effort to protect the Cheyennes and Arapahos 
when they were most vulnerable, his response to the 
Sand Creek Massacre was reprehensibly obtuse and 
self-interested. His recollections of  the event displayed 
complete indifference to the suffering inflicted on 
Cheyennes and Arapahos.” Northwestern Report, 90.
1864. Certainly, there are aspects of this story for 
which John Evans cannot in fairness be accused: 
there is no evidence that he co-conspired with 
Chivington to carry out the attack; he cannot be 
attributed responsibility for the specific atrocities 
that occurred at the hands of Chivington’s troops; 
he was not the only powerful official that shared 
responsibility for the decisions and actions 
preceding the massacre; and he did not ascribe to 
what at the time was called an exterminationist 
policy in regards to the so-called “Indian problem” 
(to which Chivington, for all intents and purposes 
did ascribe)—that is, a willingness to systematically 
hunt down and murder Native peoples, “little 
and big” as Chivington said, wherever they were 
encountered.5 However, there are critical elements 
of this history anchored uniquely and directly 
in Evans’s positions, decisions, and actions as 
governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and 
it would be imprudent and irresponsible not to 
address those facts squarely. 
According to our analysis, Evans bears serious 
culpability for the Sand Creek Massacre having 
occurred. This is true for at least the following four 
reasons, which will be elaborated upon in the pages 
that follow. On their own, none of these amounts 
to culpability, but their combination under the 
conditions in Colorado Territory in 1863 and 
1864 supports a strong case for a culpability 
different in character but equal in degree to that of 
John Chivington. 
Abrogation of  Duties as 
Superintendent
Whether as a product of his worldview or because 
he was simply ill equipped for the position, Evans 
did not respond seriously enough his mandate 
from Indian Commissioner Dole to negotiate a 
treaty of peace with the Cheyenne and Arapaho. 
As superintendent, he repeatedly made decisions or 
failed to resolve problems in ways that amounted 
to letting the Native people, whose rights he was  
 
5  Roberts, “Thoughts,” p. 26.
Introduction   13 
legally obligated to protect, fend for themselves 
against settler-colonists and the military intruding 
on what was, by previous occupancy and American 
law, their land. Under dangerous conditions, Evans 
exerted grossly insufficient legal enforcement of 
claims on behalf of the tribes and largely ignored 
their complaints, thereby contributing to the  
acceleration in conflict. Compared with 
neighboring superintendents working under 
similar or even more challenging conditions, 
Evans delayed, evaded, and blamed his Native 
constituents, while his counterparts in Nevada 
and Utah successfully negotiated treaties with the 
Native populations and averted the escalation of 
violence. When faced with a last desperate attempt 
by leaders from those nations to make a peace 
that might have changed the trajectory of events, 
Evans blamed and rebuffed them, and arbitrarily, 
without sufficient cause, passed off his authority 
to the military. This pattern of irresponsible 
leadership amounted to dereliction of his duties as 
superintendent.
Advocacy of  War over Peace 
From late 1863 onward, when faced repeatedly 
with the opportunity to allay settler colonists’ 
fears of Native people and agitations for war, 
Evans instead chose escalation and panic. His 
consistent conjectures of war and lobbying for 
the use of military force were far out of bounds 
with regard to his duties as superintendent, and 
irresponsible exercises of his civic influence as 
governor. Evans’s two proclamations in June 
and August 1864 represent effective declarations 
of war (an authority he did not have), which 
acted to inflame settler passions and put peace-
seeking Native leaders in a dangerously untenable 
position. Neither proclamation defined criteria 
for differentiating so-called “hostile Indians” from 
“friendly” ones; and the caveats provided, urging 
that attacks on “friendly Indians” be avoided, were 
grossly inadequate to the conditions that prevailed 
in the Territory by summer 1864. The second 
proclamation explicitly endorsed and proposed to 
finance vigilante citizen violence against Native 
peoples without regard to gender or age. These 
proclamations were anomalous in comparison 
with the policies of other governors. Moreover, 
as directives issuing from the governor’s office 
they cannot but have influenced the attitudes of 
the untrained volunteers who enlisted in the 3rd 
Regiment, a force raised explicitly to “kill Indians.” 
Even early on and when there was evidence to the 
contrary, Evans was attached to the idea that a 
general Indian war was on its way, and his reactions 
to this terrifying specter created an environment in 
which it became likely.
Authorization for the 3rd 
Regiment
Evans singlehandedly agitated federal officials, 
primarily Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 
for the authority to raise the federal one hundred-
day unit, with the stated purpose of making war 
on Native peoples. Without the 3rd Regiment, 
John Chivington could not have attacked the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho camped at Sand Creek. 
Although Evans lacked the authority to authorize 
or command the 3rd, he was transparent about 
his intentions for it: he sought an attack on Native 
peoples in winter, when the tribes were most 
vulnerable. He looked to other winter massacres 
of Native peoples as exemplars, and urged General 
Connor, who had massacred over 400 Shoshone 
at Bear River in 1863 to “chastise” Native people. 
Even when given the clear opportunity to broker 
peace with the Cheyenne and Arapaho at the 
Camp Weld Council in September, Evans balked, 
saying, “What will I do with the 3rd Regiment if 
I make peace? The 3rd Regiment was raised to kill  
Indians, and kill Indians it must.”6 Though Evans 
likely did not know precisely what Chivington 
would do with the 3rd, Evans was responsible for 
the creation of that force and ultimately the actions 
 
6 Roberts, Thoughts, p. 12.
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that then resulted.
 
Deferral of  Authority to the 
Military
Given a clear mandate from Indian Commissioner 
Dole (and others at different points) to do 
everything he could to broker peace with the 
tribes who had not signed onto or did not support 
the Treaty of Fort Wise, and given his political 
authority and influence as territorial governor, John 
Evans was not obligated to surrender authority to 
the military. Although a military official instructed 
him not to make peace with Native Americans 
in the early fall of 1864, as Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, Evans could have brokered an 
agreement even if it displeased military officials, 
as the military had no authority over the Indian 
affairs settlement process. Rather than pursuing 
the perhaps less popular path of peace, Evans 
allowed Colonel Chivington to declare martial 
law. In doing so, the governor-superintendent 
handed the fate of Colorado’s Native inhabitants 
to a military hungry for war; to a commander 
dead set on achieving military glory before his 
commission expired (though technically it already 
had); and to a regiment populated with untrained 
settler colonists whose anti-Native fervor Evans had 
explicitly helped to incite.
In laying out the case for a fuller reading of 
Evans’s culpability for the Sand Creek Massacre, 
our analysis pivot not upon Evans’s personal 
prejudices, nor his character. Regarding whether it 
was possible for settler colonists in the Colorado 
Territory to share land and resources with the 
Native inhabitants who held title to the land when 
the settlers arrived, Evans shared the same (and in 
some cases more restrained) views in comparison to 
many of his settler compatriots. But, as the report 
also shows, Evans fundamentally disagreed with the 
principles upon which the treaty-making process 
was based and believed Native peoples needed 
to be “civilized,” through relocation and force if 
necessary. These beliefs are relevant to his actions 
and they can help explain his motivations, but they 
do not particularly distinguish him from other 
territorial leaders. His decisions and actions in his 
official capacities do. It is important to understand 
Evans’s worldview with regard to civilization, 
progress, and the fate of Native peoples—and to 
understand how the effects of such a worldview 
have ultimately redounded to the material benefit 
of members of our Colorado community today. 
However, our evaluation is not based on Evans’s 
personal philosophy.
This analysis allows a space for understanding 
the difficulties Evans faced as a leader charged 
with the seemingly impossible task of protecting 
settler interests and Native rights simultaneously. 
In some ways, his two posts were inherently 
in contradiction with one another. Moreover, 
Evans’s deepest commitments were to the settler 
community and to bringing progress, as he 
understood it, to an area of the country he viewed 
as uncivilized. It is important to examine how a 
man who led so well in other respects and cared 
so much about the people of Colorado could have 
made such reckless decisions with regard to the 
Native people within his jurisdiction.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin 
by explaining the office and duties of the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, describing 
how Colorado and the two adjacent territories 
of Nevada and Utah were organized. This allows 
for a comparison of the circumstances faced 
by the leaders in the three territories, and an 
understanding of how Evans’s approach to Indian 
Affairs was different than those of comparable 
officials. We then review the cascade of events and 
decisions in 1863 that resulted in Evans’s seeming 
acceleration toward war and away from treaty-
making efforts. As conflict turns toward crisis in 
1864, we take a closer look at critical events and 
decisions we believe were insufficiently addressed 
in the Northwestern Report. A review of our 
core conclusions and our specific disagreements 
with Northwestern Committee’s final evaluation 
concludes the report. 
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Power in Office: The Coterminous Roles 
of Governor and Superintendent of  
Indian Affairs
Territorial governors such as John Evans were 
appointed by the U.S. President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate; Superintendents of 
Indian Affairs were appointed in the same way. 
Both positions carried enormous powers and 
responsibilities in their jurisdictions. Therefore, 
an individual who was appointed simultaneously 
Territorial Governor and Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs occupied the primary position 
of power and responsibility in his jurisdiction, 
albeit a jurisdiction that included two distinct 
populations—settler colonists and Native peoples. 
To understand the actions and decisions Evans 
made in the positions he held in the Colorado 
Territory, especially with regard to Native people, 
it is important to review how the Office of Indian 
Affairs worked in the mountain west of the 1860s. 
In the following section, then, we review the dual 
responsibilities of territorial governors who held 
the coterminous Indian superintendent position. 
This entails an explanation of the founding of the 
Office of Indian Affairs, its separation from the 
War Department, and the historical role of the 
territorial superintendencies. We also contextualize 
the importance of federal treaties, the “supreme 
law of the land” for the administration of federal 
Indian policies, and explain how those policies 
were heavily influenced by a series of Supreme 
Court precedent-setting decisions from the 1820s 
and 1830s. We begin with the history of how the 
territories of the mountain west were created.
 
Indian Superintendencies in 
Western Territories
The Mexican-American War and ratification of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 brought 
extensive western territories into the jurisdiction of 
the United States. This, combined with the Oregon 
Treaty of 1846, demarcated the boundaries of the 
Oregon country and British Columbia, with a new 
American/British division set at the 49th parallel. 
In the period of Euro-American settlement that 
came after the expedition of Lewis and Clark, the 
Rocky Mountain region became known as the 
“mountain west,” displacing the frontier boundary 
of the old northwest. 
This region initially became Oregon, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Washington territories. What is 
now Colorado was carved from New Mexico and 
Utah territories with a portion of western Kansas 
annexed to it. (“Jefferson Territory,” encompassing 
much of what became eastern Colorado, never 
gained legal status.) In 1861, Nevada was created 
out of Utah Territory and Colorado was formed 
out of land previously constituted as northern New 
Mexico, western Kansas, and eastern Utah. Idaho 
was carved out of Washington Territory in 1863 
and initially included Montana.1 Regardless of 
the change in place-names, however, vast portions 
of this land remained firmly under the control of 
Native nations of the region. The military prowess  
 
1 What became Wyoming Territory were parts of  Wash-
ington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, and Dakota and Nebras-
ka territories at various times until 1868.
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of groups like the Lakota, Cheyenne, Osage, 
Kiowa, and Apache was seen as a major obstacle in 
what Richard Maxwell Brown called “the Western 
Civil War of Incorporation” and what traditional 
Western historians call the “Indian Wars.”2
Out of the desire to incorporate frontier 
lands, along with the Native peoples who 
occupied it, into the United States, the office 
of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs was 
founded by an ordinance of the Continental 
Congress in 1786. Divided into three districts, 
these superintendencies were given the authority 
to direct and supervise American Federal Indian 
policy as politically appointed administrators. 
Tracing back to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
and later extended by the nascent American 
government in the trade and intercourse acts of 
1790, 1822, and 1834, this office served a vital 
diplomatic function, as the notion of nation-
to-nation relationships with Native people had 
previously been codified into British colonial law, 
and then, after the revolution, American law. 
Although this relationship was grounded in the 
concept of federal supremacy, in its American 
form, it has been subjected to much alteration and 
revision. By the mid-nineteenth century it had 
become common practice in the western territories 
for individuals to be appointed coterminous offices 
of governor and ex officio superintendent. This was 
the case with Colorado territorial governor John 
Evans and a handful of others.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs was established 
within the War Department in 1824 by John C. 
Calhoun. It was stipulated that the position of 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs be chosen by the 
secretary and confirmed through Congress. This  
 
2 Richard Maxwell Brown, “Western Violence: Structure, 
Value, Myth” The Western Historical Quarterly 24:1 
(1993): 6. Using Brown’s conception of  these con-
flicts can be useful in moving away from the implicit 
binaries invoked by the phrase, “Indian Wars,” to more 
accurately characterize the political dynamics of  the 
conflict between migrating settlers and the region’s 
indigenous inhabitants.
arrangement prevailed in the years following the 
Indian Removal Act (1830).3 In 1849, with the 
establishment of the Department of the Interior, 
the administration of the position shifted to the 
Secretary of the Interior with the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, along with the superintendents 
of Indian Affairs, Indian agents, and sub-agents 
working under this newly established executive 
department. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
became a presidential appointment confirmed 
by the Senate. In both arrangements, due to the 
organization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs as a 
political office the stability and cohesion of Federal 
Indian policy was undermined with each change in 
administration and subsequent appointment and 
confirmation process. Within this political context, 
however, Indian agents assigned to particular tribal 
groups or reservations often remained in their 
positions, as they were typically appointed through 
the recommendations of the superintendents.
“The Supreme Law of  the 
Land”: Treaty Recognition and 
Enforcement
There was no meaningful difference between the 
ex officio superintendencies held by territorial 
governors and those separately appointed. The job 
of a superintendent was to essentially “superintend 
the intercourse with the Indians, agreeably to law; 
and execute and perform such regulations and 
duties, not inconsistent with federal law, as may 
be prescribed by the president, the Secretary of the 
Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs” and 
to “superintend” agents accordingly.4 Among  
 
3  The effects of  this law reached far beyond the Trail of  
Tears involving the Native Nations of  the southeast. 
Removal actually continued through the 1850s and 
in some cases such as with the Navajo, Modocs, and 
Chiricauhua Apaches, through to the 1870s & 80s.
4  Section 2058 24. Duties, Revised Statutes – June 30, 
1834, 4 Stat L., 736; June 5, 1850, 9 Stat L., 437; 
February 27, 1851, 9 Stat. L., 587. Schmeckebier, 
Office of Indian Affairs, 410
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the primary duties of a superintendent and his 
agents would be to supervise settler and Indian 
comportment with treaties, and negotiate new 
treaties when necessary.5  This last responsibility 
was especially germane in the western frontier 
where de facto settler land use was often in 
violation of existing Indian treaties. In such cases 
superintendents were granted with the authority 
to negotiate new treaties—an authority they were 
expected to exercise to protect settlers and defend 
national interests; however, stipulations in treaties 
that directed recurrent monetary payments and 
the supply of stock, seed and foodstuffs, as well as 
services such as medical care and education, while 
also demarcating new boundaries, however, had 
to be approved by the U.S. Senate and ratified 
by the president before they went into effect. 
In accordance with Article 6, Clause 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution—known commonly as the 
Supremacy Clause—the ratification of a treaty 
acted as an explicit and formal acknowledgement 
of a nation-to-nation relationship—in the case 
of Native people, a Native nation and the United 
States government. 
As legal documents, then, Indian treaties 
have constitutionally privileged standing as 
“the supreme law of the land.” Furthermore, 
in accordance with the canons of construction, 
which extend from English common law, as legal 
documents treaties are to be interpreted as the 
signatory would have understood them and in 
favor of the party that did not draft the document 
5 Between 1778 and 1868 the United States govern-
ment signed 394 treaties with Native nations. This 
practice of  treaty making was ended by an act of  
Congress in 1871, but in the years that followed an-
other 17 agreements were made, though not all were 
ratified. See U.S. Laws and Statutes. “Indian Treaties,” 
Vol. 2. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904. 
in question where ambiguity is an issue.6 However, 
as we will see, treaty recognition and enforcement 
also involved another relationship between Native 
nations and the United States government that was 
at odds with the “nation-to-nation” arrangement 
codified by the U.S. Constitution and through 
individual treaties. This bond became defined as 
one of dependence and tutelage as the inherent 
sovereignty of Native nations was eroded by 
the series of Supreme Court decisions that have 
come to be known as the Marshall Trilogy. Most 
explicitly, perhaps, this occurred in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia (1831), with Native nations 
politically defined as “denominated domestic, 
dependent nations” and viewed as wards under the 
charge of the federal government’s guardianship.
Given the relatively loose governing structures 
of territories so far removed from Washington, 
Indian superintendents had a great deal of latitude 
in interpreting and implementing policy and 
managing relations with Native peoples within 
their jurisdictions. To add to the inconsistency in 
the application of federal Indian policy, appointed 
superintendents and Indian agents also had widely 
varying qualifications—some with no experience 
with Native peoples at all. As one commentator 
cynically characterized it, 
The Indian agents who are placed in trust of the 
honor and faith of the government are generally 
selected without any reference to their fitness for the 
place. The congressional delegation desire to reward 
John Doe for party work, and John Doe desires the 
6 Cohen, Felix. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 37; 
Cohen cites the Winters case (1908, water rights) and 
Worcester v. Georgia (1832). When it comes to Indian 
treaties, in Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereign-
ty and American Law, David E. Wilkins and Tsianina 
Lomawaima state that the canons of  construction stip-
ulate: “(1) resolve ambiguities expressed in treaties in 
favor of  Indians; (2) interpret treaties as Indians them-
selves would have understood them; and (3) liberally 
construe treaties in favor of  the tribe” (141). David E. 
Wilkins’ and K. Tsianina Lomawaima’s, Uneven Ground: 
American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Indian Law, 
Norman: University of  Oklahoma Press, 2002.
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place, because there is a 
tradition on the border that 
an Indian agent with fifteen 
hundred dollars a year 
can retire upon an ample 
fortune in four years. The 
Indian agent appoints his 
subordinates from the same 
motive, either to reward his 
friends’ service, or to fulfill 
the bidding of his Congres-
sional patron.7
Superintendents and the 
agents under their authority 
did receive guidance from 
the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, a position 
appointed by the president. 
In the period most relevant 
to this document, the 
superintendents and agents reported to the 
commissioner, who in turn reported to the 
Secretary of the Interior. 
Treaties with Native nations were a well-
accepted part of the political dynamics that 
territorial governors were obligated to acknowledge 
until 1871, when limits were placed on presidential 
authority to negotiate, as a result of a rider to the 
Indian appropriations bill. Up until that point, 
according to Vine Deloria Jr., over 250 treaties 
between the United States government and Native 
nations were ratified, with numerous agreements 
negotiated in the western frontier throughout the 
1850s, although not all of these were signed into 
law. 
In the case of the territories we will be 
examining, treaties with Utes were negotiated by 
Brigham Young out of Salt Lake City in the 1850s,  
 
7 Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs: 
Its History, Activities and Organization, Institute for Gov-
ernment Research, Service monographs of  the United 
States Government No. 48 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1927), 47
while similar treaties were negotiated with the 
Navajos, Apaches, Comanches, Utes, and Pueblo 
peoples by various agents as well as the New 
Mexico territorial governor and Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, James Calhoun, out of Santa Fe in 
the 1840s and 1850s. Only one of the Ute treaties, 
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship negotiated 
with the Moache and Capota in Abiquiu in 1849, 
was ratified. U.S. Government agent Garland 
Hurt negotiated treaties with Utes, Shoshones 
and Goshutes in 1855 in what was then Utah; 
however, like many of the treaties drafted during 
the period these were never ratified. In addition 
to enmities related to ongoing cycles of war, the 
lack of ratification was, perhaps, also due to Hurt’s 
dubious status in having been appointed Utah’s 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs by Brigham 
Young. 
 
Johnson’s Nebraska, Dakota, Colorado, Idaho, and Kansas, 1863   |  Wikimedia
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Between Native and Settler: A 
Fraught Position
By the mid-nineteenth century, the organization of 
Indian superintendencies in the western territories 
had become something of a shifting patchwork 
of territories, reservations, and jurisdictions. 
Although initially the governorships of New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Utah were coterminous with 
the Indian superintendencies for those territories, 
separate superintendencies were established for 
New Mexico and Utah in 1857. Idaho briefly 
had a superintendency that was separate from the 
governorship, but in 1864, the two posts were 
merged and remained so until Idaho was granted 
statehood in 1869. 
The Colorado and Nevada territories were 
created in 1861. President Lincoln appointed 
territorial governors James W. Nye to Nevada and 
John Evans to Colorado in March of 1862 (with 
Evans succeeding William Gilpin). After first 
offering the Washington Territory governorship 
to Evans, who declined, Lincoln appointed 
William H. Wallace who later moved on to the 
governorship of Idaho Territory after Idaho was 
created from Washington in 1863. Up to this time, 
Utah had had a succession of territorial governors 
following the removal of Brigham Young from his 
post in 1858. His replacement, Alfred Cumming, 
had formerly headed the Upper Missouri Indian 
superintendency. During Lincoln’s tenure in 
office, of the six territories of the mountain west, 
Colorado and Nevada (and, briefly, Idaho and 
Utah as well) had governors who were also Indian 
superintendents. 
In this dual capacity, such officers had to decide 
how to divide their energies and responsibilities: 
should they expend efforts more toward the Native 
inhabitants who still held rights to resources, 
residency, and “Indian title” to the land,8 or 
more toward the growing numbers of frontier 
settlers?  Until the territories were organized with 
recognition from the U.S. government, most 
settlers were little more than immigrating intruders 
with no legal rights in Indian country, and held 
no titles to the land. Even after these territories 
were recognized, as the Supreme Court in the first 
of the Marshall trilogy decisions held in Johnson 
v. McIntosh, ownership of any land under U.S. 
federal jurisdiction could not be legally transferred 
from Indian peoples to private individuals. This 
decision asserted ownership rights of Native 
nations, while limiting their rights of negotiation 
with parties other than the federal government. At 
its core this decision was a confirmation of federal 
8 Under the doctrine of  discovery “Indian title” denotes 
rights to use and occupancy and is distinguished from 
aboriginal title, or fee simple ownership. According 
to Wilkins and Lomawaima’s analysis of  European 
interactions with indigenous peoples it is clear that 
discovery was simply viewed as granting to European 
nations “an exclusive preemptive right to be the first 
purchaser of  Indian land;” it did not void the aborigi-
nal title of  Native nations and tribes (20-21).  
James Nye, governor of the Nevada Territory 1861-1864   |  
Nevada Historical Society
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supremacy, and the limitations on Indian title must 
be viewed within this broader political context. 
Given the common misrepresentation of 
Native culture as purported in American literary 
and historical discourse, as well as in the popular 
art of the period, settlers often possessed (in 
addition to no initial land title) little to no accurate 
knowledge or appreciation for the cultures and 
socio-political organization of the Native peoples 
among whom they were living. The challenge of 
balancing the interests of Native people who had 
ceded lands while retaining denominated reserved 
rights9 with the desires of settler populations who 
often failed to understand or care anything about 
the stipulations contained in treaties, made the 
territorial governorship a deeply fraught position 
from the onset. For obvious reasons, territorial 
governors tended to favor settler interests while 
often failing to safeguard the rights of Native 
peoples, which they were legally bound to uphold. 
And while some territorial executives possessed 
a greater understanding of these responsibilities 
and the legal hurdles requisite to supervising the 
activities of two distinct populations, Native people 
often came out for the worse whenever conflict did 
arise.
In this context, comparison of leadership in the 
three territories in the period is valuable. 
9 Simply stated, reserved rights are those that Na-
tive nations never explicitly surrender in treaties. As 
Lomawaima and Wilkins, note, “all rights are reserved 
except those specifically given up in a treaty or similar 
agreement” (14). This principle has been confirmed 
and codified by the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Winans (1905) and in Winters v. United 
States (1908).
Territorial Organization in 
Historical Context
A brief summary of how the three territorial 
superintendencies were organized enables 
us to better understand the mandates facing 
superintendents in Nevada, Utah, and Colorado.
In Colorado Territory, the Upper Platte Agency, 
which had no permanent headquarters, was 
established from the Central Superintendency in 
1851 to serve specifically the Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Comanche and Lakota/
Dakota/Nakota peoples within the territorial 
boundaries. In 1854 the Upper Arkansas Agency 
replaced the Upper Platte, with the headquarters 
assigned to Bent’s Fort, with the Lakota/
Dakota/Nakota and Kiowa remaining under the 
jurisdiction of the Upper Platte agency. John Loree, 
with whom John Evans was in regular contact, 
was the agent in charge of this agency, but Evans 
had no authority over him, his agency, or the 
Native peoples it was created to oversee. In 1861 
the Lakota/Dakota/Nakota were transferred to 
the new Dakota Superintendency and the Upper 
Arkansas Agency was transferred to the new 
Colorado Superintendency with Governor John 
Evans appointed as territorial Governor and ex 
officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs in March 
of 1862.
 Utah, although administered by the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints as the 
independent “State of Deseret” between 1846 and 
1857, had been brought under federal jurisdiction 
by the middle of 1858 through martial law and 
the imposition of U.S. troops. This coincided 
with the ouster of Brigham Young as governor. In 
mid-1860 J.C. Stambaugh was the first of Utah’s 
Indian superintendents to be appointed directly 
from Washington. Stambaugh was specifically 
sent out by the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office and appointed Surveyor General of 
Utah Territory, though his primary duties were to 
survey Utah Territory. Stambaugh enforced the 
tenets of the Trade and Intercourse Acts and the 
The challenge of balancing the interests of 
Native people ...with the desires of settler 
populations...made the territorial governorship 
a deeply fraught position from the onset.
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subsequent decision in Johnson v. McIntosh that 
settler colonists could not gain title to Native lands 
until legally ceded by Native occupants via treaties 
and then opened up to homesteading by the U.S. 
government. 10 In 1861 James Duane Doty was 
appointed Utah’s Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
then put in charge of a special treaty commission. 
In 1863, Doty was promoted to territorial 
governor. 
Due to the competing interests of various 
settlers there was some overlap in the boundaries 
of the Nevada and Utah territories throughout the 
mid-nineteenth century. Migrating Mormons, for 
example, often considered “Nevada” to be part 
of the “Deseret” lands after the town of Genoa 
was established in the eastern foothills of the 
Sierra Nevadas in 1851. Consequently, this area 
was administered by the Utah Superintendency 
through most of 1861 (although not really dealt 
with until 1854). 
All three territorial entities (Colorado, Nevada, 
and the part of Utah that became Idaho in 1863) 
10 Letters Received by the Office of  Indian Affairs, Stam-
baugh to Greenwood, 6-21-1860, M(icrofilm)-234, 
(Roll) 899, National Archives and Records Center.
experienced the same political economic urgencies 
that fueled rapid, excessive and intense  
 
immigration and boom-bust social cycles driven 
by wildcat gold “discoveries.” Native peoples in 
these territories witnessed a huge influx of settler 
colonists, which was accompanied by outbreaks 
of conflict and violence between incoming 
miners and homesteaders and the region’s Native 
inhabitants. In all three territories Native nations 
soon became perceived as the primary threat to 
immigrating settlers and a serious impediment to 
further expansionism. 
At the same time, however, Native land 
title, including reserved rights to occupy, hunt, 
fish, forage, and travel freely within these lands 
as denominated in various treaties, was being 
constantly reinforced by the U.S. government. 
With the exception of John Evans, the leaders 
in these territories were participants in a series 
of successful treaty negotiations and agreements 
(some with provisions for land cessions and 
reservations) with ostensibly “hostile” groups of 
Shoshones, Goshutes, Bannocks, and Northern 
Paiutes in what is now Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, and 
Nevada. Most were negotiated by the previously 
noted treaty commission headed by James Duane 
Doty in his role as governor.11 
Political ambitions were also part of the 
calculus of appointment to all three territorial 
governorships. Both Nye and Evans aspired to be 
elected to the U.S. Senate, while Wallace ran as a  
 
11 Five treaties Doty brokered were Fort Bridger, Box 
Elder, Ruby Valley, Tuilla Valley, Soda Springs—though 
the latter was never ratified.
James Duane Doty, 5th Governor of Utah Territory   |  
Mathew Brady/Public Domain
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occupy, hunt, fish, forage, and travel freely 
within these lands as denominated in various 
treaties, was being constantly reinforced by 
the U.S. government.
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territorial delegate to Congress. Nye and Wallace 
were successful in their campaigns; Evans was 
not. Evans and Doty are comparable in terms of 
their esteem in the national Republican political 
establishment: Evans knew and supported Lincoln 
and was an accomplished promoter of higher 
education in Illinois, while Doty proved to be 
a skilled politician in his activities in steering 
the separation of Wisconsin from Michigan as a 
territory. He then helped lead it to statehood, first 
as governor and finally as its congressional delegate. 
Like Evans, Doty was also a land speculator. A 
crucial difference between the two, however, was 
that Doty had an impressive career in not only 
negotiating with Native American groups, but 
also, as a lawyer, at times acting as an advocate for 
Native American sovereignty. 
Before proceeding with our comparison, we 
must review the legal framework for Indian policy 
under which governors and superintendents were 
expected to operate. 
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John Marshall served as Secretary of State under 
John Adams, 1800-1801, and was appointed Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court by 
Thomas Jefferson in 1801, serving until his death 
in 1835. He authored the majority decisions in 
three of the foundational cases in federal Indian 
law, which together are commonly known as the 
Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), and Worcester 
v. Georgia (1832).  Each decision was critical 
in shaping U.S. Indian policy in the nineteenth 
century and beyond, with two of the cases directly 
related to Cherokee efforts to retain the ancestral 
lands in Georgia and resist Indian removal, which 
culminated in the infamous Trail of Tears. In 
addition, these cases codified precedent-setting 
concepts regarding political status of Native 
nations that remain relevant today.  Together, they 
defined the political relationship of Native nations 
in relation to the federal government and states and 
established new legal concepts for administrating 
the U.S.-Native relationship. The cases also 
reinforced American cultural, social, and political 
hegemony on the basis of colonial ideologies, 
which included Christian missionary imperatives 
and European notions of civilization and progress.
Based on the analyses of legal scholars Steven 
T. Newcomb (Indigenous Law Institute), Peter 
d’Errico (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), 
and Eric Kades (William and Mary), as well as 
David Wilkins (University of Minnesota) and 
Tsianina Lomawaima (Arizona State University 
the main points of the Marshall Trilogy can be 
summarized as follows:1
1. Native nations or tribes have official 
recognition that is distinct from the U.S. 
government. (The correlate of this is that 
Native people who are not members of a 
recognized nation or tribe are neither Indians 
nor tribes.) 
2. These tribes are domestic dependent nations, 
with no international status. 
3. Each nation or tribe has territorial integrity. 
4. No nation or tribe has the power to sell land 
to private individuals, as the power to broker 
such exchanges is reserved to the federal 
government, who owns the lands on which 
Indians are wards. 
5. The people of each tribe or nation have 
beneficial use of the territory they occupy 
only until the United States decides to buy 
it, or seizes it in a war of conquest. Once 
the U.S. has it, Native title to that land is 
extinguished. 
6. Because the United States is a Christian 
nation under god (emphasis added) and 
because the United States is an industrial 
society of agriculturists, merchants, and 
manufacturers, it therefore has a right, on 
abstract principles, to expel hunters like the  
 
1 See Steven T. Newcomb, Pagans in the Promised Land: 
Decoding the Doctrine of Christian Discovery (Golden: 
Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), xxvii, 142, 73-87; Peter 
D’Errico “American Indian Sovereignty: Now You See it, 
Now You Don’t” in Adolfo de Oliveira, ed. Decolonising 
Indigenous Rights (New York: Routledge, 2009), 105-
121; Eric Kades, “History and interpretation of  the 
Grand Case of  Johnson v. M’Intosh, Law and History 
Review  19 (1), (2001). William and Mary Faculty Pub-
lications. Paper 50. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
facpubs/50
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Indians from the territory they possess, or to 
contract their limits (The first corollary here 
is that United States has the power to do this, 
unilaterally, any time it wants; the second 
is that all Indians are categorized as hunters 
even if they are not.) 
7. The U.S. inherited the exclusive right to 
acquire Indian land from the colonial powers 
that discovered the Indians. (The corollary is 
that if the colonial powers had not discovered 
Indians, they would not exist.) 
8. International law does not apply to Indians. 
The Worcester case invoked the 1790 Indian 
Non-intercourse Act, as well as the constitutional 
provision that congress has the power “to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes” (Art. 
1, Sec. 8, Clause 3). However, the first case of 
the trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), never 
mentions the U.S. Constitution. Instead it relies 
heavily on European colonial practice and the 
claims of the British “whose rights,” Marshall 
asserted, “have passed to the United States… .” 2 
Through this case Marshall expressly invalidated 
laws in some of the thirteen colonies that 
permitted private citizens to purchase land from 
Native peoples. At the same time, however, the 
Court implicitly recognized that Native people 
did indeed have legal claims to the land, since the 
central question was “who has the authority to 
buy any lands the tribes might choose to sell.”3 
The main result of this decision, unfortunately 
for tribes, was that the medieval doctrine of 
discovery was endorsed as the “root of all land 
titles under U.S. laws in contravention of “natural 
law.”4  Johnson dealt a blow to the status of Native 
nations by legitimizing martial force as a means  
 
2 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L.Ed. 681.
3 Lomawaima and Wilkins, 53-54.
4 David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert 
A. Williams, “Notes” in Cases and Materials on Federal 
Indian Law. St. Paul: West Group, 1998, 4th edition, 69.
of territorial acquisition, as “conquest gives a 
title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot 
deny…”5 
In making this declaration, Marshall effectively 
consolidated the ideology of cultural superiority 
with John Locke’s utilitarian notions of property 
ownership. The language is striking: 
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country 
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and 
whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. 
To leave them in possession of their country was to 
leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a 
distinct people was impossible, since they were as 
brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and 
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their 
independence.
What was the inevitable consequence of this 
state of things? The Europeans were under the 
necessity either of abandoning the country and 
relinquishing their pompous claims to it or of 
enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the 
adoption of principles adapted to the condition of 
a people with whom it was impossible to mix and 
who could not be governed as a distinct society, or 
of remaining in their neighborhood, and exposing 
themselves and their families to the perpetual 
hazard of being massacred.6
Consequently, as Marshall states, “However 
extravagant the pretension of converting the 
discovery of an inhabited country into conquest 
may appear; if the principle has been asserted in 
the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a 
country has been acquired and held under it, it 
becomes the law of the land.”7
In Cherokee v. Georgia (1831), redress was  
sought from Georgia laws that acted to “annihilate 
the Cherokees as a political society” and “seize”  
 
5 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L.Ed. 681.
6 Ibid.
7 Getches, et al., 68. Add info on previous recognition of  
Native sovereign rights in Europe here.
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their land.8 This case further eroded the legitimacy 
of sovereign Native American land rights after the 
arrival of European settlers based upon the doctrine 
of discovery, and called into question whether or 
not the U.S. government had any obligation to 
recognize originary land rights at all. Writing for 
the majority, Marshall states, 
[A]t the time the constitution was framed, the idea 
of appealing to an American court of justice for an 
assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps 
never entered the mind of an Indian or of his 
tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the 
government...If...the Cherokee nation have rights, 
this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be 
asserted…9 
Through such reasoning Marshall extended 
the fiction that the “discovery” of the “Indians” 
necessitated “absolute appropriation” because 
what was “discovered” was “only ‘a race of hunters 
connected in society by scarcely a semblance of 
organized government.’” Ultimately, however, in 
a highly politicized atmosphere driven by zealous 
states’ right sentiment, the court chose to avoid 
the central issue and held that, as “wards” of the 
American government and not a “foreign state,” 
the Cherokee simply had no standing to bring 
their case to the court. In claiming that the court 
did have jurisdiction to review the merits of the 
Cherokee complaint in this decision the fate 
of Native nations was effectively discharged to 
Congress, with legal recognition tied to Senate-
approved treaties affirming Native reserved rights 
as the only thing standing between their political 
sovereignty and the “absolute appropriation” of  
 
8 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25.
9 Monroe E. Price and Robert N. Clinton, Law and the 
American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases, 2nd Edition 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company Law 
Publishers, 1983), 76, 540.
their lands.10 
It was in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) that 
the court was forced to address the imposition 
of Georgia law on the Cherokee nation, as the 
plaintiff was a missionary from Vermont who had 
been arrested for defying Georgia law relating 
to travel on Cherokee land.  Here, Marshall 
drew reference to Great Britain’s policy “towards 
the Indian Nations,” characterizing them “’as 
nations capable of maintaining the relations 
of peace and war; of governing themselves, 
under her protection’” and making treaties with 
them. Such an acknowledgement represented a 
modification of the views Marshall had previously 
expressed in Johnson, in which Native people 
were characterized as a group of “fierce savages 
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence 
was drawn chiefly from the forest.” And as with 
Johnson, the real question came down to the issue 
of federal supremacy. That the court endorsed 
the political sovereignty and rights to occupancy 
(within the bounds established in Johnson) of 
the Cherokee Nation, and by extension all Native 
nations within the United States, was simply an 
effect of this position that could not be avoided.11 
Worcester v. Georgia harshly condemned the state 
of Georgia’s extension of its laws into the Cherokee 
Nation as being “repugnant to the constitution, 
treaties, and laws of the United States,” and thus 
“reversed and annulled.”12 Thus, the holding of 
the court affirmed Native sovereignty as far as 
relations with states were concerned. The federal 
government, however, in its guardian/ward 
relationship with Native nations, retained the 
authority to impose and enforce similar laws. The 
Indian Removal Act was one result of this.
10 Monroe E. Price and Robert N. Clinton, Law and the 
American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases, 2nd Edi-
tion (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company Law 
Publishers, 1983), 76, 540.
11 Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law [1942] 
(Albuquerque: University of  New Mexico Press, nd), 
305
12 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483.
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Indigenous scholar Steve Newcomb assesses 
the Johnson decision as “truly ingenious and, 
from an indigenous perspective, quite diabolical. 
Marshall used the Christian religion and Christian 
nationalism, combined with the cognitive powers 
of imagination and assumption, to construct a 
subjugating reality for American Indians. More 
than 180 years after Marshall set feathered pen and 
ink to write the Johnson ruling for a unanimous 
Supreme Court, this subjugating reality still 
serves as the cornerstone of federal Indian law and 
policy.”13
The Marshall Trilogy, then, not only produced 
a new legal doctrine, but also encapsulated 
the settler colonial worldview with regard to 
land acquisition, conquest, settlement, and the 
attendant rights. Until 1871 when the practice was 
ended, treaty making was the main vehicle through 
which American presidents negotiated with Native 
nations.14 Working in a chain of command under 
the president, territorial superintendents were 
expected to either abide by existing treaties with 
the tribes; broker new treaties to reallocate land 
title, overland passage, or the location of tribes 
and white settlements, as the cases demanded; 
or facilitate the negotiation of new treaties by 
commissioners of Indian Affairs, when they did 
not have the power to negotiate treaties themselves. 
Given this context, we can examine the situations 
faced by leaders in the three adjacent territories, 
beginning with John Evans.
The Office of  Indian Affairs and 
the Post-1861 Treaty Making
In April of 1861 President Lincoln appointed 
William P. Dole to the post of Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs. Like most of Lincoln’s governor  
 
13 Newcomb, Pagans, 102.
14 Philip J. Prygoski, From “Marshall to Marshall: The Su-




appointments, Dole was a staunch abolitionist 
and Lincoln supporter in the 1860 Republic 
convention. He served from April 14, 1861 until 
Lincoln’s death in 1865. Dole continued a policy 
initiated by previous Commissioner James Denver, 
the city’s namesake. Although Denver served as 
Commissioner for only eighteen months—between 
April and December 1857 and again from October 
1858 to mid-1859—his influence appears to have 
been substantial. He initiated a policy that would 
be continued by the two other predecessors to 
Evans, superintendents A.B. Greenwood (May 13, 
1859, to April 13, 1861) and Charles Mix (who 
served in two non-consecutive periods.
James Denver articulated the paradoxical but 
ultimately insidious and destructive policy that 
eventually would be enacted by Congress as the 
Dawes Act or General Allotment Act of 1887. 
This policy rejected the standard practice up to 
that time of recognizing Native conceptions of 
communal land ownership, as well as segregated 
areas such as Indian Territory, with Native 
people relocated to these places. Instead, Denver 
advocated for a policy whereby Indians’ “destiny 
Letter from William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Oct. 9, 1861. Concerns Colley’s appointment as Agent for the 
Indians of Arkansas Agency  |  Special Collections, Tutt Library, 
Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado
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must be determined and worked out where they 
are,” on reservations so “restricted as to contain 
only sufficient land to afford them a comfortable 
support by actual cultivation, and should be 
properly divided and assigned to them.”15 This 
meant that in the territories west of the Mississippi, 
including those acquired through the war with 
Mexico and the Treaty with Great Britain in 1846, 
the Indian Office would attempt to establish 
“reservations,” rather than attempting relocations 
to Indian Territory. 
The 1861 Treaty of Fort Wise, establishing 
the Upper Arkansas Reservation (which is 
discussed in more detail below), clearly reflected 
this policy. Denver insisted that “no white person 
should be permitted...even to enter” one of these 
reservations, and seemingly in response to Denver’s 
policy, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the 
Commissioner to exercise the power to “remove...
any person found therein without authority of 
law, or whose presence within...the reservation 
may, in his judgment, be detrimental to the peace 
and welfare of the Indians.”16  What this meant, 
practically, was that it was the superintendents and 
the Indian agents serving under them that were 
ultimately granted this power and responsibility 
to prepare reservations and secure tribes in the 
territory onto them.
Under this vision of enforcing “civilizing 
principles” on Native people in designated 
tracts, Congress acted on the Indian Bureau’s 
recommendation for funds and treaties for buying 
Indian land and for establishing reservations. 
Utah’s adjacent Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
James Doty was appointed to head a Treaty  
 
15 George C. Barns, Denver, The Man The Life, Letters 
and Public Papers of the Lawyer, Soldier and Statesman 
(Wilmington, Ohio: George Barns, 1949), 141
16 Barns, Ibid., 136, 140-42; 11 Stat 329 (1858), Sec 2. 
Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indi-
an Political Resurgence (Oxford University Press, 1988), 
49, 229. At several points in his dissertation (Sand 
Creek), Gary Roberts refers to the Upper Arkansas 
reservation as the “Sand Creek reservation”.
Commission in late August 1862, although he 
would not get to work on the negotiation process 
until 1863. It seems to have been generally 
accepted that Native nations held title to all lands 
in Utah, New Mexico, and what would soon 
become Nevada and Colorado, until that title was 
legally extinguished by treaty. In a letter to the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office, S.C. 
Stambaugh, Utah’s Surveyor General, “endeavored 
to show that the Indians left in the occupancy 
of this country under the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo described in the 11th article of that Treaty, 
held the same title of occupancy, recognized as 
being in those who were left in occupancy of the 
lands ceded by treaties with England, France and 
Spain.”17
17 Stambaugh to Samuel Smith, Commissioner, General 
Land Office, Washington, DC., 1-25-1860,899.  (For 
discussion of  the Treaty of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo, see Fe-
lix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law  (Albuquer-
que: University of  New Mexico Press, 1970 [1941]), 
303, 385, 387.
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Given the parameters of the Ft. Laramie treaty, 
the Cheyennes and Arapahos understood that 
they still held title to their lands in Colorado 
Territory. Thus, when an avalanche of miners 
came to Colorado in the Pike’s Peak gold rush of 
1858 and 1859, they responded peacefully to this 
serious encroachment. In 1860, however, the U.S. 
Government renegotiated a new Treaty of Fort 
Wise (soon to be renamed Fort Lyon), which was 
signed on February 15, 1861. It was conceived 
to cordon the Cheyennes and Arapahos onto a 
subdivided, roughly triangular reservation in the 
area near Sand Creek (bounded by the Arkansas 
near the Northern border of what is now New 
Mexico and the Big Sandy). However, only ten 
chiefs signed the treaty: six Cheyennes, including 
Black Kettle (Motevato o), and four Arapahos. 
These leaders were given to understand that their 
peoples had reserved the right to hunt buffalo 
throughout the larger territory, for the reservation 
had no buffalo and was not easily arable. This 
treaty was a treaty of cession. The “said chiefs and 
delegates” ceded “all lands now owned, possessed, 
or claimed by them wherever situated” except 
for a tract “reserved for them” bounded by the 
Purgatoire, Huerfano, Arkansas, and Big Sandy 
Rivers. The cession enabled the former Cheyenne 
and Arapaho lands to be annexed into the Territory 
of Colorado, but because the Treaty of Fort Wise 
was not ratified until August 1861 and proclaimed 
in December 1861, it did not go into practical 
effect until early 1862.
It is important to note that this treaty did 
not alter the rights the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
retained to “hunting, fishing, or passing over any 
of the tracts of country” described as theirs in 
the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie. Although the 
Northwestern University Report presents John 
Evans as hoping that this treaty “would resolve 
land disputes between settlers and Native people 
in Colorado,” Evans had nothing to do with 
negotiating the treaty, nor is there evidence that 
Evans understood that the basis for “land disputes” 
that subsequently ensued in the territory were 
primarily due to the settler colonists’ and miners’ 
illegal trespass on Native lands.1
Another crucial, complicating factor for 
Colorado’s Indian-settler relations is that the 
Indian Office considered the Treaty of Fort Wise to 
be applicable only to those bands whose  
leaders had agreed to it.2 Therefore, the Indian 
Office considered the rights guaranteed in the 
1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie as well as the treaty-
making process that might modify those rights to 
be active with regard to all other Indigenous groups 
that had territorial rights in Utah (and by extension 
 
1 In what is now eastern Colorado, the new reservation 
was less than one-thirteenth the size of  the lands 
demarcated in the Ft. Laramie Treaty of  1851. The 
Cheyenne chiefs were, in addition to Black Kettle, 
were White Antelope, Lean Bear, Little Wolf, Tall Bear, 
and Left Hand; the Arapaho chiefs were Little Raven, 
Storm, Shave-Head, and Big Mouth. See Charles J. 
Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Volume II, 
Treaties (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1904), 807-811; Report of the John Evans Study Commit-
tee, Northwestern University, May, 2014, 58
2 Even in a newspaper article from 1864 comparing this 
treaty to the Conejos Treaty with the Ute, the problem 
of  representation is rendered through the demeaning 
binaries of  the time: “The Ute treaty... we trust, will 
not be found to be incomplete, at least, for want of  a 
barbarous signature or two, as was the case with the 
Arapahoe treaty, though we are aware that the tribe 
was not fully represented at the council where it was 
made.” “Colorado,” The Mining Journal, Blackhawk, 
Colorado, January 16, 1864.
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as of 1863, Idaho), Nevada, and Colorado 
that were under the jurisdiction of those 
superintendencies. Emphasizing this point, on July 
16, 1863, Commissioner Dole wrote to Evans: “I 
hope you will find it possible to arrange with the 
Cheyennes and Arapahos that have not signed 
the Treaty to do so and put them together, or 
make some other arrangement that will be just to 
them, and satisfactory to the whites.”3 In short, 
Superintendent Evans’s top priority from the 
Indian Office was to secure the rest of the Indian 
signatories to the Treaty of Fort Wise, or negotiate 
a new and “just” arrangement.
Initially, Evans responded favorably to Dole’s 
instructions to continue the treaty process with 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho that had been begun 
at Fort Wise in 1861. He set about preparing 
reservation facilities at the Upper Arkansas 
Agency, secured an interpreter, William Bent, and 
was granted two agents for the Upper Arkansas 
Agency: his cousin, “Major” Samuel G. Colley, 
who replaced the pro-slavery agent, Albert Boone, 
grandson of “pioneer” Daniel Boone, who had 
negotiated the Fort Wise Treaty; and Simeon 
Whiteley, another devotee of Lincoln appointed  
to the Middle Park Agency for the Grand River,  
 
3 Letter of  William P. Dole to John Evans 07-16-1863, 
Governor’s Papers, Transcript of  original Letter Press 
Book Record. Governor John Evans. Colorado State 
Archives, History Colorado. MSS Evans 226.
Uinta, and Yampa Utes shortly after it was created 
in 1863. Based upon available records, however, 
it appears that Whiteley never had any contact 
with the Utes and Dole refused to pay his salary 
because he “was not at the agency to which he 
was appointed,” although doing so would have 
been difficult, since the agency had no physical 
location.4
Whiteley stayed in Denver and Evans directed 
him to serve as agent to two Arapaho bands that 
Evans induced to camp on the Cache La Poudre 
River north of Denver. Lafayette Head, appointed 
agent to the Southern Utes at Conejos by the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Santa Fe in 
1859, stayed on as agent, continuing to report 
to New Mexico’s Superintendent, but reporting 
officially to Evans. Michael Steck, served as agent 
under the previous New Mexico Superintendent, 
James Collins.5
Evans’s ability to govern the Territory depended 
on negotiating an agreement with the remaining 
tribes: the Cheyenne and Arapaho. Competing 
pressures between the two positions—governor and 
Indian superintendent—seemed to consistently 
lead to a minimal investment in his duties as in the 
later position and to favor settler  
security, without understanding or appreciation for 
the reserved rights that Cheyenne, Arapaho, and 
Kiowa had retained to hunt, dwell, move freely, 
and assert stewardship in their country. He seemed 
unaware or unconcerned that settlers in Colorado, 
the majority of whom had arrived between 1859 
(after the discovery of gold at Pikes Peak), and 
1861 (just as the territory was being organized) had 
done so illegally, and did not hold legal title to the 
farms and ranches that they so tenaciously regarded 
as their own private property. It was actually  
 
4 Letter of  John Evans to William P. Dole, June 22, 1864 
and Evans to Whiteley, June 22, 1864, #s 276 & 282, 
Governor’s Papers.
5 Application for Supt. of  Indian Affairs. N.M. Center for 
Southwest Research University Libraries, University 
of  New Mexico, 30 April, 1861, Steck to Dole. http://
elibrary.unm.edu.cswr/ accessed July 19, 2014
U.S. Indian Commission treaty party led by William P. Dole in 
camp at Big Lake, Sherburne County  |  Minnesota Historical 
Society
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Stephen A. Douglas, although known as a populist 
and a Lincoln antagonist, who pointed out on 
the Senate floor that “every man in Pike’s Peak is 
there in violation of law; every man of them has 
incurred the penalty of $1,000 fine and six months’ 
imprisonment for going in violation of the Indian 
intercourse law, and claiming land which was 
under Indian title”.6 
Whether Evans knew of Douglas’s observation 
and chose not to take it seriously, or distracted by 
his involvement in land speculation and institution 
building in Illinois, simply did not pay attention 
to Senate proceedings, is unknown. According to 
Evans’s future son-in-law, the Territorial Secretary 
Samuel Elbert and fellow University of Denver 
trustee, as stated in an interview with historian 
Hubert Howe Bancroft in 1884 (published in 
1889), the “provisional government” of 1860 
never went into successful operation. Law was ad 
hoc, in the hands of a “provisional Court” and a 
“Vigilance Committee” that, as he put it, “would 
get hold of a criminal case,... panel a jury, elect a 
judge, try him and generally hang him; and they 
run right together for a year or two....I don’t think 
there was anything done by any department of the 
government.”7 
As we will see, a state of semi-lawlessness was 
not unique to Evans’s Colorado Territory. Similar 
situations obtained in Nevada, also newly created,  
 
6 E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne, 2nd Edition (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 110, quoting 
Leroy Hafen, Historical Background and Development 
of  the Arapaho-Cheyenne Land Area in D.L. Horr, 
editor, Arapaho-Cheyenne Indians, 97-225 (New York: 
Garland Publishing), 141, quoted in Douglas.
7 Bancroft interviewing Elbert, 1.
and in the vast territory of “Washington,” some 
of which was temporarily added to the territory of 
Utah.8 But different solutions were proffered, at 
least concerning the Native nations that occupied 
the region.
Western Lands and the Titans 
of  Transportation
If the interests of settler colonists was Evans’s 
first priority, economics and trade, as well as 
the overland routes that brought supplies and 
communication to and from Colorado, may well 
have loomed as a parallel concern. The Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, Kiowa and other signatories to the 1851 
Treaty of Fort Laramie had given permission 
for establishment and garrisoning of forts and 
construction and maintenance of roads through 
their territories. In fact, travelers had been coming 
through since 1846 and, with discovery of gold 
in California in 1848, by the thousands every 
year. From St. Joseph or Independence, Missouri, 
westward bound travelers proceeded either by 
the Missouri River to Omaha, Nebraska, where 
they linked up with the Platte River Road, or 
by the more direct land route across the great 
plains, picking up the road at Fort Kearney. At 
the confluence with the South Platte at Julesburg, 
one road led to Denver, while the main road 
continued west past Fort Laramie to South Pass 
where the trail again split into northern and 
southern branches. From Salt Lake City, beginning 
in 1859, a government-constructed wagon road 
and a privately forged horse trail led directly west 
through Utah and Nevada. The horse trail would 
become the route of the “Pony Express” by 1860.
In that year, a single firm, the Russell, Majors, 
and Waddell partnership, wrested the mail contract 
away from another transportation titan, George 
Chorpenning, at the same time that the Pony 
8 Samuel H. Elbert collection. Photocopy of  transcript 
of  an 1884 interview with Elbert, a portion of  the 
Hubert Howe Bancroft Collection. The State Historical 
Society of  Colorado, Mss. XA. Bancroft, 449
Commissioner Dole wrote to Evans: “I hope you 
will find it possible to arrange with the Cheyennes 
and Arapahos that have not signed the Treaty to 
do so…or make some other arrangement that will 
be just to them, and satisfactory to the whites.”
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Express was being implemented. It continued 
running passenger stages carrying the U.S. mail 
over the Central Route until the Waddell-Russell-
Majors partnership went bankrupt in 1862. Ben 
Holladay’s Overland Stage Company, which had 
begun running coach routes in California in 
the 1850s, secured a practical monopoly on the 
transportation of mail and freight from St. Joseph 
to Denver, as well as to Salt Lake City in 1861, 
and took over the route from Salt Lake City after 
the Russell, Majors, and Waddell partnership went 
bankrupt in 1862.
From the very start, the Pony Express 
was a capitalist boondoggle, a 19th-century 
Ponzi scheme. It was intended as a spectacular 
demonstration of pioneer resiliency intended 
to attract investors, rather than to operate 
practically. It was therefore in the best interests of 
the operators of stage lines and the Pony Express 
organized by Holladay and the Russell, Majors, 
and Waddell groups to impress investors with the 
U.S. Government’s diligence and effectiveness 
in eliminating “thieving Indians” immediately 
in order to make the route “safe” for the Pony 
Express.9 Once he had the transportation 
monopoly from Missouri to California, Ben 
Holladay pursued the same goal.10 The Overland 
Company also secured a land freight contract from 
the Army and the weekly mail contract between 
Salt Lake City and Sacramento. Over thirteen 
days, riders for the “Horse Express” would hand 
off saddle bags in relays, twice a week, winter and 
summer, fifty-two weeks a year. Russell, Majors 
and Waddell hoped to build a financial empire 
9 On May 2, 1862, three months following the Bear 
River Massacre, mail stage operator Ben Holladay sent 
a telegram to Utah Governor Brigham Young congrat-
ulating him for resumption of  mail delivery. Edward 
W. Tullidge, History of Salt Lake City (Salt Lake City: By 
Authority of  the City Council, Star Printing, 1886), 
256.
10 The partnership took over the Central Overland Cali-
fornia and Pike’s Peak Express Company in 1858. Ray-
mond W. Settle and Mary Lund Settle, Empire on Wheels 
(1949 Stanford: Stanford University Press), 59-63.
by implying to investors that a lucrative subsidy 
from Congress for their “Special Delivery Horse 
Express” as a special service of the U.S. mail was 
imminent.11
Right out of the gate, these transportation 
titans knew that the Pony Express would be 
a losing operation. Some years later, Majors 
estimated that the “Pony” lost several hundred 
thousand dollars. By 1862 the Russell, Majors, 
and Waddell partnership turned out to have a total 
indebtedness of $1,331,526.13.12 The partnership’s 
web of schemes had been developed with a goal 
of staving off creditors, issuing junk bonds, and 
on the hope that it could eventually recoup losses 
by billing the government for purported losses 
and charging interest at the rate of 12 percent. 
The Pony Express had not been a spectacular feat 
of heroic daring and patriotic entrepreneurship 
in forging rapid communication for the western 
portion of the burgeoning Union as it fought the 
Confederacy. Rather, it had been a brazen effort 
to swindle Congress for subsidies and to defraud 
investors.
Preceding the gold rush to Pike’s Peak in 1859 
and the Pony Express in 1860-61, in the years 
between 1846 and 1854 more than 150,000 settler 
colonists and freighters had traveled the overland 
route from Missouri to Sacramento, killing game 
as they went. In 1853 the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs reported that the Cheyenne, Arapaho, and 
western Sioux were “in a starving state...Their 
women are pinched with want, and their children 
constantly crying out with hunger.”13 The Pony 
Express only made this situation worse. While they 
lasted only from 1859 to 1861, the Pony Express  
 
11 Leroy R. Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849-1869 (1926, 
Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co.), 189.
12 Settle and Settle, Empire, 75-7; Arthur Chapman, 
Arthur The Pony Express (New York: A.L. Burt, 1932), 
304; Settle and Settle, Empire, 95-117; Chapman, 
Pony, 248-55; Raymond W. Settle and Mary Lund 
Settle, Saddles and Spurs: The Pony Express Saga (1955, 
Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co.), 171-76.
13 Hoebel, The Cheyenne, 109.
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and the freight and passenger wagons that traversed 
the trail to and from Julesburg and beyond, in both 
directions—east and west—wrought much havoc 
and disrupted Native lifeways and society, which 
in many ways signaled irrevocable cultural decline 
and instability. Mule teams pulling wagons loaded 
with supplies pounded the roadways, while teams 
of four to six horses pulled the weekly stagecoaches. 
A minimum of two express horses at any one time 
thundered along any particular stretch of trail 
twice a week at breakneck speed. Stations, their 
masters and stock-tenders with horses at the ready 
were established every ten to twelve miles. Roving 
mechanics and traveling agents plied the roads to 
keep the stages rolling. Additionally, thousands 
of travelers on horses and in wagons continued to 
crowd the road. Stock watering and the overuse of 
pasturage despoiled many of the very best springs, 
the deepest and most reliable, as well as the most 
fertile parts of the broad valley floors. Horses and 
mules were turned loose to graze native grasses. 
Streams were diverted for irrigating pastures 
consisting of newly planted non-native grasses 
including invasive varieties of hay, wheat grass, 
and oats. Pony Express riders seeking firm footing 
through miles of “putty-like mud” in spring and 
autumn rains guided their horses across wide 
swaths that skirted the increasingly muddied and 
impassable roads. In summer, these same iron-shod 
horses compressed the silt-covered roadway into a 
thick carpet of fine alkaline powder that swirled in 
clouds of gritty dust with the gusting winds.14
The impact of these preferred transportation 
routes and their promoters’ interests bears on our 
inquiry for three reasons. First, the invasion of a 
country in which Native peoples had retained the 
rights to hunt and gather disrupted migrations 
of animals such as the bison and antelope, and 
offers some explanation for reports of economic 
privation all along the Overland Route, from 
Scotts Bluff to Hangtown (now Fallon, Nevada). 
This is the context within which the impetus 
for the policy of negotiating with Native 
groups perceived as “hostile” and/or accused of 
committing “depredations” became paramount.15 
Agents and superintendents mentioned incidents  
 
14 Egan, Pioneering the West, 197-8; Richard F. Burton, 
The City of The Saints, Second edition (London: Long-
man, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 548, 550-
51, 556, 561-6, 572-4, 572, 583-4, 590-91. Elliott 
West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the 
Rush to Colorado (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press 
of  Kansas, 1998), chapter 9.
15 On depredations along the road, see Letters, Forney to 
Mix 8-27-1858,898; Annual Reports of  the Commis-
sioner of  Indian Affairs (ARCIA) for 1859 (Washington: 
George W. Bowman, 1859) #175; Letters, Forney to 
Mix 9-16-1858, 898; Letters, Forney to Greenwood 
8-10-1859,899; ARCIA 1862#41).
Map of the 1860 Pony Express Route by William Henry Jackson  |   US Library of  Congres
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of “depredations” along the Humboldt River road, 
but they also mentioned the destitution of Native 
populations encountered along the route. For 
example, in 1859 the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs reported to the Secretary of the Interior 
that “the reports of the condition of the Indians 
in Utah present a melancholy picture.  The whites 
are in possession of most of the comparatively 
good country there is, and the game has become 
so scarce as no longer to afford the Indians an 
adequate subsistence.  They are often reduced 
to the greatest straits, particularly in the winter, 
which is severe in that region; and when it is no 
uncommon thing for them to perish of cold and 
hunger.  Even at other seasons, numbers of them 
are compelled to sustain life by using for food 
reptiles, insects, grass seed, and roots.”16
Secondly, the perceived economic effects of 
attacks upon road stations (which were often 
targeted because they were perceived as the 
cachements for the destruction of resources 
upon which Native peoples depended) may well 
have loomed larger than the casualties to human 
life, and may have provided a more compelling 
context not only for negotiation of treaties along 
the Overland Road, but also the gradual shift in 
context from conciliation to incendiary conflict. 
By the time Ben Holladay took over the bankrupt 
Overland in 1862, effectively gaining control of 
thousands of miles of road, hundreds of coaches 
and horses, and the U.S. mail contract, he was in 
a position to exert major, if not primary influence 
over military and civilian authorities, especially in 
Colorado and Utah. 
As Gary Roberts writes of Holladay, “Heartily 
despised by many who saw his control of the U.S. 
mails and the overland stage route as a stranglehold 
on the region…his power was unmistakable…He  
 
16 ARCIA 1859, Commissioner to Secretary of  the Interi-
or, ARCIA, 21-22.
brought tremendous pressure to bear on General 
Curtis to keep the stage route open. This task tied 
down most of Curtis’s troops in the district of 
Nebraska.”17 On September 30, 1864, two days 
after Evans had met with leaders including White 
Antelope, Black Kettle, and Neva at Camp Weld (a 
meeting discussed in further detail below), Colonel 
John Chivington, commander of the U.S. troops 
in Colorado, and Samuel Elbert, Evans’s son-in-
law and the territorial secretary, perhaps as Acting 
Governor, met with Holladay in order to persuade 
him to shift his route further south so that it could 
be more easily defended. Holladay refused to do so 
and “upbraided Chivington in the severest terms,” 
convinced that Chivington could not protect the 
road. Whether in response to this disparagement 
or not, Chivington’s troops carried out the first 
of its concerted assaults against Cheyennes and 
Arapahos. According to reports, they killed four or 
five men, three or four women and two children, 
taking the scalp of one man.18
It is from this context that we now turn to 
actions of the Indian agents and superintendents, 
and to two U.S. Army actions, in a comparative  
framework, in order to achieve an evaluation of 
John Evans’s work as Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, focusing especially on 1863 and 1864. 
17 Gary L. Roberts, Sand Creek: Tragedy and Symbol. Ph.D. 
Thesis. (Norman: Department of  History, University of  
Oklahoma, 1984) 385-6.
18 Roberts, Sand Creek, Ibid., 385-7.
The Pony Express and the freight and  
passenger wagons that traversed the trail to  
and from Julesburg and beyond…wrought  
much havoc and disrupted Native lifeways  
and society, which signaled irrevocable  
cultural decline and instability.
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In all three territories and elsewhere in the West 
it was the Native American groups through 
whose territory the transportation routes wrought 
destruction that became the objects of the most 
intense scrutiny and activity on the part of the 
Indian Office. The same held for the U.S. Army 
when not diverted to the Civil War. The Native 
groups along the route from St. Joseph through 
Julesburg, Salt Lake City, South Pass and Fort 
Hall and on into Nevada are glossed in historical 
accounts as Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Eastern 
Shoshone, Northwestern Shoshone, Gosiute, 
Western Shoshone, Bannock, and Northern 
Paiute. The eastern part of this area was also the 
ancestral home of the Oto, Missouri, Pawnee, and 
Omaha, but these groups had been induced to 
cede their territorial rights and in the case of the 
Oto and Missouri, to relocate. Despite a long-
current impression that for travelers coming from 
the eastern United States, the greatest threat of 
death lay on the Great Plains—the territory of the 
Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho—in fact, according 
to historian John Unruh, “an analysis of the 
geographic regions where nearly 400 overlanders 
were killed between 1840 and 1860 indicates that 
approximately 90 percent of all emigrant killings 
took place west of South Pass, principally along the 
Snake and Humboldt Rivers and on the Applegate 
(Lassen) Trail,” in the territory of the Shoshones, 
Bannock and Northern Paiute, not in the territory 
of the Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho.1 
A further observation must be made here: even 
though by far the most dangerous part of the trail 
for emigrants was along its Snake and Humboldt 
1  John W. Unruh, The Plains Across (Urbana: University 
of  Illinois Press, 1979), 144 (Unruh gives no figures 
for 1858).
sections, the trail was even more dangerous for 
Native people. Between 1850 and 1857, 305 
emigrants were killed. The number of Native 
Americans killed by emigrants was 416. Only in 
1859 and 1860 do the numbers for emigrants 
killed eclipse that of Native people, totaling fifty-
seven, as opposed to 20 Indians killed, according 
to official records. An additional thirteen emigrants 
were killed by whites disguised as Indians in 
1859.2 Along the Snake River road, attackers in 
one incident in 1862 were identified as “Indian 
warriors...led by white men”.3 In Utah James Doty 
confronted a major challenge: a fifteen-year-long 
legacy of conflict along the “overland” route and a 
recent history of especially intense conflicts from 
1861 to 1863 when Native warriors attempted 
to drive the destructive Pony Express out of their 
homeland.
But Doty’s earlier experience in Michigan 
provided him with a perspective that enabled 
him to meet this challenge. In 1821 two Native 
Americans were arrested and charged with 
murder. One, a Menominee, was remanded to 
the Michigan Supreme Court because his alleged 
crime had been committed in an area that was 
under the jurisdiction of the “organized territorial 
government,” that is, on land that had been 
ceded to the United States in a series of treaties 
dating from 1817, 1819, and 1820. The second, 
an Anishinaabe (Chippewa) man by the name of 
Ke-taw-kah, was remanded to the same court with 
jurisdiction given to the U.S. circuit and district 
court, as his crime had been committed on land 
2  Ibid., 144.
3  Brigham Madsen, The Shoshoni Frontier and the Bear 
River Massacre (Salt Lake City: University of  Utah 
Press, 1985), 159-160.
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that had not been ceded. 
The young lawyer assigned as Ke-taw-kah’s 
public defender was none other than James Doty. 
Part of the defense that Doty put forth was that 
the murder had been committed on lands that 
were not yet owned or consolidated under the 
legal jurisdiction of the United States, but which 
that remained under the control of Native nations. 
He argued that international law, not U.S. law 
should apply because the United States had, in 
fact, recognized the international status of Native 
nations by negotiating treaties with them, just 
as it did with foreign nations, and that Native 
nations exercised “every act an independent nation 
did.”4 The court did not accept this argument 
and although Doty did not prevail on behalf of 
Ke-taw-ka, he nonetheless demonstrated some 
important and salient principles, including 
the recognition of the international status of 
Native nations, appreciation for the legal parity 
between the United States and Native nations, 
acknowledgement that Native nations maintained 
independence and jurisdiction over their lands 
until it was relinquished through treaty-making, 
and a perspective on Native rights that would not 
enter international political diplomacy until the 
4  Alice Elizabeth Smith, James Duane Doty, Frontier Pro-
moter (Madison: State Historical Society of  Wisconsin, 
1954), 24
United Nations’ adoption of the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. 
Three years later, in his capacity as an 
appointed federal judge for western Michigan, 
Doty once again asserted his adherence to these 
principles. In this case a Menominee person was 
accused of having bitten off the thumb of a white 
trader in a dispute that took place in a similarly 
unceded area some fifty miles northeast of Detroit. 
The lawyer for the defense employed the same 
defense that Doty had used for Ke-taw-kah. 
Similarly, the jury did not accept the argument. 
But Doty was now the judge. He ruled that 
indeed, the event had happened in Indian country 
where Michigan Territorial law had no standing, 
and because “[t]he act for the punishment of 
crimes adopted by the Governor and Judges does 
not extend to the Indian country…There being 
no statute of the United States for the punishment 
of crime of maiming within the Indian country, 
the prisoner [was] discharged…”5 Despite the 
precedent that Doty’s decision as United States 
judge should have established for Native nations 
as subject to international law, two years later, in 
1823, Chief Justice John Marshall made sure that 
it did not do so.
Negotiation and 
Accommodation: Nevada  
and Utah
Nearly forty years later, as Treaty Commissioner, 
Doty had willing assistance from Nevada Territorial 
Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
James Nye, as well as agents Lockhart, Martin, 
Hatch, Wasson, and Mann and interpreters 
Butterfield and Huntington. Martin had already 
brought up the idea of a treaty with leaders of the 
Eastern and Western Shoshone in 1861 and had 
reported them “unanimously in favor of a treaty,”  
 
5  Alice Elizabeth Smith, James Duane Doty, Frontier Pro-
moter (Madison: State Historical Society of  Wisconsin, 
1954), 23-24, 62.
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as long as it included “annual presents” [goods 
to exchange as part of the council process], and 
agreed “to hold themselves responsible for any 
depredations committed by any of their bands....” 
Later, one of the chiefs, Shokub, traveled to Salt 
Lake City from his home 200 miles to the west 
to tell Martin that “. . . his bands were much in 
need of provisions and blankets; on account of the 
monopoly of the grass in their country by the mail 
company to feed their stock, which deprived them 
of the seed which they have heretofore used as an 
article of food.”6  
Nye in Nevada
In Nevada territory, Nye was very much in 
agreement with the proactive approach anticipated 
by the Indian Office. One of the first things he 
did upon arriving in Nevada from New York in 
early spring, 1861, was to “go among the Indians” 
living on Nevada’s two reservations “and distribute 
such presents as had arrived.” Each reservation was 
about fifty miles distant from Carson City. One of 
the most important Northern Paiute leaders was 
Winnemucca, who lived at Honey Lake, and Nye 
had to wait a couple of days for him to arrive. But 
wait he did. Nye “entered into a more minute and 
detailed conversation” with him “than with any of 
the other [leaders] and explained more particularly 
the fact of an existing government, its nature, and 
power,” and also of the overland stage route and 
the telegraph. Winnemucca “said he would tell all 
his people not in anyway to interfere with either;7 
and further that if any one interfered with either,  
 
6 Indians complained that whites depleted the game 
and that they were forced to beg for food or starve. 
Martin responded to these concerns claiming there 
was too little money to satisfy their needs and that 
“the only manner in which this can be effected...is by 
a treaty with all the tribes in this superintendency.” AR-
CIA 1861, Letter #50, Henry Martin, Superintendent 
of  Indian Affairs, Salt Lake City to Dole, 134- 136.
7 James W. Nye, Territorial Governor and Superintendent 
of  Indian Affairs, Nevada to Caleb Smith, Secretary 
of  the Interior, August 14, 1861, Letters Received by 
the Office of  Indian Affairs. National Archives. M(icro-
film)-538
he would let [Nye] know it.”7
Nye also advised the Indians to let the agent 
know “of any depredations committed upon their 
rights...” Nye found five trespassing settler colonists 
attempting to establish ranches on the reservation; 
they were warned off.  In late November 1861, 
the Army notified Governor Nye that it was going 
to station troops along the mail route but also 
considered it absolutely imperative that provisions 
be supplied to the “starving Indians” along the 
route and even offered to sell military stores to 
the Indian Office if it did not have any, perhaps 
in response to agent Martin’s frantic plea to Dole, 
by telegram, that “Indians should have provisions 
on mail line at once to keep them quiet. I have no 
funds what shall I do answer at once [sic].”8
Although skeptical of the idea to station 500 
“volunteer soldiers” along the stage route, Nye 
recommended a treaty that would extinguish 
Indian title, and also noted that pursuing a peace 
policy would require that the government provide 
food for the Native people and furnish them with 
blankets. He regarded the rumors of the danger 
of imminent attacks on the overland Mail to be 
“greatly magnified by ungrounded fears of many 
of the Station keepers...” In pursuit of the peace 
policy, Nye again met with Northern Paiute 
leaders Winnemucca and his son, Numaga, in 
May of 1862, and went on to the Reese River, 
near Austin, where he met with Western Shoshone 
leader Tutuwa (To-toa). He arranged for Tutuwa to 
8  ARCIA 1861, Utah Superintendency, Paper #50; 
Letters, Nye to Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of  the 
Interior, August 14, 1861, M-538; Letters, Telegram 
from Henry Martin, Supt. of  Indian Affairs, Utah to CIA 
Dole, November 21, 1861, 900; Letter from “G. Wright, 
Brigadier General, Commanding...Headquarters De-
partment of  the Pacific, San Francisco to “His Excel-
lency J.W. Nye, Governor” November 22, 1861, ARCIA 
for 1861 Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1862), 216-217. Just a year earlier, in 1860, eighty 
Indians were reported as having “bullied” the two men 
at the Overland Mail’s Egan’s station, demanding flour, 
bacon and sugar. The men baked all the bread they 
could. Meanwhile, soldiers arrived with guns blazing, 
killing eighteen Indians; Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 
126.
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receive gifts as a show of respect and friendship.9 
As will be evident, these perceptions and actions 
differed markedly from those of his counterpart, 
territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs Dr. John Evans.
Doty in Utah
Governor Albert Cumming, who replaced 
Brigham Young after the “Mormon War” of 
1857 and served Utah territory until 1860, had 
insisted that along with surveying the land, the 
government must also secure title to all lands 
that were surveyed, and it could only do so by 
negotiating treaties that compensated the Native 
owners for the usurpation of such resources. Along 
with other officials, in 1860 Cumming urged 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to negotiate 
treaties as soon as possible. They cited the fact that 
this had not yet been done as a primary reason for 
“depredations,” that is, the securing of economic 
resources, largely livestock, from immigrants and 
settler colonists: 
The undersigned actuated by a sense of duty, would 
respectfully call your attention, and through you the 
attention of Congress to the pressing necessity of 
taking immediate steps towards bringing the Indians 
of the Territory of Utah under treaty obligation.  It is 
believed that this Territory presents the only instance 
of the organization of a Territorial government by 
Congress, the country thrown open to settlement, 
without measures being first adopted to extinguish 
Indian title.10 
Of course, once Nevada and Colorado were 
organized as territories in 1861, this would become 
true of them as well. If the government had 
brought the Native population under normalized 
treaty stipulations, argued the Governor 
Cumming, depredations would not have occurred.  
 
9 Letters, Nye to Smith, August 14, 1861, 538; Nye to 
Dole, ARCIA for #46, 359.
10  Letters, Cumming, Rogers et al to Greenwood 11-1-
1860, 899.
Accordingly, the Native people of the region “fully 
realize the effect produced by settlement, taking 
possession of their most valuable hunting ground, 
driving off their game consuming their grass, 
and begging and plunder, seem to them not only 
justifiable but their only alternative.”11 Therefore, 
the case was presented for treaty negotiations quite 
ironically as driven by considerations for justice; as 
a humanitarian duty; as a legal necessity; and in the 
service of pragmatic American diplomatic strategy.
Utah Superintendent of Indian Affairs James 
Doty’s authorization to negotiate a treaty with 
the Shoshone came through in the waning days 
of August 1862. Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Dole “saw the treaty system as the best guarantor 
of Indian rights...Only when the tribes were 
protected in this way, he believed, could the federal 
government withdraw from Indian management. 
The treaty system would settle the question of land 
title once and for all and would allow the Indians a 
voice in their own future.”12 But Doty doubted he 
could do it that year because many bands were  out 
hunting on the tributaries of the Missouri River, 
and also because “Indians have committed so many 
outrageous murders and depredations this season 
it’s doubtful they will venture into council with 
us.” In other words, the Native people of the  
 
 
11  Ibid, 899.
12  Roberts, Sand Creek, 209.
Nye recommended a treaty that would extinguish 
Indian title, and also noted that pursuing a peace 
policy would require that the government provide 
food for the Native people and furnish them with 
blankets. He regarded the rumors of the danger 
of imminent attacks on the overland Mail to be 
“greatly magnified by ungrounded fears of many  
of the Station keepers...” 
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region were growing increasingly alarmed by the 
incursions of settlers onto their lands, which made 
the negotiation of treaties an uncertain endeavor.13
But persist he did, along with Henry Martin, 
who had succeeded Doty as Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs after Doty had taken the position 
of Treaty Commissioner. In December of 1862, 
Martin “assembled Shoshones in Ruby Valley 
with regard to instructions to do so for the 
treaty.”  He found them “more hostile” than he 
had anticipated, but assured the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs that there was “nothing to fear.” 
James Nye subsequently prepared a list of goods 
necessary to the making of the Treaty at Ruby 
Valley.14 In November 1862 Doty wrote to Dole, 
“If, according to your Instructions, cessions of 
territory, so as to include the white settlements and 
thus relieve the settlers from the tribute constantly 
demanded of them by individuals of these Tribes, 
are not to be made in the Treaty, provision I think  
ought to be made by which the discoverers of gold, 
silver, and other minerals are permitted to explore 
and occupy any portion of the country for mining 
purposes”.15 Indeed, all the treaties contained such 
provisions. 
 
13  Letters, Doty to Dole, 8-29-1862, 900; Doty to Dole, 
11-26-1862, Doty to Nye, 11-29-1862,  NSLABx-
TERR-0108FdC-11. He also insisted on including the 
“Banucks” because the “Banucks” were now “mixed” 
with the Shoshones; “they live and hunt together, rang-
ing through Nevada, Utah and Washington Territories 
…  and therefore … it is not possible that a Council 
can be held without many Banuncks and Utahs being 
present.” By “Utahs” Doty meant a group known as 
“Weber Utes” in popular parlance, living just west of  
Salt Lake. They were in fact Shoshones, with Little 
Soldier as their chief. How they came to be labeled 
“Utes” is unknown. See Julian Steward, BasinPlateau 
Aboriginal SocioPolitical Groups. Bulletin Number l20. 
Bureau of  American Ethnology (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1938), 133-4.
14 Letters, Martin to Dole, 12-9-1862, M-234,901; Let-
ters, Nye to Dole 6-6-1863,901.
15 Doty to Dole 11-26-1862, NSLABxTERR-0108,C-11. It 
is perhaps instructive that Nye does not question the 
legitimacy of  the “tribute”.
Six months later, Doty reported that the Native 
people who had “been hostile, and [had] 
committed depredations upon the persons and 
property of emigrants and settlers” now expressed 
“a strong desire for peace.” Doty saw the primary 
purpose of the treaties as threefold: (1) making 
“some arrangement...by which they can with 
satisfaction return to their hunting grounds,”(2) 
to do so “upon terms which shall secure peace 
hereafter, safety to the Emigrants & travelers, and 
(3) relieve the Department [of the Interior] from 
the expense now being incurred...”16
The Massacre at Bear River
The hostility that Martin encountered at Ruby 
Valley was undoubtedly occasioned by the deadly 
pursuit and killings of Native people, largely 
unacknowledged in the historical record that 
preceded the Bear River Massacre of more than 
400 Shoshone in Utah in January 1863. Colonel 
Patrick Connor marched his 1,121-man 3rd 
Infantry of California Volunteers out from Fort 
Churchill, Nevada in August 1862. Ostensibly 
acting on a report that “Indians” had recently 
killed twenty-three emigrants (this figure was 
later reduced to twelve) on the Humboldt River 
branch of the Overland Trail, Connor ordered 
Major Edward McGarry to find the perpetrators. 
Connor’s offer of fifty dollars for every Shoshone 
responsible for the attack to be delivered to him 
got no takers. McGarry was then ordered to 
“’immediately hang’’ any “perpetrators” that could 
be located and captured. He was unsuccessful in 
this regard, but he did report the killing of twenty- 
four Shoshone who refused to cooperate, or tried 
to escape.17
It is difficult to know just how many 
unreported incidents occurred that would push 
the actual figure of Shoshone casualties higher. A 
Shoshone woman who died in 1949, at well over  
 
16 Letters, Doty to Dole, June 20, 1863, 901.
17 Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 167-8.
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a hundred years, related her story of the killings at 
a camp near present-day Austin, which occurred 
when she was a small girl. The troops had captured 
a Shoshone man and made him scout for them. 
The scout attempted to escape, but the troops 
followed him. When the troops attacked, her aunt 
hid her in a crevice in a rock outcrop above the 
camp. The troops shot an undetermined number 
of Shoshone people, but this small girl witnessed 
the attack and killings and escaped to tell the story 
of her band.18 These were most likely the troops 
commanded by Major McGarry that spent several 
weeks during September and October hunting 
Shoshones and trying to force them into leading 
them to those allegedly responsible for the killing 
of the twelve emigrants.19 Anthropologist Julian 
Steward noted in 1938 that at Basonip Village, in 
Spring Valley, “about seven families...were killed by 
white soldiers.”20 Shoshone oral history attributes 
several additional killing incidents by troops. 
Altogether, there may have been half a dozen other 
incidents involving the killing of Shoshone people 
in September and October of 1862, resulting in 
upwards of 100 dead.21
Having established Camp Douglas outside of 
Salt Lake City in October, 1862, in January 1863, 
Connor marched 300 troops out of Camp Douglas 
and attacked the Shoshone camp on Bear River, 
 
18 Richard O. Clemmer, Field Notes, 1989, 87-8, 200, in 
Richard O. Clemmer’s possession.
19 Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 168.
20 Steward, Basin-Plateau, 127. The date is uncertain. 
The incident could have occurred in 1861 in connec-
tion with retaliation for destruction of  the Spring Valley 
stage and express station.
21 Richard O. Clemmer, Field Notes, 1989, 15, 17, 56, 
87-8, 200, 277, 303-4; Sylvester L. Lahren, Jr., Ph.D, 
Tribal Ethnographer/Principal Investigator, Confeder-
ated Tribes of  the Goshute Reservation. A Shoshone/
Goshute Traditional Cultural property and Cultural Land-
scape. Spring Valley, Nevada. Prepared at the Request 
of  the Confederated Tribes of  the Goshute Reserva-
tion. Cooperating Tribes: Ely Shoshone Tribe; Duck-
water Shoshone Tribe, 17-22. Lahren’s interpretations 
attribute an undetermined number of  killings to U.S. 
troops between 1858 and 1863.
in what was then Washington Territory. “Being 
satisfied,” he later wrote in his report, “that ...[the] 
body of Indians, on Bear River ...were the same 
band who had been murdering emigrants on 
the overland mail route for the past fifteen years, 
I determined to chastise them.” The plan was 
put into motion initially as a ruse “to deceive 
the Indians by sending a small force in advance, 
judging, and rightly, that they would not fear a 
small number.”22 “Feeling that secrecy was the 
surest way to success,” Connor led the rest of his 
troops to Bear River a week later. 
His strategy worked; even though he attacked 
in the early morning hours of January 29, 1863, 
Sagwitch, one of three chiefs in the camp, thought 
Connor might have come to talk and negotiate.23 
Connor, with no intention to negotiate, made no 
attempt to find Sagwitch. Connor’s troops came to 
kill, not to parley; they suffered eighteen casualties 
and forty-nine wounded, and Connor claimed to 
have personally killed Sagwitch. Connor counted 
“224 [Indian] bodies in the field...How many more 
were killed than stated I am unable to say,” Connor 
later wrote in his report because he “was unable 
to examine the field.” After the assault had been 
completed he also testified to the release of 160 
22 He sent 69 infantrymen with thirteen wagons and two 
howitzer guns on January 22. Scott R. Christensen, 
Sagwitch, Shoshone Chieftain, Mormon Elder 1822-1887 
(1999, Logan: Utah State University Press), 47; Report 
of  Patrick Connor, Colonel, 3rd California Volunteers, to 
Colonel P.C. Dunn, Assistant Adjutant General, Depart-
ment of  the Pacific, in Edward W. Tullidge, History of 
Salt Lake City, 286.
23 Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier 169; Mae T. Parry, a 
granddaughter of  Chief  Sagwitch, in “Massacre at 
Boa Ogai” (1976, 231-8 in Madsen; Shoshoni Frontier, 
233) states that Sagwitch would have turned over the 
“guilty” in an incident in which three miners recently 
had been killed. The other two chiefs, Lehi and Bear 
Hunter, were also killed.
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captured children and “squaws” in the field.24
Several hours after the end of the massacre, a 
visitor to the killing field noted many instances of 
rape on the soldiers’ part and that “squaws were 
killed because they would not submit to lie down 
and be ravished.”25 Another reporter noted soldiers 
massacring women and children as well as men, 
and of troops holding infants by their heals and 
beating their brains out against “any hard substance 
they could find.”26 One soldier found “a dead 
squaw…with a little infant still alive…The soldiers 
killed it.”27 Local Salt Lake City historian, Edward 
Tullidge, some years later discovered a “historical 
note” in the Logan Branch of the Church of Latter 
Day Saints records from an “eye-witness from 
Franklin” [Utah] who counted 368 dead, “besides 
many wounded who afterward died”.28
If documented and probable killings by U.S. 
troops were summed, including an additional  
 
24 “Report of  Patrick Connor, Colonel, 3rd California 
Volunteers, to Colonel P.C. Dunn, Assistant Adjutant 
General, Department of  the Pacific,” in Edward W. 
Tullidge, History of  Salt Lake City (Salt Lake City: By 
Authority of  the City Council, Star Printing, 1886), 
283-6.
25  Verso of  a drawing prepared by Cache County survey-
or James H. Martineau. Christensen, Sagwitch, 49, 52.
26  Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 200.
27  Tullidge, History of Salt Lake City, 290.
28  Ibid., 290.
unknown number from those at Bear River who 
were wounded and later died, the totals would 
top 500 for 1862 and 1863. Historian Brigham 
Madsen characterizes “Connor’s destruction of 
a peaceful village of Shoshoni” as having few 
parallels “for rapine and human atrocity.”29 His 
assessment was that “Connor’s efforts to punish 
the Northern Shoshone and subdue them proved 
ineffective.” “Instead of cowing the Northwestern 
Shoshone into submission...there is overwhelming 
evidence that the reverse happened.” Rumors were 
circulated that Indians were now so angry with 
the soldiers that they intended to “steal and kill 
every white man they could find.” The surviving 
bands, “enraged at the slaughter of their neighbors, 
friends, and relatives, mounted new hostilities” 
against settler colonists.30 Three hundred and 
seventy-five miles away in Denver, the massacre 
was given ample press.31 
So the fact that Doty was able to accomplish 
treaty negotiations in the Summer and Autumn of 
1863 is remarkable in the context of the anger and 
resentment that Shoshone must have felt in the 
wake of the killings and massacre. Later that  
 
29 Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 222.
30 Brigham Madsen, The Northern Shoshone (Caldwell: Cax-
ton Printers, 1980), 36; Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 201.
31 Northwestern Report, 58.
Painting of the Bear River Massacre in the Preston Post Office.  |   Preston Chamber of  Commerce
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Spring, following the Bear River Massacre in 
January of 1863, Doty spent six weeks on the 
road, travelling over nine hundred miles, meeting 
with Bannocks and Shoshone, under escort from 
some of Connor’s troops. Doty noted that the 
only bands that appeared “determined to continue 
hostilities are those of Pokatello, Sagowitz and 
Sanpitz.” The latter two groups were decimated by 
Connor’s assault at Bear River. At that time Doty 
could “obtain no communication” with them. 
When meeting with Bannock and Shoshone at 
Kamas Prairie, they told him about an attack by 
drunken white men when they were in Bannock 
City (now Idaho City, a gold rush town northeast 
of Boise). They told him they did not intend to 
revenge “this wanton act.” Doty decided to not 
only see if he could find more Indians along the  
road, but also to try to verify the incident. He did 
so, “with regret.”32
A scant few days after returning from his 
Spring trip, he set out again, concluding the Treaty 
of Fort Bridger on July 2 and the Treaty  
 
32  Letters, Doty to Dole, July 20, 1863, 901.
of Box Elder on July 30. At Fort Bridger, the 
bands of Bear Hunter, Ashingodimah, Sagowitz, 
and Sanpitz, whom Doty duly noted as “nearly 
exterminated” in what he called “the battle on 
Bear River” were present. Within the intervening 
month, the bands led by Pokatello, Sagowitz, 
and Sanpitz, which took up a posture of armed 
resistance early in the conflict, were eventually 
persuaded to agree to a Treaty.33 Doty negotiated 
five treaties altogether, including one with “mixed 
bands of Shoshone and Banucks of the Shoshone 
or Snake River in Idaho Territory,” although the 
treaty (Soda Springs, October 14, 1863) was not 
ratified at the time.34
33  Letters, Doty to Dole, Nov. 10, 1863, 901.
34  Letters, Doty to Dole, 12-30-1863 in ARCIA1864#64; 
Cross reference sheets, M-234, 901.
Instead of cowing the Northwestern Shoshone  
into submission...there is overwhelming evidence 
that [the massacre caused] the reverse to happen.
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A central point of comparison between the 
Colorado Superintendency and Superintendent 
Nye and Commissioner Doty is the degree of 
close attention and success in negotiating treaties 
of peace and friendship with Native nations that 
had been involved in “depredations” along the 
western branches of the Great Platte River. Here 
it is worthwhile to reiterate, as above, that on July 
16, 1863, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Doty 
wrote to Evans: “I hope you will find it possible 
to arrange with the Cheyennes and Arapahos 
that have not signed the Treaty to do so and put 
them together, or make some other arrangement 
that will be just to them, and satisfactory to the 
whites.”1 
Evans seems to have been overwhelmed by the 
tasks for which he was responsible. In addition to 
the charge of negotiating with the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho, Evans had another treaty to manage with 
the southern Utes. This treaty was actually in the 
process of being settled, although apparently Evans 
was unaware of this fact. He complained to Dole 
on July 16, 1863, that on the one hand he feared 
failure with the Utes because “they [were] scattered 
over 400 by 150 miles of mountains,” but noted 
on the other hand that it was necessary to have 
all the Utes at the treaty signing because “a treaty 
made with a small part of the tribe [was] worse 
than no treaty.”2 The same dictum, of course, 
would apply to the Fort Wise Treaty  
 
1 Evans to Dole, July 29, 1863, 226 Evans Box 6, FF 64, 
Governor’s Papers, History Colorado, Hart Library.
2 Evans to Dole, July 16, 1863, Governor’s papers.
with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, which should 
have underscored the urgency of securing more 
representation and support for that treaty. On 
August 24, 1863, Evans again wrote to Dole, 
this time to apologize for being “disrespectful” in 
a misunderstanding he did not create regarding 
the surveying of the Upper Arkansas Reservation 
created by the Treaty of Fort Wise. Again his 
correspondence is deeply ambivalent. On the 
one hand, he declares himself “ready and anxious 
to carry out the wishes of the Dept. when made 
known to [him]” and goes on to embrace the task 
of making “the two treaties you have honored 
me by a commission to aid in making.” On the 
other hand, he complained that this was going to 
make for him “a very hard summer…The Utes 
have been fighting the soldiers that they seem 
averse to treating,” he noted, and the Arapaho 
and Cheyenne were “divided among themselves.”3 
In fact, these conditions were very similar to 
those faced by Doty at almost the same time, 
but where Doty was successful, Evans was not. 
Moreover, as we will see, it was the New Mexico 
superintendency that could count the Ute Treaty 
of Conejos (October 7, 1863) as its achievement, 
one not attributable to Evans’s leadership.
It is nevertheless noteworthy that as of August, 
1863, Evans clearly regarded himself as mandated 
with two treaty commissions: one concerning  
 
3 Dole to Evans 07-16-1863; Evans to Dole, 07-29-1863; 
Evans to Dole, 08-24,1863, Box 6, FF 64, Governor’s 
Papers. This latter letter has “Private” written across 
the top, and in places the handwriting is difficult to 
decipher.
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the Utes, which, as he wrote, was being handily 
facilitated by agent Lafayette Head, out of New 
Mexico, who would do what Evans did not 
think he himself could do: get the “Scattered” 
Utes together. The other Treaty Commission 
was directed at the Cheyenne and Arapaho. 
Despite anticipating an accurately predicted 
failure with regard to the Cheyenne and Arapaho, 
Evans willingly took on a responsibility of treaty 
commissioner like James Doty. 
Other points of contrast between Evans 
and Nye and Doty are as follows: (1) the 
degree to which “Indian title” was or was not 
acknowledged in the correspondence of John 
Evans and the agents under his authority; 
(2) the degree of recognition of the damage 
to Indians’ resources done by settlement and 
travel along the transcontinental roads; and 
(3) the use of pacifying, conciliatory language 
of the Utah and Nevada correspondence, 
compared to the increasing use of inflammatory, 
vehement exasperation and paroxysms of fear 
and impotency in correspondence coming from 
Colorado. Another striking difference is (4) the 
very high frequency of communication that 
Evans, as Superintendent, maintained with Army 
personnel. Such a high volume of correspondence 
is simply not evident in the exchanges between 
superintendents Martin and Doty between 1861 
and 1863, or of Nye between 1861 and 1864.4 
These points of contrast and comparison will be  
 
4 Based on a comprehensive examination of  all corre-
spondence between Indian agents and superinten-
dents and the Indian Office for the territory/state 
of  Nevada between 1861 and 1864; the territory of  
Idaho between 1861 and 1866; and for the territory 
of  Utah between 1855 and 1863, deposited in the 
San Bruno branch of  the Federal Archives and Records 
Center; on relevant Federal Archives and Records Cen-
ter microfilm reels in the 234 series; and in the Territo-
rial Papers of  the Nevada and Idaho state Archives, in 
Carson City and Boise respectively; and between John 
Evans and the Indian Office between 1861 and 1864 
reproduced in the “Evans Papers” in the Colorado 
State Archives at History Colorado.
taken up in turn.
In 1862, conditions were ripe for negotiating a 
new treaty to replace the deeply flawed Fort Wise 
Treaty.5 Evans set about preparing reservation 
facilities at the Upper Arkansas Agency and 
secured an interpreter, William Bent, who was 
married to a Cheyenne woman, as well as an 
agent for the Upper Arkansas Agency, “Major” 
S.G. Colley, who replaced the pro-slavery agent, 
Albert Boone, who had negotiated the Fort Wise 
Treaty. He initiated diplomatic efforts that resulted 
in agreement to a treaty council, confirming 
the Council with Arapaho and Cheyenne 
representatives.6 However, Neva, a probable 
participant in the council and one of the three 
delegates from the Cheyenne and Arapaho nations 
of Colorado, who had recently returned from 
Washington, D.C., as part of a delegation that met 
with Commissioner Dole and President Lincoln, 
accused agent Colley of blocking the participation 
of Little Raven and Left Hand in the delegation, 
as they wanted to bring matters about corruption 
at the Upper Arkansas River reservation directly 
to Lincoln’s attention.7 Evans ignored Neva’s 
complaint. This error may have been one factor 
contributing to the refusal of the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho to attend Evans’s scheduled council.
A second factor, although similar to the 
above circumstance but certainly not the only 
determining one, may have been Evans’s refusal 
to acknowledge the inherent sovereign rights 
of Cheyenne and Arapaho people. Although 
representatives of each Native nation seem to have 
tried to make authorities in the Colorado Territory 
aware of their rights, Evans did not seem to have 
understood them or considered them with  
 
5 Northwestern Report, 59.
6 Evans to Dole, July 29, 1863, Governor’s Papers.
7 As noted above, the agent Colley was appointed, as 
were all agents, officially by the President, but most 
likely in this case on Commissioner Dole’s recommen-
dation as Colley was Dole’s cousin. (The Northwestern 
Report mentions this situation on pp. 59-60, citing a 
letter from Evans to Dole dated 21 May 1863.)
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any seriousness. In his annual report for 1863, 
Evans noted a conversation between a Lieutenant 
Hawkins and a small band of Cheyenne at Bijou 
Creek in Weld County, following an incident in 
which settler colonists reported Indians entering 
their homesteads and robbing them. He used an 
extract from Hawkins’ report to show “the feeling 
of the Indians at that time: ‘The Indians talk very 
bitterly of the whites—they say they have stolen 
their ponies and abused their women, taking 
their hunting grounds, and that they expected 
they would have to fight for their rights.’”8 
Although Evans was well aware that “a portion of 
the tribes...[had] not yet accepted the provisions 
of the [Fort Wise] treaty,” he did not seem to 
connect the “rights” alluded to in this report and 
the acceptance of the Fort Wise Treaty cession by 
only a small portion of Cheyennes and Arapahos. 
In Evans’s own words, if we recall, “a treaty made 
with a small part of the tribe...is worse than no 
treaty.” These contradictions aside, the fact of the 
matter is that the provisions of the 1851 Treaty 
of Fort Laramie were still in force, and thus, the 
devastating actions of settlers in seizing resources 
and arrogantly disregarding Cheyenne and 
Arapaho territorial boundaries was an affront to 
established American law.9
In addition, the spring of 1863 had been 
particularly distressful for Native populations of 
the region: “racked with disease, unable to find 
sufficient game and forced north by hostilities in 
Texas and the Indian Territory, the Comanches, 
Kiowas, Caddoes, and Wichitas spread whooping 
cough, smallpox, erysipelas, and other diseases 
to the Cheyennes and Arapahos.” And it was not 
just “natural” disasters that were befalling them, 
but also the acts of settlers who “encroached upon 
hunting grounds which were already failing to fill 
the needs of the Cheyennes and Arapahos. White 
buffalo hunters on the buffalo grounds east of Fort 
Larned, Kansas exacerbated the situation. As the  
 
8 ARCIA, Colorado Superintendency, 122.
9 Roberts, Sand Creek, 164
summer wore on, the prolonged absence of rain 
brought a drought that threatened to dry up the 
Arkansas River.”10 The situation was so desperate 
that Cheyenne and Arapaho were reported to 
have come to Fort Larned to beg for food,11 and 
then “lay around the military posts” in hopes of 
receiving help.12
It was under these circumstances that 
John Evans proposed his Treaty Council, in 
accordance with Dole’s instructions, to induce 
all the Cheyenne and Arapaho to move from 
the territories that they occupied and re-settle 
on the Upper Arkansas reservation. He decided 
to distribute annual annuities that were due 
under the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie—further 
reinforcing the treaty’s validity—at the council. 
By the time Evans’s emissaries “departed from 
Denver to invite the tribes to the governor’s 
conference” however, the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
“had scattered to hunt and to prepare for the 
coming winter. In that hot, dry summer, the task 
was especially critical, for game was scarce, water 
was sparse, and grass was spotty. Only disease 
seemed to flourish.” Agent Colley “reported that 
the Southern groups would not be able to make 
the journey” to the rendezvous point on the 
Republican River “because they are making their 
lodges...Their horses are poor, and ...from where 
they are it is impossible for them to go for want of 
water.” Nonetheless, a group of Northern Arapahos 
with whom Evans met in the summer of 1863 did 
agree to meet in council, but not necessarily to 
settle on the Upper Arkansas reservation. Driven, 
perhaps, by fear and paranoia, Evans thought the 
Cheyenne, in contrast were “meditating war” and 
would refuse to council.13
In fact, some Cheyenne did agree to council. 
In August, along with Arapaho leaders Friday,  
10 Ibid., 175.
11 Ibid., 175.
12 Evans to Chivington, Sept. 21, 1863, Governor’s pa-
pers.
13 All quotes in this section from Roberts, Sand Creek, 
168.
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Roman Nose, and Black Bear, along with 
Cheyenne leaders Spotted Horse and Shield, this 
delegation signed an agreement with John Loree, 
agent for the Upper Platte Agency (which was 
not under Evans’s jurisdiction) stating that they 
would “abide by any treaty that has been made 
by our people with the United States.”14 Despite 
this agreement, Evans “found only four lodges 
of Cheyennes waiting for him” at the designated 
rendezvous point on August 27, 1863. Evans used 
the knowledge and experience of a trader, Elbridge 
Gerry, throughout 1863 and 1864, to liaise with 
Cheyenne and Arapaho. When Indians did not 
arrive at the Arickaree fork of the Republican, as 
Evans thought he had arranged, he enlisted the 
help of the trader, Elbridge Gerry to seek them 
out. Gerry was eventually successful in locating an 
encampment of 240 lodges, or “roughly two thirds 
of the southern Cheyenne people”.15 Cheyenne 
representing this large group told Gerry they were 
willing to meet with Evans, but that they could 
not move at that time because of a widespread 
sickness that was circulating among them. In 
contrast to those who had signed the agreement 
with John Loree, however, they told Gerry they 




the reservation had no game, and they were not 
willing to give up their lands near the confluence 
of the Upper Republican River and Smoky Hill 
Creek, and those who had done so had acted 
without the authority of the people. This included 
the entire Cheyenne representative assembly, the 
Tribal Council of all forty-four designated Peace 
Chiefs,16 as well as White Antelope and Black 
Kettle, who had indeed signed the agreement, but 
denied having done so.17 Gerry talked with Bull 
Bear who is reported to have asked, “he [Evans] 
wants us to come in and settle down like white 
men?” When Gerry answered in the affirmative, 
Bull Bear continued, “You tell white chief, Indian 
maybe not so low yet.”18 To add yet another 
dimension of texture to the narrative of these 
events, the Cheyenne were also incensed at the 
murder of Little Heart at Fort Larned, stating, 
“The white man’s hands were dripping with their 
blood.”19 Evans did not seem to take any of these 
objections seriously.
It is not clear whether, at this point, it would 
have been feasible for Evans to have traveled to 
the diphtheria- and whooping cough-infested 
encampment on Beaver Creek, which was located 
approximately twenty-five miles distant from 
the Republican River council site. But it does 
seems that, in the spirit of the kind of pre-treaty 
reconnaissance that Superintendents Martin and 
Doty and Governor Nye had pursued in 1861 
and 1862, a follow-up effort might have been 
attempted and resulted in some success. On 
October 16, 1863, Evans requested $30,000 to 
meet treaty obligations owed to the Arapaho and 
Cheyenne for 1864-5, presumably adding the 
$15,000 from 1863 that had apparently never 
been provided.20
16 See Hoebel, The Cheyennes, 43-53.
17 Roberts, Sand Creek, 169-171.
18 Roberts, Sand Creek, 157.
19 Idem, n. 27.
20 Evans to Dole, Oct. 16, 1863, Governor’s papers.
Portrait of Arapaho chief Friday  |  Charles Milton Bell, 1873
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However, the requested funds were also 
apparently never delivered. If they had been, 
Evans might well have had some leverage in re-
scheduling the treaty council. Just why he never 
followed up on these requests is not clear. Even 
less clear is why he did not pursue a rescheduling 
of the August 27 council, when he received news 
of the reasons for the Cheyenne’s absence. At any 
rate, after late 1863, Evans made no effort to seek 
a fair and reasonable settlement with the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho, and acted as though the settlers were 
already at war with them. 
In October 1863, the Treaty of Conejos 
negotiated with the Tabeguache Utes brought 
about the cession of a large portion of Ute land 
in Colorado Territory.21 The Northwestern 
University report credits the “impressive progress” 
Evans made in helping to negotiate this treaty, 
while offering the claim “that the Utes’ more 
remote location attracted fewer settlers” at the time 
the agreement was signed.22 Neither is accurate. 
The Tabeguache cession included an area that 
had experienced settlement from the Taos area of 
New Mexico beginning in 1851 due to its being 
included in portions of the Tierra Amarilla, Sangre 
 
21 As Richard Keith Young, notes in The Ute Indians of 
Colorado in the Twentieth Century, however, this treaty, 
also known as the Tabegauche Treaty, was intensely 
unpopular as it was signed by only one band of  Utes, 
the Tabegauche, but ceded a large portions of  the 
“hunting lands of  other Ute bands,” 25.
22 Northwestern Report, 61.
de Cristo, and Conejos Mexican land grants 
made between 1832 and 1843; and although 
the Northwestern University report mistakenly 
credits Evans with undertaking an “arduous trip” 
to negotiate this treaty, it was in fact negotiated by 
Lafayette Head, the Conejos agent, and Michael 
Steck, New Mexico’s Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. Johann Georg Nicolay, President Lincoln’s 
personal secretary whom he sent out to attend this 
meeting, specifically credited Head with bringing 
in the 1,500 Tabeguache (Umcompaghre) Utes 
for the treaty signing. Nicolay and Evans were 
there simply as honorifics.23 The arrangements 
for this treaty signing were made without Evans’s 
participation. Although he was expected to attend, 
the originally scheduled signing date of September 
1 conflicted with the date of Evans’s scheduled 
council with the Cheyenne and Arapaho.24 The 
Tabeguache Treaty signing was duly postponed. 
Any effort to contrast Evans’s relationships with 
the Utes as evidencing “important progress” is 
clearly mislaid as the Colorado Superintendency 
virtually ignored the Grand River, Uinta and 
Yampa Utes, making Evans’s name on the 
Tabeguache Treaty inconsequential.25
23 Nicolay, Report, 148.
24 Roberts, Sand Creek, 167.
25 Northwestern Report, 61.
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Two new territories had been created by 1861 
through which the western portion of the 
Overland Road led, requiring the appointment 
of three new Superintendents of Indian Affairs. 
These developments were accompanied by the 
development of government policies to address 
issues relating to Native peoples. These issues 
include the inescapable recognition that large 
portions of the new territories consisted of 
Indian land; the necessity of territorial officials 
to negotiate treaties of peace and friendship with 
Native people, thereby recognizing the implicit 
validity of Native title; the recognition that the 
intrusion of settlers into these territories; and the 
associated effects of the use and destruction of 
resources, particularly in the case of the buffalo, 
had a disproportionately negative impact on 
Native communities; and that, as a result, regular 
and substantial compensation must be made 
to the Native people. Due to these exigencies, 
the eventual goal of termination of title and the 
designation of Native populations to confining 
reservations, were a secondary feature of this 
policy, although the Treaty of Fort Wise (1861) 
and Treaty of Conejos (1863) both included such 
stipulations.
These propositions were only reinforced 
within the context of escalating conflict between 
members of Native nations and intruding 
American immigrants, whether settling in the 
territories or traveling through to California or 
other destinations. In the previous two decades, 
conflict in the region west of South Pass in the 
Rocky Mountains of present day Wyoming had 
resulted in the deaths of more than four hundred 
travelers and settlers, with double the number of 
Native people estimated to have been also killed. 
South and east of South Pass, the conflicts and 
casualties were much lower, amounting to a figure 
of several hundred, based on a limited number 
of available records, in comparison to more than 
a thousand farther west. The 1861 Treaty of Fort 
Wise with the Cheyenne and Arapaho was a treaty 
of land cession that established boundaries for 
reservation lands. This treaty was a departure from 
the design of the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 
which also involved the Lakota and Dakota, and 
recognized the validity of Cheyenne and Arapaho 
claims to lands in Wyoming from the north fork 
of the Platte to its source, through the Rockies, 
and to the headwaters of the Arkansas River, which 
also included much of the northeastern portions 
of Colorado, western Kansas, and southwestern 
Nebraska. The Indian Office regarded this latter 
treaty as still in effect, with several years’ worth of 
treaty annuities still owed. At the same time, the 
Indian Office regarded the Treaty of Fort Wise as 
applying only to those Cheyenne and Arapaho 
who had expressly agreed to it, and not to those 
who had not been parties to it. As a result of this 
clearly untenable situation, negotiation of a new 
treaty was anticipated. 
Moreover, the Cheyenne and Arapaho retained 
reserved rights to hunting and gathering resources, 
as well as to unimpeded travel throughout the 
territory described in the 1851 Treaty of Fort 
Negotiating Peace in the Mountain West: 
A Comparative Study
After late 1863, Evans made no effort to seek 
a fair and reasonable settlement with the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho, and acted as though the 
settlers were already at war with them.
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Laramie,1 even though some Cheyenne and 
Arapaho had ostensibly relinquished their claims 
to the land itself. In light of these developments, 
the newly appointed Governor and Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs, John Evans, was instructed to 
continue with the treaty process that would bring 
the majority, if not all, of Cheyenne and Arapaho 
into agreement with the Fort Wise Treaty.  If this 
goal could not be achieved, the next step would be 
to enter into negotiations with the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho to produce a new treaty.2
If the contrast in the levels of violence between 
the western and eastern portions of the Overland 
Route were taken into consideration, it would 
seem that the Indian Office might have considered 
the eastern area as more safe, secure, and peaceful. 
Evans was well aware of the intrusive nature of 
settler colonists on the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
who had not yet made an agreement with the 
Indian Office, but did not seem to care about 
what “Indian title” entailed, instead characterizing 
their assertion of rights as a mere expression 
of Native “feeling.” Evans’s consequent actions 
demonstrate that he also did not hold the rights 
and claims of Cheyenne and Arapaho people in 
high regard, although the treaty on which these 
were founded remained legally binding. When 
Samuel Browne, District Attorney for Colorado, 
complained to the Secretary of the Interior Caleb 
B. Smith on December 9, 1862 that the Treaty 
of Fort Wise did not define the boundaries of the 
ceded land, which had generated problems in the 
1 This is conveyed in the treaty in the stipulation that 
“the aforesaid Indian nations do not hereby aban-
don or prejudice any rights or claims they may have 
to other lands; and further, that they do not surrender 
the privilege of  hunting, fishing, or passing over any of  
the tracts of  country heretofore described.” See Indian 
Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 1904, compiled and edited 
by Charles J. Kappler, vol. 2, 595. http://digital.library.
okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/treaties/sio0594.htm#mn5
2 Dole to Evans, January 15, 1864, quoted by Gary 
Roberts, Sand Creek, 210
Courts,3 Indian Commissioner William P. Dole 
advised Browne On February 22 1863, that the 
ceded land extended from the South Platte to 
the Arkansas. The fact that the Fort Wise Treaty 
did, indeed, define the boundaries of Cheyenne 
and Arapaho land is revealing of the attitudes 
officials harbored about their duties to safeguard 
Native land rights.4 This left many white settlers 
in the area between Sand Creek to Bent’s Old Fort 
and north to Big Sandy Creek (near present day 
Limon, Colorado) in occupancy of land that was 
identified by treaty as belonging to the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho peoples.  Proceeding in a similar 
pattern of behavior after gold was discovered at 
several locations in the front range of the Rocky 
Mountains in response to the Fort Laramie Treaty 
of 1851, growing discontent was expressed about 
the terms of the Fort Wise treaty. In response 
to these factors, Browne acted to suspend land 
surveys north of the South Platte River and 
publicized the limits of the treaty boundaries in 
the territory’s newspapers.5 Consequently, one of  
 
3 Forced to interpret the land clauses of  the Treaty of  
Fort Wise, the Federal Courts could find no basis for 
claims that the Cheyenne and Arapaho had ceded the 
lands north of  the South Platte. This region, however, 
contained most of  the settlements and became an 
ever larger point of  contention as time passed. Browne 
to (Secretary of  the Interior) John Palmer Usher.  De-
cember 9, 1862.  Roberts, Sand Creek, 149.
4 Article 1 of  the treaty ends with this statement: “Ac-
cording to the understanding among themselves, it is 
hereby agreed between the United States and the said 
tribes that the said reservation shall be surveyed and 
divided by a line to be run due north from a point on 
the northern boundary of  New Mexico, fifteen miles 
west of  Purgatory River, and extending to the Sandy 
Fork of  the Arkansas River, which said line shall estab-
lish the eastern boundary of  that portion of  the reser-
vation, to be hereafter occupied by the Cheyennes, and 
the western boundary of  portion of  said reservation 
to be hereafter occupied by the Arapahoes” (Kappler, 
vol. 2, 808). http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/
Vol2/treaties/ara0807.htm#mn2
5 Roberts, Sand Creek, 150 and n. 26 and 27.  Dole to 
Edmunds, May 13, 1861. Browne to the Editor of  the 
Rocky Mountain News, March 31, 1863. 
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the primary functions of the Indian Office was 
to ensure the integrity of treaty boundaries and 
mediate between the competing interests of settlers 
to maintain peace in the Colorado territory. 
In this regard, the Indian office seems to have 
failed miserably.  That large portions of Colorado 
territory remained unceded Native land, and still 
designated as belonging to the Utes, Cheyenne, 
and Arapaho, to say nothing of the volatile 
situation created by the fact that the leadership 
of a large portion of Cheyenne and Arapaho 
disputed the terms of the Fort Wise Treaty because 
they had been left out of the negotiations, only 
increased tensions as settlers continued to flood 
into the territory and across the unceded lands.6 
Perhaps influenced by what he considered the 
inevitable course of westward expansionism, Evans 
challenged Dole’s interpretation, warning in April 
1863 that if the boundaries were not changed, 
they were “liable to have an Indian war on [their] 
hands.”7
The contradictions apparent in Evans’s 
position make his broader motivations ambiguous, 
although he seems to have anticipated that settlers 
would continue to launch assaults against the 
region’s Native people in a concerted attempt 
to drive them out. Whereas the Indian Office 
advocated for the negotiation of an entirely new 
treaty, Evans’s position on this matter is unclear. 
“While the situation demanded bold action”, notes 
Gary Roberts, “and while Evans had the authority 
to move...John Evans made no effort to pursue 
it. He never contacted any tribal leader. In fact, 
no further mention was ever made of the idea in 
official correspondence.”8 When a local newspaper  
 
6 A newspaper report from January 1864 announced a 
settler population of  50,000, with 6,000 living in Den-
ver City and 15,000 new immigrants arriving during 
the previous year. “Colorado,” The Mining Journal, 
Blackhawk, Colorado, January 16, 1864.
7 Roberts, Sand Creek, 303 and n. 28. Evans to Dole, 
April 10, 1863, Governor’s Papers.
8 Gary Roberts, “Thoughts on Evans and Sand Creek,” 
ms., December 2013, 2.
expressed perplexity about “whether the Utes, the 
Arapahos, or Uncle Sam [owned] the ground on 
which the improvements of Colorado [had been] 
made,” 9  Evans could have responded with a 
statement on Native treaty rights similar to what 
Governors Cumming, Dawson and Doty of Utah, 
and Nye of Nevada had expressed concerning 
active Indian title and related rights. 10 The fact 
that Evans made no such statement leads us to two 
possible conclusions: either Evans did not know 
what to make of the notion of Indian treaty rights, 
or he simply did not accept their validity. 
Farther west, treaties had ensured that Indian 
title to much of Nevada, Utah, and parts of what 
would become Wyoming Territories remained 
intact, with the further acknowledgement that 
the resources of these areas remained in Native 
control.11 At the same time, the ostensibly well-
announced treaty council that Evans hosted in 
Colorado Territory went unattended. A little more 
than a year later Evans attributed its failure solely 
to Cheyenne and Arapaho opposition. Despite 
these claims, however, the situation was much 
more complex and it is clear that multiple factors 
contributed to its failure. Because Evans took 
no further action to negotiate a new treaty it is 
impossible to know whether or not a follow-up 
effort might have achieved success. Nevertheless, 
it bears noting that there is no evidence that 
supports the claim of opposition on the part 
of the Cheyenne and Arapaho to participate in 
negotiations with the territorial government. It is 
quite clear that Cheyenne and Arapaho people had 
much to gain by agreements that ensured peace  
 
9 A clear reference to the notion of  private property first 
promulgated by John Locke and then taken up later by 
the Puritans in colonial New England.
10  Roberts, Sand Creek,  211.
11 A map of  “Indian Land Cessions in the United States 
by Region and Date” shows most of  Nevada, much of  
eastern Oregon, and most of  western Idaho as “never 
formally ceded.” Carl Waldman and Molly Braun, Atlas 
of the North American Indians (New York: Facts on File, 
1985), 176.
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on the borders of an increasingly violent frontier. 
A different understanding of events is apparent in 
settler accounts from the period of 1863, in which 
there is no mention of conflict along the Platte 
River road.12
There were, however, violent incidents 
occurring within other parts of the Colorado 
superintendency at this time. It is possible that 
the Colorado superintendency’s dereliction of 
duty in its refusal to take seriously, let alone 
investigate, Native complaints of incursions and 
abuses perpetrated by the settler population played 
a significant role in the dismal failure of Evan’s 
1863 treaty council. It is difficult to know how 
much Cheyenne and Arapaho people might have 
known about the prevailing sentiment among 
personnel of the Colorado superintendency, but 
there was also, according to Gary Roberts, a great 
deal of resentment against those leaders who had 
signed the Fort Wise Treaty of cession. Even so, 
“John Evans,” Roberts notes, “was oblivious” to 
these internal dynamics within the two tribes 
“and he probably would not have understood” the 
resentment anyway.13 The information conveyed 
about the tribes’ need to continue their traditional 
hunting practices should have prompted Evans to 
see what could be done to ensure peace and make 
time to accommodate these priorities, just as Doty  
 
12  E.g., Report of  John G. Nicolay, Special Agent and 
Secretary to the (Treaty) Commission to Commission-
er of  Indian Affairs Wm. Dole, Nov. 10, 1863, ARCIA, 
paper No. 66½, 143-151; Burton, Richard F. Burton, 
The City of  The Saints, Second edition. (London: Long-
man, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 106-160.
13  Roberts, Sand Creek, 169.
had done in the late summer of 1862. For reasons 
that are unclear, however, Evans chose not to 
follow Doty’s example. Instead, “Evans returned to 
Denver convinced that reports of Indian duplicity 
were accurate and determined to prove that the 
Plains Indians were hostile.”14 He therefore forged 
ahead with an agenda that was in direct contrast to 
that of Nye and Doty. Furthermore, there was an 
inexplicable lack of explanation for the muddled 
situation that attended the Upper Arkansas 
Agency, including illegal emigrant settlement 
and confusion over which Native peoples were 
supposed to be there. Complaints of corruption 
at the Arkansas River reservations by Arapaho 
leaders Little Raven and Left Hand were effectively 
silenced by Colley who deliberately left them off of 
the “delegation who met with [President] Abraham 
Lincoln” in March of 1863.15
Although he made three trips in his capacity as 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, only two—one 
to the Upper Arkansas Agency and one to the 
failed treaty council—could be said to have been 
in the service of Native peoples. In total, these 
two trips amounted to only a few weeks in terms 
of time and less than 500 miles of travel distance. 
Evans did make an annual eastern journey while 
governor, each trip lasting several weeks and 
requiring an arduous 400-mile ride via coach 
to the nearest railroad station.16  Negotiations 
with the Shoshone resulting in the Ruby Valley 
Treaty of 1863, by contrast, required Nevada 
Governor James Nye to travel more than 500 
miles over four weeks. Utah Governor James Doty 
covered a remarkable 3,000 miles over a period of 
approximately twelve weeks.17
14  Ibid., 169, 172.
15  Northwestern Report, 59.
16  Northwestern Report, 58.
17  Smith, James Duane Doty, 379.
The information conveyed about the tribes’ need 
to continue their traditional hunting practices 
should have prompted Evans to see what could 
be done to ensure peace and make time to 
accommodate these priorities, as 
Doty had done in the late summer of 1862.
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Close attention to the correspondence that John 
Evans maintained as Superintendent reflects (1) 
increasingly inflammatory language connoting 
an increasingly bellicose attitude toward Indians; 
and (2) an unusual degree of intimacy, initiated 
entirely by Evans, with military personnel. This 
correspondence began just a few months after 
Evans accepted the governorship. On September 
11, 1862, Evans wrote to Secretary of War Stanton 
asking for “that part of the territory of Nebraska, 
south of the Platte river, and west of the East line 
of Colorado…” to “be restored to the Department 
of Kansas” because “supplies for the winter 
subsistence of about 30,000 people must pass over 
this route this fall to Colorado, or people will be 
subject to the horrors of starvation, in addition to 
those of an impending Indian war.”1 Colorado 
and western Kansas had been part of the Military 
Department of New Mexico, with headquarters 
at Fort Union, thirty miles northeast of Las Vegas. 
Fort Union was intended to provide protection for 
the western part of the Santa Fe Trail and also lines 
of communication north to Colorado and east to 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. After the routing 
of Confederate troops at the Battle of Glorieta 
Pass in March 1862 by Brig. Gen. Edward Canby 
and Colonel John Chivington, Confederate forces 
were confined to Texas, and the Kansas-Missouri 
border became a major military focus. While Evans 
was not asking for troops in this request, he was 
asking for a redistricting that would give him closer 
contact with the military command structure of 
the Kansas Department, and did so on the basis of 
the idea that there was about to be an “Indian war.” 
1 Evans to Stanton, Sept. 11, 1862, “Chicago,” Hart 
Library, History Colorado, Governor’s Papers, Box 5, 
FF 59.
His request was granted. 
Evans renewed his insistence that an “Indian 
war” was pending just over a year later. Therefore, 
perhaps it is not surprising that an atmosphere of 
seriously deteriorating relations between Native 
peoples and settlers marked the opening of 
1864. He renewed his alarming predictions on 
November 10, 1863. Dismissing views that were 
skeptical of such reports, he did so on the word of 
one spy Robert North, who falsely reported that 
Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, Northern Arapahos 
and all Cheyennes with the Sioux had held a 
“’big medicine dance’” 55 miles below Fort Lyon 
on the Arkansas. Mr. North said as soon as they 
could get ammunition, they wanted him to join 
them in the war in which they would take a great 
many white women and children prisoners and 
get a heap of property. Mr. North was “connected 
with [Arapahoes (sic)] by marriage and live[d] 
with them.”2  Without checking further, Evans 
forwarded this allegation to Secretary of War 
Stanton on December 14, 1863, stating that, “an 
alliance of several thousand warriors beginning in 
the sparse settlements at various points along an 
extended frontier, as these wild savages propose to 
do, might sweep off our settlers by thousands.”3  
 
2 Evans to P. Dole , Nov 10th [186]3 (Governor’s Papers, 
Colorado History); see Annual Report of  the Commis-
sioner of  Indian Affairs for 1864, pp. 252-3.
3 Evans to E.M. Stanton, Secretary of  War, Dec. 14, 
1863, Governor’s Papers #115. 
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“An alliance of several thousand warriors beginning 
in the sparse settlements at various points along an 
extended frontier, as these wild savages propose to 
do, might sweep off our settlers by thousands.”
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Did such claims reflect reality?
Here is where Evans’s dependence on and 
willingness to accommodate the perspectives 
of local military commanders and dubiously 
reliable informants, regardless of his duties as 
superintendent, bears consideration. In the spring  
of 1864, for instance, the U.S. army, led by Major 
Jacob Downing, Lieutenants Clarke Dunn, George 
S. Eayre, and Captain Joseph C. Davidson, all 
under the command of Colonel John Chivington, 
had gone in search of Native combatants. U.S. 
law gave broad powers to Indian superintendents 
to utilize the military and other federal forces to 
“procure the arrest and trial of...Indians accused of 
committing any crime,” though only the president 
could authorize the military to be employed in 
such campaigns. Superintendents did not have the 
authority to issue blanket commands for vigilantes 
to pursue and kill Native peoples on the basis 
of purported sentiments of hostility.4 Moreover, 
even military commanders lacked the authority 
to execute Native people, even alleged“hostile 
Indians”5 without the façade of a trial and 
accompanying conviction. 
Nevertheless, 330 miles east of Denver, troops  
 
4 Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs, 422.
under the command of Lieutenant George S. 
Eayre, part of Chivington’s command, scouting5 
for presumed “hostiles”, carried out attack on a 
camp of “friendly” Cheyennes under the leadership 
of Black Kettle and Lean Bear. Both were elected 
members of the Cheyenne’s Council of Forty-
Four—the Cheyenne legislative delegation—which 
served as the judicial and executive body and was 
composed of chiefs who had pledged peace. Lean 
Bear had been one of the leaders who traveled to 
Washington D.C. to meet with President Lincoln 
and Indian Commissioner Dole in 1863.6 When 
the soldiers were seen advancing in formation as 
if to attack, Lean Bear went out to meet them 
peacefully, with a number of Indians following 
him, He wore the medallion presented to him in 
Washington and carried official papers underlining 
his friendliness to the United States. As the small 
group neared the soldiers, Lieutenant Eayre gave 
the order to fire. Lean Bear and another leader, 
Star, fell to the ground. The soldiers then rode over 
to them and shot them again to make sure that 
they were dead. 
The attack at Cedar Bluffs was one of three 
fights that Chivington’s troops had with Cheyennes 
in a little over a month’s time and inaugurated 
a pattern of army murder of peace leaders, 
culminating at Sand Creek and instigating the 
“general war” which Evans feared. Even so, at the 
site of Lean Bear’s killing, Black Kettle had told 
the warriors at the time that “they must not fight 
5 Such a term is inextricably tied up to the same repre-
sentational binaries that give concepts such as savage 
and barbarian meaning. Such terms, then, could op-
erate as alibis for policies of  preemptive warfare and 
as a retroactive justification for attacks against Native 
American populations. 
6 George Bent refers to them, sarcastically, as “big 
friend(s) of  the whites.”  Hyde, Life of George Bent, 
131. Lean Bear had also lived with Black Kettle, and 
from all reports was said to admire him greatly.  David 
Fridtjof  Halaas and Andrew E,  Masich, Halfbreed: 
The Remarkable True Story of George Bent, 109-11. See 
Hoebel, The Cheyennes, “The Council of  Forty-Four,” 
43-53
Southern Plains Indian delegation with President Lincoln in 
the White House Conservatory on March 27, 1863  |  Library of  
Congress
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with the whites”.7 This incident indicates that 
Black Kettle was convinced that Native people 
would have to make a peaceful settlement with an 
overwhelming number of better-armed whites and 
acted on this conviction throughout.
Wars—Or Rumors of  Wars
As for whether a general condition of Indian 
warfare existed by mid-1864 (or more precisely, 
whether such a work existed in Colorado 
Territory), there is reason to believe that such was 
a matter of interpretation. Some were skeptical. 
Even the Weekly Rocky Mountain News, edited 
by William N. Byers, a frequent supporter of 
Evans and Chivington and often a vehicle for 
Indian hatred, published an editorial on May 4, 
stating, “This Indian war was ‘a heap of talk for a 
little cider.’ White men have undoubtedly been 
the aggressors.”8 Nathaniel Hill, a mine chemist 
visiting Colorado wrote, “Rumors are floating 
around every day of some Indian depredation; 
but when you resolve it all down to simple fact, 
it amounts to a few soldiers killed in April, one 
family murdered a few days ago...and numerous 
little thefts.” Of John Evans, Hill said, “The 
Governor is a very fine man, but very timid, and 
he is unfortunately smitten with the belief that 
they are to have an Indian war.  He encourages 
sending all reports of Indian troubles to the States, 
to enable him to get arms and soldiers.”9
Hill’s murdered family refers to the Hungate 
family, whose members were killed on June 12th 
at a small colonist settlement on Box Elder Creek, 
thirty miles southeast of Denver. Nathan Hungate 
was foreman for a rancher named Van Wormer. He 
 
7 George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes (Norman: 
University of  Oklahoma Press,1955 (1915)), 145-6, 
quoting Wolf  Chief, an eye-witness member of  Black 
Kettle’s band at Oak Creek. See also Stan Hoig, The 
Sand Creek Massacre (Norman: University of  Oklahoma 
Press, 1961), 51-53.
8 Roberts, “Thoughts,” 5.
9 Roberts, Sand Creek, 252 and n.76. Hill to his wife, 
June 19, 1864 in Hill, “Letters,” 249. 
and another ranch hand noticed smoke billowing 
above one of the ranch buildings. The other ranch 
hand rushed off for help; Hungate rode off to his 
own house, where his family was at home. When 
neighbors arrived, they found Hungate, his wife 
and his two daughters dead. Because Mrs. Hungate 
and the two daughters had been scalped and 
mutilated, it was decided that Indians had been 
responsible for the murders. Moccasins and arrows 
were reportedly found nearby. The bodies were 
eventually carried to Denver in a couple of crates. 
They were placed on display and an eyewitness 
thought that nearly all of Denver’s population went 
to see them.10
Evans made full use of the hysteria surrounding 
these murders. He telegraphed Dole on June 
14, 1864, stating, “the war I reported last fall 
begun in earnest. Spies report large numbers 
in alliance.” Seeming to advance the standard 
military strategy of dividing “hostile Indians” 
from the “friendly” ones so as to avoid a larger 
war, he requested “authority to rendezvous the 
friendly Indians at different points … so that 
we may avoid placing all of them in the ranks of 
the enemy,” as their hunting grounds were “in 
the hostile region,”11  Evans did not specify who 
the “friendly” Indians were. He also specifically 
requested of Dole, “Please ask the War Department 
to strengthen our defenses and also to authorize 
me by telegraph to call out militia.12  The next 
day he followed up his telegram with a long letter  
 
10 Kelman, Misplaced Massacre, 147-148; Jeff  Broome, 
2003, “Indian Massacres in Elbert County Colorado: 
New Information on the 1864 Hungate and 1868 
Dietemann Murders.” kcloenwolf.com/History/Snd 
Creek/Guest/broome-hungate
11 (Telegram) Evans to Dole, June 14, 1864, Governor’s 
Papers
12 Ibid.
“The Governor is a very fine man, but very timid, 
and he is unfortunately smitten with the belief that 
they are to have an Indian war.” 
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to Dole, June 15, 1864, ticking off a number 
of alleged incidents in support of his assertion, 
among them those instigated by Eayre’s, Dunn’s, 
Davidsons’s, and Downing’s aggressions:  Indians 
ran off 175 head from Government herd; troops 
recaptured 75; 400 Cheyenne charged 100 troops 
at Smoky Hill; 25-30 Indians killed including 
Black Kettle (which turned out not to be true); 
Major Downing surprised a camp of 100, killed 
25 Indians, captured 100 horses, with 1 soldier 
killed. He lastly notes the Hungate murders: “the 
scalped and horribly mangled bodies” having been 
“brought into the city yesterday.” He asked for 
aid to “subsist” them and ended the letter with a 
seemingly reasonable conclusion: “They cannot live 
in peace unless subsistence is furnished. I believe 
this the only way to bring about a peace and keep 
peace with those who do not want to fight.”13 
On June 16th, Evans informed General Curtis 
that he wanted to raise a militia of 100: “It is 
very important that Col Chivington operate with 
his command on these infernal Indians.”14 Evans 
wrote to a “Captain S. P. Ashcroft” on June 21, 
less than a week later again expressing his desire to 
raise a company for home defense so that he could 
distribute arms to settlers.15 He sent another letter 
to Arapaho Chief Roman Nose requesting him to 
direct “all of [his] band to come to the Cache La 
Poudre at once to meet [him],” and stating further 
that he did indeed have the “authority to treat” 
with him as he had “promised last fall.” The  
invitation, he told Roman Nose, extended to “any 
Band of Cheyennes belonging on the North Platte  
who are friendly to the Whites and wish to keep 
peace.” As a contrast to the growing atmosphere 
of fear and rumor taking shape during this time, 
“while prepared for the worst,” Roman Nose 
responded to the invitation and established his  
 
13 Evans to Dole, June 15, 1864, Governor’s papers
14  Evans to Curtis June 16, 1864. Governor’s papers. 
These murders are also discussed in the Northwestern 
Report, 64.
15  Evans to Dole, June 14; Evans to Dole, June 15, 
Governor’s Papers; Evans to Ashcroft, June 21, #271, 
Governor’s Papers.
camp on the Cache La Poudre, near Camp (Fort) 
Collins. “Friday’s Band” also did so. Upon their 
arrival these groups were described as “destitute” 
and hardly represented any threat to the military 
or settlers of the area. Evans requested military 
requisitions for them, and directed the Upper 
Arkansas agent Samuel Colley to collect, feed and 
support the friendly Indians at Fort Lyon, and 
direct Comanche and Kiowa to Fort Larned and 
other locations where they could all be fed. 16
John Evans and the  
Call for Arms
Aside from Colonel Chivington, few military 
officials agreed that pursuing a policy of war 
was the best option. Also in June, Curtis’s 
inspector general, Major T. I. McKenny advised 
headquarters, “It should be our policy to try and 
conciliate them [the Cheyenne and Arapaho], 
guard our mails and trains well to prevent theft, 
and stop these scouting parties that are roaming 
over the country who do not know one tribe from 
another, and who will kill anything in the shape of 
an Indian [an apparent reference to Chivington’s 
attacks in Colorado].  It will require but few 
murders on the part of our troops to unite all of 
these warlike tribes on the plains.”17 And as a 
further contrast, Major General Curtis insisted in 
a letter to Evans dated July: “We may not exert 
ourselves in pursuit of rumors...however much we 
may have reason to apprehend a general Indian war 
we should not conclude that such a thing in actual 
existence before doing all in our power to prevent 
such a disaster.”18 In deference to Evans’s authority, 
 
16  Evans to Colley June 16; Evans to General Curtis June 
16; Evans to Colley September 31, 1864 (sic), Gover-
nor’s Papers
17  Roberts, “Thoughts,” 7. 
18  Curtis to Evans, July 5, 1864, in Scott, The War of the 
Rebellion, serial 084, page 0053. http://ehistory.osu.
edu/books/official-records/084/0053  This letter is 
also cited in Ronald Becher’s Massacre Along the Med-
icine Road: A Social History of the Indian War of 1864 in 
Nebraska Territory (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Press, 1999), 
104-105, with Curtis described as “sharply rebuking” 
Evans.
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 however, Curtis concluded his letter, stating, “I 
assure you, Governor, that I shall do all in my 
power to aid in suppressing Indian hostilities.”19 
Again, from military officials’ point of view, the 
objective was to contain hostilities where possible  
and negotiate with the identified friendly Indians 
so as to avoid provocation for Native people to 
join forces against the settlers. With so much 
manpower and dollars still tied up in managing 
the Civil War, few had interest in straining limited 
resources to engage a colonial war against Natives 
simultaneously. 
In his desperation to quickly raise a military 
force, Evans had also reached out on June 16 to 
Brigadier General James Carleton. Like Connor, 
Carleton headed up a contingent of “California 
volunteers” and decided on his own to pursue 
Native peoples after chasing Confederate troops 
routed by Chivington into Texas following the 
Battle of Glorieta Pass in March, 1862. No known 
copy of Evans’s letter exists, but on June 26, 
Carleton gave an interesting response. He first 
described how the entire force of his operations 
was currently occupied against “the numerous 
hordes of Apaches in Arizona,” a deeply intense 
conflict which spanned more than fifty years and 
is marked by the issuance of scalp bounties against 
the Apache in both Mexico and Arizona Territory.   
 
19  Ibid, 084:0053.
Following this warning, Carleton continues 
ominously, “be of good cheer, the winter time is 
the most favorable for operations against Indians…
they soon become exhausted of supplies.”20  This 
advice was offered, however, with a pointed caution 
to the governor: 
When [war] is commenced, it should be 
commenced because they have been the 
aggressors, and are clearly in the wrong. In 
this case the punishment should be very severe. I 
mention these matters to your excellency, so that all 
efforts for peace may be resorted to before war is 
resorted to; then, if we must have war in spite of our 
efforts, Colorado and New Mexico united may make 
it a war which they will remember.21 (Emphasis 
added)
Thus, in the midst of his own military 
campaign with the Apache and well-versed in the 
strategy of winter attack, Carleton nonetheless 
conveys to Evans that pursuit of peace should 
be the governor’s first priority, while a military 
campaign requires clear justification and should 
come only as a last resort.
20  Brigadier General James H. Carleton to John Evans, 
June 26, 1864, U.S. Congress, Condition of  the Indian 
Tribes (Doolittle Report): Joint Special Committee 
Report; Appointed under Joint Resolution of  March 3, 
1865, Appendix, 186. Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1867.
21  Ibid.
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Evans’s last attempt to secure an alliance with the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho seems to have occurred 
in June 1864. He sent Spotted Horse and Little 
Horse, along with their families to Fort Lyon, 
granted with a supply of flour, meat, coffee and 
sugar, and accompanied by an escort of soldiers 
“in the hope that they may be instrumental in 
bringing about a Peace and to serve as guides...”1 
It is difficult to see how Evans, having opted 
for a halfhearted and indifferent approach to 
negotiate a peaceful agreement with the remaining 
groups of Arapaho and Cheyenne who were 
not parties to any treaty in the aftermath of his 
failed council, could have managed such an 
undertaking. Beginning on June 14, 1864, over 
the following five months the correspondence from 
the Colorado Superintendency announced a total 
of twelve incidents of attacks by cavalry troops 
upon Native peoples or alleged depredations by 
Native aggressors between April and September. 
Yet between June 11 and July 17, 1864, “there 
were no confirmed reports of Indian hostilities” 
within Colorado Territory and the overarching 
superintendency.2 Classifying Native peoples 
into the diametric categories of “hostiles” and 
“friendlies” was not an unusual practice for 
territorial administrations, but in contrast to 
Doty in Utah and what would become Idaho and 
Wyoming, who made efforts to reform “hostiles” 
into “friendlies,” Evans’s impatience and propensity 
for panic exacerbated conflict and may have 
actually had the effect of encouraging fear and 
suspicion on both sides, which led inevitably to 
further hostility.
1 Evans to Elbridge Gerry June 10, 1864, Governor’s 
Papers
2 Roberts, “Thoughts,” 6.
After a month of instituting stopgap measures 
with “friendly” bands while seeking military 
resources to augment the perceived ongoing 
battle with “hostiles,” Evans issued the fateful 
June 27th  Proclamation [see insert for full text]. 
3  The brief treatment of this statement in the 
Northwestern report is, in our view, inadequate.4 
This document is significant because it reflects 
not simply a kind overture toward “friendlies” as 
the Northwestern report characterizes it, but it 
also reflects a clearly articulated policy decision—
from the superintendent’s office, no less—to 
move toward, rather than away from war with 
many of the Native peoples residing within his 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it comes close to being an 
official declaration of war, albeit through the use 
of curious and obfuscating phrasing. For these and 
other reasons we see it as a harbinger for a major 
shift in the trajectory of events culminating in 
Chivington’s assault on the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
encampment at Sand Creek that occurred on 
November 29, 1864.
As we have indicated, events on the ground 
in spring and early summer point not to an 
unambiguous picture of “Indian war,” but rather 
to a variety of possibilities—a cycle of military 
oversteps and reprisals, Native retaliations, and 
intermittent attempts at peaceful negotiation. 
Given the complexity of the unfolding events, 
and Evans’s ability in his position as governor and 
superintendent to influence relevant parties’—and 
the public’s—interpretation of potentially but not 
necessarily escalating events, it is noteworthy that 
in this document, circulated by Indian agents, 
3 Evans to Colley, June 16; “To the Friendly Indians of  
the Plains...”, June 27, Governor’s Papers
4 Northwestern Report, 65.
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interpreters, and traders to tribes, Evans seems to 
up the ante. 
Evans’s June Proclamation is at once a warning, 
a set of instructions, and a public vehicle for 
representing his personal interpretation of the 
state of affairs in Colorado Territory. It begins by 
explaining to the “friendly Indians” (and to anyone 
reading) that some Cheyenne/Arapaho have 
“gone to war with the white people” as indicated 
by incidents of stealing stock, attacking soldiers, 
and even “murder.” This description overlooks 
the fact that many such incidents were responses 
to trespasses and deadly 
assaults on so-called 
“friendly Indians” by the 
military, as in the case 
of Cheyenne Chief Lean 
Bear’s murder less than a 
month prior, which deeply 
upset the Plains bands. 
Then, borrowing the 
condescending language 
long used by federal 
officials and recently 
employed by President 
Lincoln in his 1863 
speech to the gathering of 
Plains Indians (at which, 
ironically in retrospect, 
Lean Bear was present) the 
proclamation mentions 
the “Great Father” and 
invokes the notion of 
an impending righteous 
retribution in which 
specific groups are targeted. 
This rhetorical angry father 
“will certainly hunt them 
out and punish them, but 
he does not want to injure 
those who remain friendly 
to the whites. He wants 
to protect and take care 
of them.” Shifting to first 
person narration, Evans, 
as Governor, directs such Native peoples to “places 
of safety” at designated military outposts, where 
they are promised security and provisions. The 
proclamation fails to provide a timeline for willing 
parties to come to the outposts, which is significant 
since many bands were located in remote areas 
where they were pursuing game into late June. The 
lack of clear instruction regarding this distinction 
becomes crucial in the subsequent months.
The second paragraph reiterates the hostiles/
COLORADO SUPERINTENDENCY INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
Denver, June 27, 1864.
TO THE FRIENDLY INDIANS OF THE PLAINS:
Agents, interpreters, and traders will inform the friendly Indians of the plains that some 
members of their tribes have gone to war with the white people. They steal stock and 
run it off, hoping to escape detection and punishment. In some instances they have 
attacked and killed soldiers and murdered peaceable citizens. For this the Great Father 
is angry, and will certainly hunt them out and punish them, but he does not want to 
injure those who remain friendly to the whites. He desires to protect and take care of 
them. For this purpose I direct that all friendly Indians keep away from those who are 
at war, and go to places of safety. Friendly Arapahoes and Cheyennes belonging on the 
Arkansas River will go to Major Colley, U. S. Indian agent at Fort Lyon, who will give 
them provisions, and show them a place of safety. Friendly Kiowas and Comanches will 
go to Fort Larned, where they will be cared for in the same way. Friendly Sioux will 
go to their agent at Fort Laramie for directions. Friendly Arapahoes and Cheyennes of 
the Upper Platte will go to Camp Collins on the Cache la Poudre, where they will be 
assigned a place of safety and provisions will be given them.
The object of this is to prevent friendly Indians from being killed through mistake. 
None but those who intend to be friendly with the whites must come to these places. 
The families of those who have gone to war with the whites must be kept away from 
among the friendly Indians. The war on hostile Indians will be continued until they are 
all effectually subdued.
JOHN EVANS, 
Governor of Colorado and Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
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friendlies distinction standard in Indian policy, 
under the aegis of avoiding unintentional killings: 
However, it also draws another distinction whereby 
not only warriors but also their family members, 
which would necessarily include women, children, 
other male non-warriors, and elders, were explicitly 
barred from approaching the designated refuges. In 
contrast to Doty’s strategy of limiting the number 
of “hostiles,” by excluding family members from 
this calculus, Evans’s Proclamation casts as wide 
a net as possible. Indeed it explicitly puts women 
and children at risk. This language is also decidedly 
less restrained than General Samuel Curtis’s Field 
Order 1 just a month later, in which he stated, 
“Indians at war with us will be the object of our 
pursuit and destruction, but women and children 
must be spared.”5 Ultimately, it seems that this 
logic was given over to immortal infamy in 
Chivington’s expression that “nits make lice.”
The Northwestern Report refers to the June 
27th Proclamation as Evans’s “safe haven plan for 
the southern bands,” and notes that it produced 
“very limited results.” At least two major obstacles 
relevant to these events are referenced, the first 
being that the Indian Office refused to provide the 
necessary provisions to support the camps at the 
designated outposts, and the second being that, 
as peace-seeking Indians including Black Kettle 
and Left Hand later reported, sentries at many of 
the outposts would not let them approach and 
sometimes fired on them. The plan seems to have 
been more successful with the bands camped 
at Camp Collins with whom, according to the 
Northwestern report, Evans was still counting on a 
5 Roberts, Thoughts, 9.
treaty council.
What the Report fails to adequately address, 
as it relates to Evans’s culpability for subsequent 
events up to and including Sand Creek, is that the 
proclamation’s last sentence clearly articulates a 
threat of a full-scale war as endorsed by territorial 
leadership—indeed by the Indian superintendent 
himself: “The war on hostile Indians will be 
continued until they are all effectively subdued.” 
Based upon such evidence it is a difficult 
proposition to deny that the proclamation commits 
the territorial administration to war, despite 
the fact that a similar posture of war was never 
proclaimed by Cheyenne, Arapaho, or any other 
Native people within the boundaries of Colorado 
territory. Evans threatens war despite his duty, and 
indeed the primary responsibility as superintendent 
to pursue negotiations, which he had ample 
opportunity to do, so as to avoid war, and despite 
his official lack of authority to declare war. 
Moreover, wouldn’t Evans’s threat of redoubled 
hostilities by the military be a great obstacle to 
the Proclamation’s effectiveness in bringing the 
“friendly Indians” into the outposts?
A “General Indian War”
Despite the cautions from Curtis’s office in 
June, Evans seemed to interpret every event on 
the plains as a sign of a general Indian war.6  
Much of Evans’s information in early August 
seems to have come from agent Colley who was 
transmitting Chivington’s view that “all the tribes 
were involved in attacks and the governor’s efforts 
to promote peace had come to naught.”7 Yet as 
the Northwestern report documents, General 
Curtis and his force of 400 men scouting for 
raiding Indians in Arapaho and Cheyenne country 
throughout July, ultimately came up empty 
handed.8 In early August the cross-tribal raiding 
parties did resume and in Nebraska and Kansas 
6 Evans to General Curtis, June 16
7 NU Report, 66.
8 NU Report, 66.
Evans threatens war despite his duty, and indeed 
the primary responsibility as superintendent 
to pursue negotiations, which he had ample 
opportunity to do, so as to avoid war, and despite 
his official lack of authority to declare war. 
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killed “several” soldiers, while also taking “several” 
captives. Closer to Fort Lyon, Kiowas had led 
attacks that resulted in the killing of several 
settlers. By August, supplies to Denver were even 
being threatened. One result of the fear generated 
from these developments was that the price of 
flour, and other goods, tripled.9 Exactly what led 
to such a drastic escalation in price is unclear, but 
it is presumed that Holladay raised his rates to pay 
for the rebuilding of burnt stage stations.
On August 8, Evans wrote Commissioner Dole 
to plead for the “speedy reinforcement of [his] 
troops,” because, as he noted with now-typical 
fervor, “the tribes of the plains [were] nearly 
all combined in this terrible war.” Three days 
later, Evans demanded a return of the Colorado 
regiment fighting in the Civil War 600 miles away 
in Kansas. He also asked General Curtis to deploy 
an additional 5,000 soldiers along the Platte and 
the Arkansas. Curtis balked, demanding evidence 
of Native attacks from Evans, writing, “I wish 
you would give me facts, so I would know of your 
disasters.”10 On August 20, Curtis concluded, 
expressing exasperation to his secretary, that every 
report from Colorado is “censational [sic].”11 
Although it has been said that neither Evans nor 
Dole, as civilian officials, had the authority to 
direct troops against Native peoples, in letters 
to Evans, Major General Curtis referred to the 
Denver militia as “your militia” and speaks of 
them as if Evans was, indeed, commander with the 
 
9 Hyde, Life of George Bent, 139, 141-42.
10 Evans to Dole, August 10, 1864; Proclamation, August 
11, 1864; Evans to Charles Autibees, Esq, Boonville, 
CT, Aug. 16, 1864, Governor’s Papers.
11  Thoughts,” 10 See also Roberts, Sand Creek,  236.
ability to direct them to “aid...Federal troops.”12 
Further, Evans was relentless in his lobbying of 
Curtis and scores of other military officials to carry 
out operations to that end. 
Gary Roberts confirms Evans’s assessment 
that by late July it was “too late to salvage the 
peace” and “[t]he frequency and the distribution 
of Indian attacks in August confirmed a general 
Indian war...It was bloody and cruel and terrifying. 
No place between the Kansas settlements and the 
Rockies [was] truly safe. Cheyennes, Arapahos, 
Sioux, Kiowas, and Comanches were involved.”13 
A series of deadly attacks on settler colonists 
by Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors in August 
confirmed this. In the same period Cheyenne 
bands led by Black Kettle and White Antelope 
headed off toward Northern Kansas with the 
majority of the Southern Arapaho joining them, 
concerned that Evans’s call for them to come in 
the June Proclamation may have been a ruse. 
14  By the time of the reported attacks, however, 
the peace-seeking tribes had reversed course and 
led about five hundred people toward Fort Lyon, 
leaving only the Dog Soldiers to travel on toward 
the Solomon River. 15  The Dog Soldiers by 1864 
were a separate division of the Cheyenne nation, 
along with the Southern Cheyenne and Northern 
Cheyenne. They were also a fusion of Cheyenne 
and Sioux, even some Arapahos and Kiowas.16
12 Curtis to Evans, July 5, 1864, in Scott, The War of the 
Rebellion, serial 084, page 0053. http://ehistory.osu.
edu/books/official-records/084/0053
13 Roberts Dissertation.
14 Roberts, Sand Creek, 267.
15 Roberts, Sand Creek, 396, 398
16 Jean Afton, David Fridtjof  Halaas, and Andy Masich, 
Cheyenne Dog Soldiers: A Ledgerbook History of Coups 
and Combat (Niwot, Colo., and Denver: University 
Press of  Colorado and the Colorado Historical Society, 
1997), passim.
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In the grip of his rising panic, on August 11, 
Evans attempted to press his influence as the top 
political official in the territory by issuing his 
second proclamation. Scantly discussed in the 
Northwestern Report, presumably because it is 
characterized as “having little effect,” we believe 
that this document merits much more serious 
and careful review as it marks another critical step 
in John Evans’s decision-making, while revealing 
much about his mindset toward the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho by mid-August. [See insert for full text.] 
The first paragraph gives Evans’s account of his 
call for tribes to come to the four forts designated 
in the June 27th Proclamation. It claims that the 
evidence is now “conclusive” that the “tribes of 
the plains are at war and hostile to the whites,” 
and asserts that Evans has done his “utmost” to 
induce the tribes to these places of “subsistence 
and protection.” The extent of Evans’s efforts is 
highly debatable. Evans had sent out messengers, 
but aside from contact with the Arapaho leader, 
Roman Nose, Friday, and a few other of the 
deemed “friendly Indians,” he made little effort to 
induce others to come in. Although, as previously 
noted, most people who attempted to approach 
Fort Lyon were turned away at gunpoint by 
sentries as Curtis had ordered, Evans characterizes 
these Native people as having “refused” to 
come in.1 It strains credulity that Evans had no 
knowledge that military directives at some of the 
forts undermined his own instructions given the 
frequency with which he corresponded with fort 
officials.
Nonetheless, the claims in the proclamation’s 
first paragraph set up the governor’s  
 
1 Northwestern Report, 66 and footnote 31.
“authorization”—one whose legality is nowhere 
to be found in the realm of federal Indian law—
directing Colorado citizens to take up arms against 
so-called hostile Indians on the plains. Evans 
explicitly authorized settlers to organize killing 
parties targeting Indians perceived as a threat to 
territorial consolidation; to take captives; to hold 
“for their private use and benefit” any property 
they capture; and to receive “proper and just” 
reward for any property acquired. Evans then 
offers to furnish arms and ammunition and to pay 
any parties that will organize under the militia 
law of the territory to seek out and kill Indians, a 
promise Evans makes prior to martial law having 
been declared. The latter was an effort to recruit 
citizens to the federal regiment of hundred-day 
volunteers for which Evans had been lobbying 
Secretary of War Stanton. 
Under these enormously broad parameters, 
the caution to “scrupulously [avoid] those who 
have responded to [his] said call to rendezvous 
at the points indicated” cannot be understood 
as anything but an impotent caveat. No criteria 
are offered for violence-hungry settlers, who have 
been bombarded with anti-Indian sentiment 
from the state, the military, and local newspapers, 
and who would be outfitted and paid by the 
state, to differentiate hostile from friendly 
Indians. The proclamation does not merely carry 
a “vigilante tone” as the Northwestern report 
notes and for which critics have condemned it; 
it is a blanket endorsement of citizen violence 
against Native people in partnership with 
territorial civil leadership. Concluding that, 
“few citizens appear to have taken up arms 
against threatening Cheyennes and Arapahos” 
is not a basis for evaluating the potential impact 
The Second Proclamation
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of the proclamation. 
The document 
puts forth a clearly 
articulated framework of 
encouragement from the 
top political official in the 
territory for widespread, 
undisciplined, and 
preemptive warfare against 
Native occupants of the 
region.2
 As for issuing 
such a proclamation as 
superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, not in any stretch of 
the imagination could the 
laws that were in place at 
the time be interpreted as 
permitting a superintendent 
to send cadres of armed 
citizens to exterminate and 
loot unidentified Native 
people. As ambivalent as 
federal Indian law and 
policy may have been at 
this time, the authorization 
of superintendents to 
send enforcement forces 
into Indian country to 
arrest suspected wrong 
doers could only be done 
with the approval of 
the president. The law 
of 1858, however, did 
authorize superintendents 
to bar potential or 
identified troublemakers 
or questionable individuals 
(rogue settlers) from 
entering Native lands. 
Given his role as 
superintendent, even 
2 Northwestern Report, 67.
BY ORDER OF HON. JOHN EVANS 
GOVERNOR, TERRITORY OF COLORADO 
AUGUST 11, 1864
PROCLAMATION.
Having sent special messengers to the Indians of the plains, directing the friendly to 
rendezvous at Fort Lyon, Fort Larned, Fort Laramie, and Camp Collins for safety and 
protection, warning them that all hostile Indians would be pursued and destroyed, and 
the last of said messengers having now returned, and the evidence being conclusive that 
most of the Indian tribes of the plains are at war and hostile to the whites, and having 
to the utmost of my ability endeavored to induce all of the Indians of the plains to 
come to said places of rendezvous, promising them subsistence and protection, which, 
with a few exceptions, they have refused to do:
Now, therefore, I, John Evans, governor of Colorado Territory, do issue this my 
proclamation, authorizing all citizens of Colorado, either individually or in such parties 
as they may organize, to go in pursuit of all hostile Indians on the plains, scrupulously 
avoiding those who have responded to my said call to rendezvous at the points 
indicated; also, to kill and destroy, as enemies of the country, wherever they may be 
found, all such hostile Indians. And further, as the only reward I am authorized to offer 
for such services, I hereby empower such citizens, or parties of citizens, to take captive, 
and hold to their own private use and benefit, all the property of said hostile Indians 
that they may capture, and to receive for all stolen property recovered from said Indians 
such reward as may be deemed proper and just therefor.
I further offer to all such parties as will organize under the militia law of the 
Territory for the purpose to furnish them arms and ammunition, and to present their 
accounts for pay as regular soldiers for themselves, their horses, their subsistence, and 
transportation, to Congress, under the assurance of the department commander that 
they will be paid.
The conflict is upon us, and all good citizens are called upon to do their duty for the 
defence of their homes and families.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the great seal of the 
Territory of Colorado to be affixed this 11th day of August, A. D. 1864.
JOHN EVANS
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under conditions of crisis (which he had reason 
to perceive by August), Evans nonetheless still 
had the responsibility as both superintendent and 
governor to ensure that irresponsible individuals—
which the vast majority of the 3rd Regiment of 
Colorado volunteers led by Chivington at Sand 
Creek proved to be—not be given license to 
kill and plunder as they wished. The August 11 
Proclamation, however, did exactly that.
So although Evans may not have explicitly 
authorized Chivington and his troops to attack the 
peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho camped on the 
boundary of their promised reservation at Sand 
Creek in late November, the August Proclamation 
certainly emboldened settlers inclined to war. It 
must have seemed as if Chivington and not Evans 
was “in charge” of Indian policy from August 
11 forward. The policy laid out in this fateful 
document was tantamount to a declaration of war, 
and it was one which Evans had no legal authority 
to make.
The rationale for Evans’s August Proclamation 
was the perception of a general state of Indian war. 
In light of this, it is worth pausing to consider 
whether the escalating conflict was at least in 
part due to the fact that the Colorado Indian 
superintendency had by August become a hand-in-
glove abettor to the plans and obsessions of local 
military commanders poised to carry out the wars 
of extermination that were clamored for in venues 
such as William Byers and John Dailey’s Rocky 
Mountain News. The Northwestern report cites 
the “inflammatory” tone of the correspondence 
among military personnel in April and May 1864 
as indicative of a readiness for war; but it is also 
noteworthy that between June 14 and November 
14, 1864, these letters are awash with exasperated, 
frantic, and inflammatory language directed 
towards the idea of a general Indian war, even 
during months when there were little to no active 
hostilities.3 By late summer 1864 this hoped-for 
war had become a reality, though how “general” or 
widespread it was remains debatable. The conflict 
that was taking place can be more fruitfully viewed 
as the culmination of a long and consistent claim 
from Evans to his federal superiors that a coalition 
of Native nations was already waging a general 
war against white settlers on the Plains—a kind 
of self-fulfilling prophesy cultivated more than 
anyone else (besides Chivington) by John Evans. 
Evans’s panic over a general Indian war seemed to 
have found its original expression in letters from 
late 1862 and accelerated from late 1863 through 
all of 1864, all we must recall, on the words of 
a single spy, Robert North, and in the skeptical 
reports of military leaders such as General Curtis. 
The situation only grew worse after the Second 
Proclamation.
3 Examples of  this phrasing include: “Indian murders,” 
“burning houses,” “Cheyenne charged 100 troops,” 
“killed 25 Indians,” “destroyed a village,” “chastising 
the hostile ones,” “infernal Indians,” “this Indian War 
is no myth,” “put forces after the hostile Indians,” 
“hostile Indians on the Overland Route,” “Utes prepar-
ing to attack Conejos,” “Indians have nearly all joined 
in the hostilities,” “largest Indian war this country ever 
had,” “hostile disposition of  the Indians in the vivinity 
(sic) of  Ft. Lyon,” “go in pursuit of  all hostile Indians 
on the plains,” “gigantic Indian war,” “one thousand 
warriors in camp to strike our frontier settlements,” 
and Evans’s August 11 proclamation authorizing 
anybody and everybody who wanted to do so to hunt 
down “hostile Indians” and “hold to their own private 
use and benefit all the property of  said hostile Indians 
that they may capture.”
The document puts forth a clearly articulated 
framework of encouragement from the top 
political official in the territory for widespread, 
undisciplined, and preemptive warfare 
against Native occupants of the region.
66   The Declaration of  Martial Law
In the direct aftermath of these events Col. John 
Chivington declared martial law on August 
23, at the request of Denver businessmen who 
“hoped to promote enlistments of 100-day men 
to rid our territory of all hostile Indians”.1 One 
definition of martial law would simply be “the 
exercise of government and control by military 
authorities over the civilian population of a 
designated territory.” But such a state of affairs 
“carries no precise meaning.”2 Most declarations 
of martial law do, however, share some common 
features. Generally, the institution of martial law 
contemplates some degree of military force. To a 
varying extent, depending on how a declaration 
of martial law is expressed, federal military 
personnel have the authority to make and enforce 
civil and criminal laws. Certain civil liberties may 
be suspended, such as the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of 
association, and freedom of movement.”3 Utah 
Territorial Governor Brigham Young declared 
martial law on September 11, 1857, authorizing 
Utah’s citizens to arm themselves to resist federal 
troops on their way to Utah. Again, there is no 
indication of when martial law may have been 
lifted; but apparently a distinct change in the 
authority structure whereby the person who 
declared martial law and no longer in authority 
could be taken as the ultimate determinate. 
Young’s appointed replacement, Albert Cumming, 
arrived in Salt Lake City on April 5, 1858 and  
 
1 Rocky Mountain News, August 23, 1864. Roberts, 
Dissertation, 301-304 also discusses the enlistment 
priority of  the declaration of  martial law.
2 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 
90 L. Ed. 688 [1946].
3 TheFreeDictionary. “Martial Law.” Accessed Sept. 01, 
2014
assumed leadership of the government on April 
6. President Buchanan’s proclamation offering 
amnesty to any Mormons who submitted to 
federal authority was accepted by Mormon leaders. 
Thus, Utah martial law seems to have begun on 
September 11, 1857 and ended on April 6, 1858.
In Colorado, particularly Denver, businesses 
were closed, and travel out of the city was shut 
off.4 These measures probably reinforced the 
Governor’s proclamation urging formation of 
vigilante posses. However, in fact, the military 
justification for martial law was quite specific: 
to fill out enlistments for the 3rd regiment. 
But the most important aspect of this series 
of incidents seems to be that General Curtis 
accepted the declaration of martial law as a fait 
accompli and part and parcel of the military’s 
complete takeover of civilian affairs, including 
the Indian superintendency. Therefore, it seems 
that it may have been assumed, at least by Denver 
residents, that martial law was in effect from late 
August until the early days of January, 1865, 
after Chivington’s commission had expired and 
he was replaced by Colonel Thomas Moonlight. 
It seems that Dole also assumed, as of October 
15, that martial law was indeed in force and 
therefore Chivington, not Evans, was in charge of 
Colorado’s civil and military structure.
In his October 15 letter to Evans of, Dole 
unequivocally says that his directive to Evans—to 
negotiate peace—is still very much in effect: “… 
As superintending of Indian affairs, it is your duty 
to hold yourself in readiness to encourage and 
receive the first intimations of a desire on the part 
of the Indians for a permanent peace, and to  
 
4 http://www.kclonewolf.com/History/SandCreek/ 
Accessed Aug. 31, 2014
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cooperate with the military in securing a treaty of  
peace and amity…” He directs Evans to cooperate 
with the military only because the civil authority 
was “in abeyance”—because Evans had declared it 
so! Evans’s Proclamation of August 11 essentially 
created an unregulated vigilante force, and 
Chivington’s declaration of martial law on August 
23 placed that vigilante force into service as 
regulated U.S. Army troops, the Colorado 3rd 
Regiment, which Evans had requested be formed. 
Here is how it might have looked to outside 
observers: First there were the Hungate murders, 
the bodies of a family discovered by a posse of 
ranchers, freighters and soldiers searching for 
Indian war parties that were stealing livestock in 
the area” on June 11, and the subsequent display of 
their bodies in Denver on June 14, accompanied 
by wild rumors of a massive Dog Soldier attack 
on the ranch where the Hungate family was 
murdered. Then came the subsequent panic, 
with Denver residents taking refuge in barricaded 
Denver buildings and ransacking the armory for 
guns. Then rancher William Shortridge, followed 
by dozens of settlers from the eastern plains who 
abandoned their homes at the news Shortridge 
carried, frantically rode into town with the news 
that a large band of warriors were headed straight 
for Denver. (As it turns out, the large cloud of 
dust that Shortridge saw billowing in the distance 
and assumed was Indians was simply a bunch 
of cattle that stampeded when Mexican cattle 
drivers lost control of them.) To anyone witnessing 
such hysteria, it must have seemed that only the 
military could keep order and therefore the total 
authority of the military, under martial law, would 
be assumed.
In abdicating civilian authority, Evans made 
an unprecedented, and improper abandonment 
of his responsibilities as superintendent of Indian 
affairs to that of the military. Evans appears to 
have lost the ability to negotiate peace when, 
on the same day as the Sept. 28 council, Curtis 
telegraphs Chivington that “he alone could make 
peace,” and characterized the Indian Office as too 
eager to come to terms. “I want no peace until the 
Indians suffer more.” Although the Northwestern 
University Report infers from this statement that 
only Curtis had authority to negotiate peace, 
military command trumped the Indian office 
only temporarily and locally in unmistakable 
battle situations.5 There was really no precedent 
for Evans’s apparent total abandonment of the 
Colorado superintendency. Most usually, if military 
procedures were undertaken, military personnel 
would report to the Indian superintendency.
Again here is where a comparison is useful. 
Between May, 1860 and May, 1863 – when Doty 
started his peace negotiations – there were 18 
recorded (and probably another 3-4 unrecorded) 
altercations between whites and Native people 
along the Overland Road in Nevada and Utah, 
not counting the Bear River massacre. In that 
three-year period, it could be said that there was 
considerable antagonism between settler colonists 
and the Indigenous inhabitants. Yet none of 
the correspondence from the Indian Bureau 
representatives ever uses the term “war”. It’s always 
“depredations” by the Indians or if Indians are 
killed, then “battle”. The Indian superintendents 
of both territories never yielded responsibility 
to the military. Colonel Patrick Connor went 
marching off on his search-and-destroy mission 
in October, 1862 (possibly taking advantage of 
the uncertainty in superintendency authority due 
to the uncertainty of boundaries between Nevada 
and Utah and Utah and Washington Territories 
at the time), with neither advice nor input from 
Superintendents/ Governors Nye, Doty, and 
Martin or from agents Lockhart, Hatch, Wasson, 
and Mann. Although Connor was present at two 
treaty signings (Fort Bridger and Ruby Valley) he 
was not in charge of either. Following the Bear 
River massacre, he was clearly at Doty’s direction 
at the Treaty signings of Fort Bridger and Ruby 
Valley.6
5 Northwestern Report, 72.
6 Letters, Doty to Dole, July 18, 1863, M-901. Connor 
even offered his troops at Doty’s disposal to build 
housing for Indians on the new reservations that would 
be established.
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A pivotal opportunity for Evans to pull away 
from the apparent free fall into war arrived in 
early September through the initiative of some 
Native leaders. Learning of Evans’s June 27th 
Proclamation late in the summer, Black Kettle and 
other Cheyenne and Southern Arapaho leaders 
had been appealing to members of various tribal 
military societies to end the raids and restore 
peace.1  On September 6, One Eye, his wife, and 
another Cheyenne arrived outside of Ft. Lyon 
waving a white flag. They carried a note dictated 
by Black Kettle and drafted by George Bent, the 
mixed-race son of trader William Bent and Owl 
Woman, who spoke English. The note, addressed 
to agent Samuel Colley, was a direct response to 
Evans’s Proclamation. It reported that a recent 
council of chiefs had agreed to “make peace with 
you providing you make peace with the Kiowas, 
Comanches, Arapahoes [sic] and Apaches, and 
Sioux.”2 Referencing Indian prisoners in Denver, 
Black Kettle offered to return seven settler 
prisoners captured in recent raids 
Suspicious of the arrival of the three Cheyenne, 
Wynkoop was initially furious at his men for 
letting the leaders through and worried that 
Black Kettle’s proposal might be a trap.3 But to 
free the prisoners in question, which included 
children, Wynkoop gathered 127 cavalry and 
some weapons and rode to Smoky Hill, where over 
1 NU Report, 68
2 Black Keettle & 7 Other Chieves to Major Colley, 29 
August 1864, RCIA 1864, 377. This is online at http://
www2.coloradocollege.edu/library/specialcollections/
Manuscript/SandCreek/Kettle1.html 
3 Halaas and Masich, Halfbreed, 134; NU Report, 68.
2,000 Cheyenne and 200 Arapaho were camped.4 
Wynkoop recovered four captive children and 
conferenced with the groups’ leaders. Seeing an 
opportunity to broker a larger peace settlement for 
the region, Wynkoop promised safety for a peace 
delegation to travel to Denver to meet with Evans. 
The Native leaders accepted his offer. In retrospect, 
Wynkoop regretted his failure to ask superiors for 
their approval of this mission, an oversight he paid 
for a few months later when he was replaced at the 
Ft. Lyon post.5 
Evans learned about Black Kettle’s letter 
through agent Colley and Wynkoop’s subsequent 
notification that he was en route to Denver with 
the delegation of Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders. 
In preparation for the meeting Wynkoop met with  
 
4 Edward W. Wynkoop to “FORT LYON, COLO, TER., Sep-
tember 18, 1864. Lieut. J. E. Tappan, Acting Assistant 
Adjutant-General, Dist. of  Upper Arkansas.”   Most 
historians give the number as 127.
5 NU Report, 69.
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Evans and seemed to have had some difficulty 
convincing him to speak with the tribal leaders. 
According to Gary Roberts, Evans chillingly “told 
Wynkoop matters were out of his hand, and that 
the Indians needed to be punished more to insure 
peace. More than once Evans asked, ‘What will I 
do with the 3rd Regiment if I make peace?’ He told 
Wynkoop, ‘The 3rd Regiment was raised to kill 
Indians, and kill Indians it must.’”6 Evans asserted 
that his credibility in Washington would be lost if, 
having agitated so stridently for war, he now made 
peace. Given Evans’s insistence to Washington that 
the defense of Colorado required the recruitment 
of 100-day volunteers, the Governor seemed 
more concerned about his reputation than the 
consequences of an open war. 
Even Evans’s firm ally, William Byers of 
the Rocky Mountain News, seemed to differ 
with Evans about the value of pursuing peace 
negotiations. As Roberts notes, “The following 
day the News reported that Byers had met with 
Wynkoop as well, concluding ‘we believe it is the 
part of prudence to compromise with the tribes 
named upon the terms which they propose. They 
have unquestionably had great provocation for 
hostilities, and were not the first to violate friendly 
relations.’” 7 
Despite the tribal leaders having travelled some 
400 miles at great personal risk after learning of 
Evans’s June 27th Proclamation, Wynkoop had 
difficulty in even getting Evans to meet with them. 
Still under the mandate of the Treaty commission, 
Evans’s actions indicated he had no interest in 
this fresh chance to address concerns and broker 
new agreements with key leaders. This refusal 
would seem to be in direct defiance of Indian 
Commissioner Dole, who had only recently 
(in 1862) supervised Doty’s successful efforts at 
obtaining peace with the Shoshone and Bannocs, 
who were blamed for far more clashes with settlers  
than the Cheyenne and Arapaho. Clearly, Dole did  
 
6 Roberts, Thoughts, 12.
7 Roberts, Thoughts,” 12-13. See also The NU Report, 
70.
not want another Indian war and he undertook 
sufficient efforts to avoid it.
In the end, however, Evans decided that 
he could not avoid speaking with the Native 
representatives and finally did so on September 
28 at Camp Weld. It is instructive to examine in 
detail the official published report of the meeting, 
which included the Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs, 
Governor Evans, Colonel John Chivington, and 
Major Edward Wynkoop. The report reflects 
perspectives on the issues of the Upper Arkansas 
reservation, the issue of subsistence, “depredations,” 
and the role of the military in Indian-settler 
relations. More importantly, it demonstrates a 
critical moment in which Evans effectively violates 
the military “divide and rule” strategy of separating 
“hostile” (by colonial definitions) from “friendly” 
Indians. By refusing to make peace with the chiefs 
who came into Denver to council, the governor-
superintendent effectively treats the most avowedly 
friendly Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs as if they 
were enemies, using the martial law scenario he has 
helped put into place as his rationale for doing so. 
Pleas and Rebuffs
When they were finally gathered, Black Kettle 
was first to speak and eloquently appealed for 
conciliation, even deferring to Evans via the 
language of the territorial “father”:8
8 Halaas and Malich, Halfbreed, 138; all following quota-
tions and dialogue are from the Report of Council with 
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Chiefs and Warriors, Brought to 
Denver by Major Wynkoop, Taken Down by U.S. Indian 
Agent Simeon Whiteley as it Progressed, Camp Weld, 
Denver, Wednesday, Sept. 28, 1864, The State Histori-
cal Society of  Colorado, 226 Evans Box 6/17, Folder 
FF64.
More than once Evans asked, “What will I do  
with the 3rd Regiment if I make peace?” He  
told Wynkoop, “The 3rd Regiment was raised to  
kill Indians, and kill Indians it must.”
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We have come with our eyes shut, following [Major 
Wynkoop’s] handful of men like coming through 
the fire. All we ask is that we have peace with the 
whites. We want to hold you by the hand. You are 
our father. We have been traveling thro’ a cloud. The 
sky has been dark ever since the war began. These 
braves who are with me are all willing to do what 
I say. We want to take good tidings home to our 
people, that they may sleep in peace. I want you to 
give all the chiefs of these soldiers to understand that 
we are for peace, and that we have made peace, that 
we may not be mistaken by them for enemies. I have 
not come here with a little wolf bark, but have come 
to talk plain with you. We must live near the buffalo 
or starve. When we came here we came free, without 
any apprehension to see you, and when I go home 
and tell my people that I have taken your hand, and 
the hand of all the chiefs here in Denver, they will 
feel well, and so will all the different tribes of Indians 
on the Plains, after we have eaten and drank with 
them.
Evans responded, “I am sorry you did not 
respond to my appeal at once. I wish you had 
done this when I issued my Proclamation.” But as 
noted above, Evans’s Proclamation had not given 
the Cheyenne or Arapaho any set or reasonable 
timetable to appear for negotiations. Black Kettle 
had made every effort to comply, and as he and 
Left Hand conveyed to both Wynkoop and 
Joseph Cramer, many peace-seeking Native people 
had in fact been turned away by soldiers when 
attempting to approach the outposts. Moreover, as 
the Northwestern Report notes, the proclamation 
and related messages had not explained how 
particular Indians were to be categorized as friendly 
or hostile.9 This ambiguity was a result of Evans’s 
leadership failures as manifest in his imprecise and 
erroneous directives.
White Antelope was one leader who expressed 
worry, stating, “I fear that these new soldiers who  
 
9  Northwestern Report, 67.
have gone out, may kill some of my people while I 
am here.” 
Governor Evans, seemingly aware of the threat, 
replied, “There is great danger of it.” 
Evans then continued to direct the conversation 
to the supposed state of general Indian warfare, 
the existence of which he had been declaring 
since late 1862. Carrying a grudge for more than 
a year following the failed council, Evans accused 
the leaders—men who had already signed the 
Fort Wise Treaty and who had now come to him 
at great personal risk—of being allied with the 
Lakota and having committed depredations: “I 
was under the necessity, after all my trouble, and 
all the expense [of coming out with “gifts” for 
the meeting he tried to set up on September 1, 
1863], of returning home without seeing them,” he 
complained. “Instead of this...You have gone into 
an alliance with the Sioux, who were at war with 
us.” Evans then reiterated this accusatory refrain, 
drawn almost exclusively from the words of the 
spy, Robert North. 
The leaders denied the allegation. “I don’t 
know who could have told you this,” the 
transcript records Black Kettle as saying in 
reference to Evans’s assumption that going into 
country controlled by the Lakota was indicative 
of an alliance with them. In reality they were 
simply searching for buffalo. Evans refused to be 
convinced, stating, “No matter who said this but 
your conduct has proved to my satisfaction that 
was the case.” Several of the Natives in attendance 
responded, asserting, “This is a mistake. We have 
made no alliance with the Sioux, or any one 
else.” As the meeting report shows, the Cheyenne 
and Arapahos also pointed out that they did not 
know the reasons for the fighting launched by 
Chivington’s forces in the three battles of the 
spring, with White Antelope raising this question 
to Evans, who simply ignored it:
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Gov. Evans: Who took the stock from Fremont’s 
Orchard, and had the first fight with the soldiers this 
spring, north of there?
White Antelope: Before answering this question 
I would like for you to know that this was the 
beginning of war and I should like to know what it 
was for, as a soldier fired first.
Gov. Evans: The Indians had stolen about forty 
horses, the soldiers went to recover them, and the 
Indians fired a volley into their ranks.
White Antelope: This is all a mistake.  They were 
coming down the Bijou, and found one horse and 
one mule. They returned one horse before they got 
to Geary’s to a man, then went to Geary’s, expecting 
to turn the other one over to some one.  They then 
heard that the soldiers and Indians were fighting 
somewhere down the Platte; then they took fright, 
and all fled.
The fact of the matter was that the fighting 
broke out because Colonel Chivington had 
declared war on them.
Evans also took the opportunity to further 
castigate these peace-seeking representatives 
during this council for not settling on the Upper 
Arkansas reservation. But Evans’s claims about the 
reservation merit close scrutiny. “We have been 
spending thousands of dollars in opening farms 
for you, and making preparations to feed, protect, 
and make you comfortable,” he told the Indians. 
This statement was, if not an unequivocal lie, at 
best an optimistic self-delusion. Evans had indeed 
inspected construction of reservation buildings, 
writing about it to Commissioner Dole on April 
11, 1864: “I just returned from a visit to the 
Upper Arkansas Agency...The new line of ditch 
I should judge to be well laid. It will irrigate a 
very large track of land in addition to the Agency 
and school lands principly [sic] on the Arapahoe 
portion of the Reservation...No finer building 
stone can be found anywhere than one on the 
grounds in great abundance and easily quarried. 
If this suggestion is approved please telegraph.”10 
Evans had indeed requested money from Dole on 
June 3 for improvements to the reservation, but on 
June 7 he referred to conflict between claimants 
to (Mexican) land grants and Native peoples as 
already having “been productive of trouble.”11 In 
fact, however, the grants in question were located 
to the east of the reservation’s western boundary, 
and colonists had no rights to settle there either 
under Mexican or U.S. land tenure rules. The 
grant, as congressionally confirmed, had as its 
northeast boundary the Arkansas and Purgatoire 
Rivers.12 The Upper Arkansas Reservation was east 
of the grant.
The upshot is that Evans’s description at 
Camp Weld of having made the Upper Arkansas 
reservation “comfortable” for the Indians was 
hardly plausible, especially given that settlers had 
invaded the reservation, a fact of which Evans 
was well aware. It is not quite clear whether the 
invasion occurred prior to negotiation of the 1861 
treaty, but it seems that it likely occurred in 1862 
and 1863. Evans’s idea for solving this conflict of 
title on the Upper Arkansas reservation was “to 
get The Indians to release title to the invaders!”13 
Even the portion that had not been claim-jumped 
by the settlers was leased out to “tenants” and 
“Major” S.G. Colley, the agent, was farming the 
rest “on Government account.”14 Given these facts, 
where, one might ask, was there any room for the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho? Could they be expected to 
settle among hostile settler colonists?
Additionally, there was bureaucratic confusion 
concerning just for whom the reservation was  
 
10 Evans to Dole, April 11, 1864, Governor’s Papers.
11 Evans to Dole, June 03, 1864; see also Evans to Craig, 
May 16th (186), 4 #196, Governor’s Papers.
12 Bonnie J. Clark, Amache Ochinee Powers: An Archaeobi-
ography of a Cheyenne Indian. Masters Thesis, Depart-
ment of  Anthropology, 1996, 46.
13 Evans to Dole June 07, 1864, Governor’s Papers
14 Evans to Chivington, Sept. 12, 1864, Governor’s Pa-
pers
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being prepared. Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs Charles Mix, a career bureaucrat who filled 
in whenever the commissioner was unavailable, 
had instructed “Major” Colley, just a year 
earlier, that a “Mr. Wright” was in the process of 
purchasing supplies for the Caddoes, for whom 
the reservation had been designated.15 Only if 
the Caddoes turned out not to be interested in 
settling there would the reservation be exclusively 
for the Cheyenne and Arapaho, Wright implied 
in August 1863.16 Wright was also supposed 
to survey the reservation. This was the problem 
about which Evans apologized to Dole a week 
later. (See above.) The most important aspect of 
the situation is that Evans insisted to Wright that 
“treaty negotiations would be necessary before 
plans for dividing the land could be carried 
out,” presumably to get additional Indians to 
agree to settle there, but perhaps to negotiate 
different or additional reservation sites.17 If Evans 
placed so much importance on his obligations 
as Treaty commissioner, why did he not take the 
opportunity to renew negotiations when given the 
clearest possible chance a year later?18
It is also deeply ironic, given Evans’s Camp 
Weld references to the reservation, that the Sand  
 
15 Evans to Dole June 07, 1864, Governor’s Papers.
16 (Acting Commissioner of  Indian Affairs) Mix to Colley, 
August 14, 1863, No. 65, 140-42 in ARCIA for 1863
17 Roberts, Sand Creek, 165
18 Other pieces of  correspondence reinforced the 
reservation’s problematic status. On Sept. 12 1864, 
Evans wrote to Chivington, in reply to a letter from 
him on the 11th, stating enigmatically that he was 
“not able to state positively the amount of  damage 
[the buildings on the property] are liable to from fire” 
but presumes they “had been finished” and would be 
seriously damaged or destroyed if  fired.” Was Evans 
anticipating an additional threat from Indians? Had the 
settler colonists threatened to burn the buildings on 
the reservation? Was Chivington thinking of  burning 
them? The exact meaning of  this enigmatic piece of  
communication is impossible to interpret, but at the 
very least it suggests the at best fragile state of  this 
purported haven for the Cheyenne and Arapaho. 
Creek encampment which Chivington was to 
viciously attack on November 29 was either right 
on the reservation’s northwestern boundary or 
perhaps just within it. Since the surveying for this 
track had not been completed it would have been 
nearly impossible for either the superintendency 
or the Cheyenne and Arapaho to know if they 
were within its boundaries when they were sent 
there after arriving in Ft. Lyon, as directed at the 
end of the Camp Weld conference. Cheyennes 
and Arapahos were legitimately within their 
rights to be in residence, where they were 
camped, undisturbed, at the Upper Arkansas 
Reservation. Given their close relationship with 
Major Wynkoop, who had escorted them and 
co-arranged with them the council with Evans 
on September 28, it would take a deliberate 
rendition of interpretation to put a construction 
on the situation to construe the residents of this 
camp as appropriate for attack. There is no way 
that any reasonable interpretation other than 
“coming into Fort Lyon” and as “friendly” could be 
accommodated. 
Toward the end of the meeting, Evans claimed 
that he was obligated to turn the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho over to the Army, given his claim 
that the settlers and Native peoples were at war: 
“Another reason that I am not in a condition 
to make a treaty, is that war is begun, and the 
power to make a treaty of peace has passed from 
me to the Great War Chief,” he asserted. This 
statement is particularly startling as it clearly 
indicates an abdication of his responsibility under 
Dole’s instruction, as well as in his role of Indian 
commissioner, to negotiate for peace at every 
opportunity. Instead, it seems clear that Evans 
felt he could avoid such by telling the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho representatives in the council—
who were there in good faith in response to his 
orders that all “friendly Indians” come in and seek 
peace—instead that a war was already in progress 
and that he anticipated the launch of a winter 
campaign that would “drive all the Indians off the 
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plains,” despite this not being his charge in either 
of his official capacities. As a consequence, Evans 
rebuffed the perilous efforts that were made on 
the part of Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders in an 
attempt to ensure peace. “All we ask is that we have 
peace with the whites”, said Black Kettle, on behalf 
of conciliation. “We want to hold you by the 
hand...”19 Evans clearly rejected this opportunity 
to parlay the meeting into an agreement that could 
have set events on a new trajectory and likely 
averted the massacre. 
When considering what might have motivated 
Evans’s reasoning, the language Evans employed 
the following day in a one-paragraph message to 
Indian agent Colley is illuminating:
SIR: The chiefs brought in by Major Wynkoop have 
been heard. I have declined to make any peace with 
them, lest it might embarrass the military operations 
 
19  Halaas and Malich, Halfbreed, 138.
against the hostile Indians of the plains. The 
Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians being now at war 
with the United States government, must make 
peace with the military authorities. Of course this 
arrangement relieves the Indian bureau of their 
care until peace is declared with them; and as these 
tribes are yet scattered, and all except Friday’s band 
are at war, it is not probable that it will be done 
immediately. You will be particular to impress upon 
these chiefs the fact that my talk with them was for 
the purpose of ascertaining their views, and not 
to offer them anything whatever. They must deal 
with the military authorities until peace, in which 
case, alone, they will be in proper position to treat 
with the government in relation to the future.20 
(Emphasis added)
Likely dashed off as a quick recap to ensure 
Colley understands the plan, much is conveyed 
in this message. Evans does not explain that he 
is operating on military instruction or protocol; 
instead he “declines,” chooses, not to make peace, 
because it will “embarrass military operations.” The 
logic is clear: he has rejected the offer because the 
military campaign has priority. In so doing, he has 
exercised his authority as superintendent. Too, in 
his phrasing all Cheyenne and Arapaho are at war 
(even these bands, apparently) and, to spell it out 
to Colley in no uncertain terms, “this arrangement 
relieves the Indian bureau of their care until peace 
is declared,” despite the reality that the military’s 
instructions are certainly not to make peace. The 
superintendent instructs Colley to reiterate to 
the chiefs when they return that he only wanted 
to gather information from them, not to give 
them anything. Evans has relieved the Colorado 
superintendency of the matter.
Following his stated inability to make peace, 
Evans’s next words are particularly striking, 
especially coming from the highest ranking  
 
20 John Evans to Maj. S.G. Colley, September 29, 1864, 
in “Condition of  the Tribes,” Report of  the Joint Spe-
cial Committee, Government Printing Office, 1867, 82.
Front row, kneeling, left to right: Major Edward W. Wynkoop, 
commander at Fort Lyon and later agent for the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes; Captain Silas S. Soule, provost marshal, later mur-
dered in Denver. Middle row, seated, left to right: White Ante-
lope (or perhaps White Wolf), Bull Bear, Black Kettle, One Eye, 
Natame (Arapaho). Back row, standing, left to right: Colorado 
militiaman, unknown civilian, John H. Smith (interpreter), Heap 
of Buffalo (Arapaho), Neva (Arapaho), unknown civilian, sentry. 
Another identification states that Neva is seated on the left and 
the Indian next to Smith is White Wolf (Cheyenne).  |  Colorado 
Historical Society
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official appointed to negotiate with the tribes of 
the Colorado territory: “The time when you can 
make war best, is in the summer time; when I can 
make war best, is in the winter. You, so far have 
had the advantage; my time is just coming.”21 
Evans explicitly articulates a desire to attack entire 
Native camps—not just engage in battles with 
groups of warriors—when they would be at their 
most vulnerable. Indeed, as Evans well knew, even 
having expressed admiration for the event, Colonel 
Connor’s massacre at the Shoshone winter camp at 
Bear River in January 1863 had also resulted in the 
deaths of many women and children. As General 
Carleton had also mentioned in late June, the 
advantage of a winter attack was that the normally 
mobile and elusive tribes would be camped, and, 
thus, have a difficult time mounting a defense 
as their first priority would be to protect the 
women and children. Therefore, winter campaigns 
led, intentionally and inevitably, to substantial 
casualties among populations of innocents. Did 
Evans have the Bear River massacre in mind when 
he spoke so menacingly and in the first person? Or 
had he remembered General Carleton’s description 
of military strategy against the Navajo and other 
native nations of the southwest, but then forgotten 
about his urging to do everything he could for 
peace?
We cannot know his thoughts, of course, 
but the strategy Evans employed at the Camp 
Weld conference seems intended to redefine all 
Cheyenne and all Arapaho as enemies, with the 
21 Report of Council with Cheyenne and Arapahoe Chiefs 
and Warriors, Brought to Denver by Major Wynkoop, 
Taken Down by U.S. Indian Agent Simeon Whiteley as it 
Progressed, Camp Weld, Denver, Wednesday, Sept. 28, 
1864, The State Historical Society of  Colorado, 226 
Evans Box 6/17, Folder FF64
only exclusion being the two bands at Camp 
Collins. Again, this refusal to increase the ranks of 
“friendlies” though this very obvious opportunity 
is a departure from the standard military policy. 
Evans initially seems to leave a door open in this 
wall of refusal and conflict escalation, telling the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho at the meeting that the 
only way they could be on the side of the territorial 
government would be to help the soldiers—in 
other words, to fight Evans’s enemies, “all Indians 
who are fighting us.”
Black Kettle was amenable to this idea. He 
thought he could get his young men to help the 
soldiers, as long as it was assured that “that we may 
have peace with the whites.” This statement would 
seem to indicate the urgency felt by the chiefs in 
their negotiations with Evans. Bull Bear reinforced 
Black Kettle’s proposal, noting that assistance to 
the troops along with a peace agreement should 
be accompanied by “presents.” But despite these 
overtures, Evans seemed to reject the strategy 
just as Black Kettle and Bull Bear agreed to it, 
and began a prosecutorial interrogation on the 
subject of who was responsible for a litany of 
seven incidents of “depredation.” When queried 
by White Antelope about the idea of helping the 
soldiers in return for peace and presents, Evans 
reversed himself, saying that he could “not say 
anything about those things.”
Altogether, the Cheyenne and Arapaho had 
difficulty in keeping Evans focused on the topic 
they had come to discuss: peace and partnership 
with the settlers. The available evidence indicates 
that Evans had little desire to discuss the idea, but 
that he was also determined to use the opportunity 
to redefine the peaceful Native groups as hostiles, 
accusing those who had come to him at great risk 
as responsible for the reported depredations. “It is 
utterly out of the question,” Evans accused, “for 
you to be at peace with us, while living with our 
enemies, and being on friendly terms with them.” 
Statements such as these eliminate any doubt 
that Evans believed “friendly” Indians could live 
“Another reason that I am not in a 
condition to make a treaty, is that war is begun, 
and the power to make a treaty of peace has 
passed from me to the Great War Chief. ”
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anywhere but on the military outposts to which 
he had assigned him—and from which many of 
which many of them had already been aggressively 
turned away.
When asked in several variations by both Black 
Kettle and White Antelope how they could make 
peace, Evans deferred, arguing that his authority—
apparently in both political offices—had expired: 
“I am not in a condition to make a treaty,” he 
asserted, claiming again, “war has begun, and the 
power to make a treaty of peace has passed from 
me to the Great War Chief.” Native people must 
“turn on the side of the government and show, by 
your acts, that friendly disposition you profess to 
me.” Yet it is not the government to which he turns 
them, but the military acting as in the capacity 
of the government, which was due more than 
anything else to Evans’s own lobbying. “I hand you 
over to the military, one of the chiefs of which is 
here today, and can speak for himself, to them, if 
he chooses,” he says, affirming at the very least his 
own authority as it relates to Native people. Black 
Kettle, perhaps seeing the danger of the situation 
nonetheless agrees to return to Fort Lyon with 
Major Wynkoop. Expressing his own worry about 
this arrangement, White Antelope asks, “How can 
we be protected from the soldiers on the plains?” 
Evans’s reply was as simple as it was cold, given 
what we know of the context: “You must make that 
arrangement with the Military Chief.” Although 
Wynkoop commanded the troops at Fort Lyon, 
Colonel John Chivington announced at Camp 
Weld, “all the soldiers in this country are at my 
command.” Still, Chivington reiterated that the 
Indians should go to Major Wynkoop when they 
got ready to make arrangements.22
In sum, the Indians at Camp Weld asked for 
peace and protection in response to Evans’s June 
Proclamation calling for tribes to do exactly that. 
In direct reply to their face-to-face inquiries, Evans 
told them to report to the military authorities at  
 
22 Report of Council with Cheyenne and Arapahoe Chiefs and 
Warriors
Ft. Lyon, where they had already tried, without 
success, to come in. Disregarding this, Evans 
clearly implied they would now receive at least 
temporary peace and protection under designated 
parameters. But throughout the conference, 
Evans’s comportment could only have been deeply 
confusing to the chiefs as he had effectively accused 
them, repeatedly, of being enemies because they 
had contact with the territorial and military 
leadership’s enemies, yet he made it clear that 
going with the military would be regarded as a 
“friendly” effort. Within this context, the options 
of the Arapaho and Cheyenne were quickly being 
reduced to zero. 
Evans’s subsequent comments betray the 
same contradictions. In the telegram to Curtis 
immediately after the meeting, Evans described the 
group as “the most reliable Chiefs of the Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe tribes,” and “earnest in their desire 
for peace.”23 But in the Bancroft interviews two 
decades later makes this comment: “[W]hile I was 
in Washington, the people got evidence and the 
military authorities got evidence that that camp 
was a refuge for Indian warriors, etc. that were at 
war with us, and this terrible massacre, as it was 
called, of Chivington, was perpetrated during 
that year.”24  The Bancroft comment sounds very 
much like a justification for the massacre because 
if military officials learned that the Natives camped 
at Sand Creek were actually “at war with us,” 
then the massacre would have been entirely in 
line with Evans’s plans to use the 3rd Regiment to 
thoroughly prosecute “hostiles” in Colorado  
 
23 Northwestern Report, 85. 
24 Bancroft Interview [double-check date; 1889], 21-22.
The available evidence indicates that Evans … 
was determined to use the opportunity to redefine 
the peaceful Native groups as hostiles, accusing 
those who had come to him at great risk as 
responsible for the reported depredations.
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Territory. But it flies in the face of what Evans 
assured Curtis directly after Camp Weld, and we 
have no indication that any new, clear “evidence” 
emerged for either “the people” or the “military 
authorities” to interpret as cause for massacre.
It is important to recall that the camp at 
Sand Creek to which Major Anthony directed 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho, on the border of the 
“reservation” much touted by Evans, was just about 
as close as the tribes could get to Fort Lyon without 
actually living on top of the troops. Gary Roberts 
points out that there would have been a problem 
if the camp had been any closer: “the Army never 
recognized these locations as refuges, and, indeed, 
General Curtis explicitly forbade Indians from 
entering military reservations.” 
  
Wynkoop Reassigned
On November 2, Major Scott Anthony replaced 
Major Edward Wynkoop as the commander 
of Fort Lyon. The ostensible reason for the 
replacement was attributed to “unofficial rumors...
that certain officers [had] issued stores, goods, 
or supplies to hostile Indians, in direct violation 
of orders from the general commanding the 
department.” In fact, Wynkoop had been doing so, 
using rations allocated for supporting prisoners.25  
 
25 Roberts, Sand Creek, 397.
Yet two years previously just exactly this kind 
of emergency action on the part of the Army in 
Nevada had probably gone a long way toward 
keeping the peace there. When Major Scott 
Anthony replaced Wynkoop, he commanded the 
prisoners to surrender their weapons. He lied to 
them, trying to convince them that they were at 
peace, and that he would warn them first if he 
heard from higher military authority that they were 
not.  Instead, Anthony asked for reinforcements 
from Denver to wage an attack, but he may also 
have contemplated attacking “hostiles,” something 
that, he reported later, Chivington had told him 
they would do.
It is difficult to know just what Evans’s 
involvement in this replacement was. However, 
it must be remembered that this replacement was 
made two-and-a-half months after Chivington 
had declared martial law and three weeks after 
Commissioner Dole had reluctantly acknowledged 
Evans’s abdication of civilian authority to the 
military. If this action was not done specifically 
at Evans’s invitation, then it was certainly done 
at least without any objection from him. Given 
Evans’s knowledge of Wynkoop’s pivotal and 
effective response to Cheyenne’s conciliation 
efforts, the significance of this replacement should 
not have escaped him.
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It took one long day for Colonel John Chivington 
and his 3rd Regiment to deliver on Chivington’s 
vision of “chastisement” for Colorado Native 
people. But the bloody deeds committed at the 
Sand Creek encampment would generate hundreds 
of hours of inquiry and reams of interview 
transcriptions in subsequent years, as federal 
agencies launched investigations into an event that 
even a westward-expanding national government 
quickly saw as anomalous and deplorable. Gary 
Roberts reviews the context of each investigation 
and the popular reactions each new commission 
generated in Colorado Territory.1 Here we 
focus primarily on the conclusions that remain 
consistent across the investigations, on Evans’s 
efforts to defend his performance as a territorial 
leader, and on how each committee seemed to 
weigh Evans’s responsibility. 
In the wake of Chivington’s massacre, news 
reports of the “Sand Creek affair” covered most 
of the basics: that the Cheyenne and Arapaho at 
the encampment were peaceful and under the 
temporary protection of the military until a peace 
settlement could be arranged; that the battle itself 
was chaotic and without any clear command or 
control under a commander intent on “stirring 
up the Indians”; that most of the dead were 
women and children; and that the bodies of the 
dead were scalped and mutilated. By winter of 
1864-65 it was clear to federal officials that the 
event demanded attention—though, as Roberts 
notes, settlers in Colorado were puzzled by the 
charges, as Colorado press had generally supported 
Chivington’s campaign at Sand Creek (and in 
general for the previous two years) and kept critical 
1 Dissertation, Chapter XV.
voices out of the news.2
Three separate investigations were eventually 
conducted, one military and two congressional. 
The “Military Investigation of the Sand Creek 
Massacre” was ordered through the army chief 
of staff and will be referred to as the Tappan 
investigation after its president, Lieut. Colonel 
Samuel F. Tappan. The commission did not 
interview Evans. A second inquiry came out 
of “Bluff” Ben Wade’s Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of War, an important investigative body 
that attempted to apply congressional strength to 
control the president’s prosecution of the Civil 
War; in Roberts’ words, this committee “served 
as a kind of national grand jury.”3 The Wade 
Commission conducted its investigations in spring 
of 1865 and issued a scathing report in early 
May, effectively condemning the “Chivington 
affair” as a case study in how not to prosecute a 
military attack. Finally, the Senate’s Joint Special 
Committee on the Condition of the Indian 
Tribes, known as the Doolittle Committee 
after its chairman James Doolittle, included an 
investigation of the Sand Creek Massacre in its 
1867 report, “Conditions of the Indian Tribes.”
 Most of the Doolittle report consists of a 
review of the dire conditions facing Native peoples 
in the United States in the 1860s, of the role of 
the Indian Bureau and related agencies, and of the 
question whether the Bureau should be moved 
back to the Department of War or kept in the 
Department of the Interior. It does not provide a 
formal account of the Sand Creek Massacre per se, 
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under the title “The Chivington Massacre.” 
A brief section in the report itself does refer 
to the massacre to exemplify how a “war of 
extermination” was being waged by white men in 
the frontiers. Chivington’s “wholesale massacre of 
Arrapahoes [sic] and Cheyennes” is described as 
uniquely deserving of condemnation not because 
of the “indiscriminate slaughter” conducted there 
(that was not unique) but because “those Indians 
were there camped under the direction of our own 
officers, and believed themselves to be under the 
protection of the flag.”4
Together the evidence in the reports supported 
highly critical and even damning conclusions, 
not only with regard to the massacre itself, but 
also the political and military policies that created 
the conditions for it, and the leaders who acted 
or failed to act in the events that proceeded 
Chivington’s attack. The investigations did not 
rest solely on the damning accounts of witnesses 
like Silas Soule, Joseph Cramer and John Smith 
who had already spoken out about the massacre, 
but delivered detailed accounts of the atrocities 
that occurred at the hands of federalized troops 
through interviews with soldiers who fully 
supported annihilationist policies.
The military commission was ordered in 
January 1865, and established on February 1. 
In an irony of history, Lieutenant Colonel S.F. 
Tappan, a veteran of the first Colorado cavalry 
who had not been at Sand Creek but had been 
an outspoken critic of what transpired there 
and of Chivington in particular, was appointed 
by Colonel Moonlight to preside over the 
commission. Although some interpreted Tappan’s 
participation as evidence of partisanship, the 
commission’s instructions were explicitly not to 
try any one person “but simply to investigate and 
accumulate facts called for by the government, 
to fix the responsibility, if any, and to insure 
4 Doolittle, 6.
justice to all parties.”5 The committee had a broad 
mandate, as Roberts summarizes it, “to determine 
whether the Indians at Sand Creek were under the 
protection of the government, by whose authority 
they were there, whether Col. Chivington knew 
their condition, whether the Indians were hostile, 
whether Chivington took prisoners or not, 
whether steps ‘to prevent unnatural outrages: or 
to punish them if they occurred, and whether or 
not the property captured was turned over to the 
quartermaster corps as required by military law.’”6
The Tappan commission traveled to Fort Lyon 
and Camp Weld in Denver in the spring of 1865, 
interviewing three-dozen witnesses and generating 
some 800 pages of testimony. In the middle of 
its work, on April 23, Silas Soule was murdered 
on Lawrence Street in downtown Denver by two 
Second Colorado Calvary soldiers who claimed he 
had incarcerated one of them—although some, 
including Tappan and Ned Wynkoop, suspected 
Chivington of being behind the killing. When the 
commission reconvened, Chivington delivered a 
dramatic self-defense, introducing a long line of 
witnesses and deposing three others in an attempt 
to discredit Soule and others. Procedurally, the 
commission was flawed for a number of reasons, 
but the transcripts represented the most detailed 
inquiry among the three committees.7 Following 
the instructions of the War Department, the 
commissioners issued no formal report of their 
own, and the transcript was boxed and sent to 
Washington, where eventually the Judge Advocate 
General Joseph Holt composed a strongly-worded 
review of the testimony, which represented the 
official military review. However, the report wasn’t 
published until 1868, and never appeared in the 
Colorado press.8  
5 Moonlight to Lt. Col. Tappan, February 12, 1865, 
Military Investigation of  the Sand Creek Massacre, 
3-4. http://www.kclonewolf.com/History/SandCreek/
sc-documents/sc-01hearing.html 
6 Roberts, Dissertation, 483.
7 Roberts, 495.
8  Ibid., 497-8; 516.
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The report worked carefully through the 
lead-up events in 1864, especially Evans’s two 
proclamations and the Camp Weld council. He 
noted the conversation with Wynkoop prior to 
the council, in which, in Holt’s paraphrasing, “If 
peace were now made there would be nothing 
for these troops to do, and it might be thought 
at Washington that he had misrepresented the 
necessity for raising them.”9 Holt was clearly 
convinced by the testimony that the Sand Creek 
affair was a massacre; a “cowardly and coldblooded 
slaughter” of friendly Indians, filled with “shocking 
and demoniac barbarities” that would merit 
punishment if Chivington were not beyond the 
reach of military trial, by virtue of his commission 
having expired. He recommended that the 
government “manifest not only its disapproval, 
but its utter abhorrence of the savage crimes thus 
committed in its name, and that it would so 
rebuke and brand the authors of these crimes by 
name, and their infamy shall cling to them, and 
that they shall thus become a warning to others, in 
all time to come.”10 
Congressman Wade’s Joint Committee 
investigations overlapped with the army 
commission inquiries and publicly overshadowed 
the latter’s work, to the dismay of many apologists 
in Colorado. Composed mostly of Radical 
Republicans critical of the new administration 
and therefore considered partisan by critics, the 
group had investigated major campaigns of the 
Civil War and took its job seriously. With Missouri 
Congressman Benjamin Franklin Loan leading the 
proceedings, all the major military officials and 
several civilians appeared in the hearings, including 
John Evans on March 15. Evans was bombarded 
with questions about his knowledge of the  Indians 
in his jurisdiction; the spring 1864 depredations 
and whether Black Kettle’s band was connected  
 
9  Judge Advocate General J. Holt to the Secretary of  
War, 16th October, 1868 (copy from files of  Gary Rob-
erts provided week of  October 27, 2014), 4.
10  Roberts, 498; Holt to War Department, 13.
with him; his perceptions of plans for a general 
Indian war; the Camp Weld meeting and the 
decision to send the Arapaho and Cheyenne 
bands to Fort Lyon; his lobbying for the regiment 
to kill Indians; and finally his sense of whether 
Chivington was justified in attacking the bands at 
Sand Creek.
Evans emerges in this interview as a figure 
with surprisingly vague knowledge of the Native 
peoples, distances, and landscapes within his 
superintendency. He has trouble distinguishing 
between different bands and leaders, explaining his 
imprecise knowledge according to the “roaming” 
and “nomadic” nature of the plains bands, which 
seem to him somewhat interchangeable. For 
example, he names four of the chiefs brought to 
Denver by Wynkoop, but can’t identify the others. 
His testimony also seems to illuminate the 
intentions and mindset he brought to the Camp 
Weld council. He emphasizes, as he does in a later 
interview with the Doolittle commission, that he 
approached the Camp Weld meeting primarily 
as a chance to (to use a modern phrasing) cull 
intel from the chiefs: “I took occasion to gather 
as much information as I could in regard to the 
extent of hostile feelings among the Indians, 
and especially in regard to what bands had been 
committing the depredations along the line and 
through the settlements, which had been very 
extensive.”11 (What information he actually 
gathered is unclear.) The governor betrays no 
indication that he took seriously the opportunity 
to negotiate peace. Indeed, he conveys an 
overriding suspicion of the chiefs’ intentions and 
a determination to characterize even these known 
peace leaders as war-makers while denying his own 
authority to make negotiate anything. In the end, 
he did not cull any significant information and 
treated the meeting more like an aggressive police 
interrogation. 
The way Evans phrases the discussions of peace 
in the interviews is interesting. First he implies 
11  Joint Committee on the Conduct of  War, 35.
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that the chiefs saw the onus as being on Evans, as 
the governor-superintendent, to broker peace. (If 
so, this would have been a logical inference based 
on Evans’s instructions in the June Proclamation 
for “friendly” bands to present themselves to him.) 
As Evans describes it:
The Indians made their statement, that they had 
come in through great fear and tribulation to see 
me, and proposed that I should make peace with 
them; or they said to me that they desired me to 
make peace. To which I replied that I was not the 
proper authority, as they were at war and had been 
fighting, and had made an alliance with the Sioux, 
Kiowas, and Comanches to go to war; that they 
should make their terms of peace with the military 
authorities. (Emphasis added)12
Later in the interview, Evans is pressed 
on whether the chiefs were responding to his 
instructions as superintendent. He evades the 
question:
Question. Did these Indians propose to do anything 
that you, as their superintendent, directed them to 
do in this matter, for the purpose of keeping peace?
Answer. They did not suggest about keeping peace; 
they proposed to make peace. They acknowledged 
that they were at war, and had been at war during 
the spring.13
In this exchange Evans has reversed a bit—now 
the chiefs have proposed making peace, not that he 
make peace with them. This framing is consistent 
with his notion that they, not the military, were 
the ones at war. At the same time he insists on a 
distinction between the chiefs wanting to “make 
peace,” as opposed to “keeping peace”—a  
distinction that underscores his determination to 
believe that the tribes had been at war throughout 
the spring (which was disputed, at least with 
regard to these bands), that they were at war in 




they said they were working to prevent war and 
no depredations had occurred for several weeks), 
and that even though they were the most respected 
peace leaders and had come to Denver at great 
risk to broker peace, such a negotiation was out 
of his hands. In the committee interviews he 
categorically rejects the possibility that the chiefs 
initiated a sincere peace effort.
Throughout both the Wade and the Doolittle 
interviews, and again in the “Reply” he publishes 
in response to the Wade Commission report, 
Evans insists that he had lost the authority to make 
peace, citing Curtis’s dispatch the day after Camp 
Weld, ordering that, “no peace should be made 
with the Indians, without his assent and authority.” 
The Reply (also included in the Doolittle 
Appendix) employs Evans’s September 29, 1864 
letter to Indian agent Colley as evidence of Evans 
having acted at Camp Weld in accordance with the 
policy of military authorities.14  However, as we 
noted in our section on the Camp Weld council, 
in that letter Evans told Colley that he “declined to 
make peace with them, lest it might embarrass the 
military operations against the hostile Indians of 
the plains”—not because of protocol or instruction 
from the military. Evans had been transparent 
with Colley that he understood this decision to 
effectively “[relieve] the Indian bureau of their care 
until peace[was] declared with them”—a peace 
that a regiment that had been raised to kill Indians 
could not soon make. In the Reply, he sticks to his 
position that “the status of these Indians was in 
no respect within [his] jurisdiction or under [his] 
official inspection”—leaving out Commissioner 
Dole’s urging after the Camp Weld debacle that 
he “hold [him]self in readiness to encourage and 
receive the first intimations of a desire on the part 
of the Indians for a permanent peace.”15 
Before both congressional commissions and in 
his Reply Evans was adamant that he knew  
 
14 John Evans to Maj. S.G. Colley, September 29, 1864, 
in “Condition of  the Tribes,” Report of  the Joint Spe-
cial Committee, Government Printing Office, 1867, 82.
15 Evans to Dole, August 10, 1864, Governor’s Papers.
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nothing of the facts connected with the massacre, 
that he had no power with regard to it, and that 
being out of Colorado Territory when it took 
place, his name should never have been associated 
with “this battle.”16 Yet despite his repeated 
assertions that he believed the bands he turned 
over to military authority at Ft. Lyon were under 
the protection of the U.S. government, he offers 
no expression of disappointment that it happened, 
nor criticism of it or decisions leading up to 
the massacre. His refusal to offer an opinion on 
Chivington’s actions is appropriate to expectations 
of a commission hearing, yet he seems to continue 
the same campaign he had been asserting in 
Colorado throughout his tenure: that the Native 
people had been conspiring for a war against 
settlers, that hostilities were abundant (but not 
because Cheyenne and Arapaho had any legitimate 
complaints), and that no Indians, even those who 
approached him for peace, could really be trusted. 
The superintendent seems to have abandoned all 
pretense of interest.
Pressed by the Wade committee’s Congressman 
Gooch on whether any circumstances at all could 
justify Chivington’s attack, Evans seems unable to 
look through anything other than the lens of  
suspicion through which he approached Cheyenne 
and Arapaho all along. Again, he conflates 
hostilities he claimed were happening in 
November 1864 with the bands at Sand Creek. 
(These hostilities don’t appear in the historical 
record, but if they happened were surely fueled by 
Evans’s and the military’s declarations of war by  
late summer, and not authored by the bands at  
 
16 John Evans, “Reply of  Governor Evans of  the Territory 
of  Colorado” in Doolittle Commission Report, 78-87.
Fort Lyon who had no incentive to commit 
hostilities.) In so doing, he avoids the question 
Gooch poses at least three times: 
Question. But from all the circumstances which you 
know, all the facts in relation to that matter, do you 
deem that Colonel Chivington had any justification 
for that attack?
Answer. So far as giving an opinion is concerned, I 
would say this: That the reports that have been made 
here, a great many of them, have come through 
persons whom I know to be personal enemies of 
Colonel Chivington for a long time. And I would 
rather not give an opinion on the subject until I 
have heard the other side of the question, which I 
have not heard yet.
Question. I do not ask for an opinion. Do you 
know of any circumstance which would justify that 
attack?
Answer. I do not know of any circumstance con-
nected with it subsequent to the time those Indians 
left me and I started for another part of the country. 
It is proper for me to say, that these attacks during 
the summer, and up to the time I came away, were 
of very frequent occurrence. The destruction of 
property was very great. Our people suffered won-
derfully, especially in their property, and in their loss 
of life. They murdered a family some twenty-odd 
miles east of Denver. The attacks by hostile Indians, 
about the time I came away, were very numerous 
along the Platte. There was an attack as I came in, 
about the month of November. It was in the eve-
ning, about sundown, and I passed over the ground 
in the night in the stage with my family, and a few 
days afterwards a party of emigrants, returning from 
Colorado, were murdered near the same ground, 
which was near Plum creek; and for a considerable 
length of time, immediately after I came in, the at-
tacks were very numerous and very violent, until the 
stage was interrupted so that it has not been  
 
 
Despite his assertions that he believed the 
bands he turned over were under the 
protection of the U.S. government, he offers no 
expression of disappointment, nor criticism of 
it or decisions leading up to the massacre.
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running since, until within a few days 17 I started 
home and could not get there because there was no 
transportation. I came back here and shall return in 
a few days again. I mention this in order to do away 
with the impression that might exist that hostilities 
had ceased, and that this attack of Colonel Chiving-
ton had excited the recent hostilities. These Indians 
told me, when they were there, that the Sioux were 
in large force on the head of the Republican, and 
would make an attack about the time I expected to 
come in. I delayed my coming in a short time on 
account of what they told me, and when I did come 
in I found some Indians commencing their dep-
redations, which they continued about the month 
following, both before and after the attack made by 
Colonel Chivington. General Curtis wrote to me 
that he did not think Chivington’s attack was the 
instigation of the hostilities perpetrated along the 
Platte.
Such tortured statements surely influenced 
the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War to 
accused John Evans (with Major Anthony) of 
being “willing to convey to your committee a false 
impression of the character of those Indians.”18 
At any rate, the committee, which utterly19 
condemned the Sand Creek Massacre and Colonel 
Chivington,19 also came down hard on Evans. 
Indeed the report stands out for its recognition of 
the interwoven relationship between civilian and 
17 None of  these attacks were reported at the time. Con-
versation with Gary Roberts, October 27, 2014.
18  Wade Commission, I.
19 “As to Colonel Chivington, your committee can hardly 
find fitting terms to describe his conduct. Wearing 
the uniform of  the United States, which should be the 
emblem of  justice and humanity; holding the import-
ant position of  commander of  a military district, and 
therefore having the honor of  the government to that 
extent in his keeping, he deliberately planned and 
executed a foul and dastardly massacre which would 
have disgraced the veriest savage among those who 
were the victims of  his cruelty. Having full knowl-
edge of  their friendly character, having himself  been 
instrumental to some extent in placing them in their 
position of  fancied security, he took advantage of  their 
inapprehension and defenceless condition to gratify 
the worst passions that ever cursed the heart of  man. 
military authorities in the events leading up to the 
massacre. It begins by noting that Evans issued 
his June Proclamation “as acting Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs” and from there keeps Evans’s 
major leadership decisions in view. Mentioning 
Evans’s claim of no peace-making authority, the 
committee quotes his testimony about sending 
Black Kettle, White Antelope, Left Hand and their 
bands to Sand Creek with the understanding that 
they could stay there until he received instructions 
from department headquarters.
At midpoint, as the massacre is described, the 
repudiations become especially forceful: 
From the sucking babe to the old warrior, all who 
were overtaken were deliberately murdered. Not 
content with killing women and children, who were 
incapable of offering any resistance, the soldiers 
indulged in acts of barbarity of the most revolting 
character; such, it is to be hoped, as never before 
disgraced the acts of men claiming to be civilized. 
No attempt was made by the officers to restrain the 
savage cruelty of the men under their command, but 
they stood by and witnessed these acts without one 
word of reproof if they did not incite their commis-
sion.20
While the atrocities are front and center, the 
committee nonetheless seems to appreciate the 
larger state of affairs with regard to Indian-settler 
relations in the Territory. Acknowledging that 
some Natives had “committed acts of hostility  
 
 
20  Ibid., III-IV.
It is thought by some that desire for political prefer-
ment prompted him to this cowardly act; that he sup-
posed that by pandering to the inflamed passions of  
an excited population he could recommend himself  to 
their regard and consideration. Others think it was to 
avoid the being sent where there was more of  danger 
and hard service to be performed; that he was willing 
to get up a show of  hostility on the part of  the Indians 
by committing himself  acts which savages themselves 
would never premeditate. Whatever may have been 
his motive, it is to be hoped that the authority of  this 
government will never again be disgraced by acts such 
as he and those acting with him have been guilty of  
committing.” (Ibid., V).
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toward the whites,” it also recognizes that “there 
seems to have existed among the people inhabiting 
that region of country a hostile feeling toward 
the Indians.” However, this is not assumed to 
be a normal state of territorial affairs over which 
officials should have been impotent. Rather, “no 
effort seems to have been made by the authorities 
there to prevent these hostilities, other than by the 
commission of even worse acts. The hatred of the 
whites to the Indians would seem to have been 
inflamed and excited to the utmost.” Describing 
how the body parts of massacre victims were 
brought to the capital for display, the committee 
rebukes Evans, specifically noting the dangerous 
implications of his August Proclamation for 
inciting precisely such kinds of violence in the 
Territory:
[Settlers’] cupidity was appealed to, for the governor 
in a proclamation calls upon all, “either individually 
or in such parties as they may organize,” “to kill and 
destroy as enemies of the country, wherever they 
may be found, all such hostile Indians,” authorizing 
them to “hold to their own private use and benefit 
all the property of said hostile Indians that they may 
capture.” What Indians he would ever term friendly 
it is impossible to tell. His testimony before your 
committee was characterized by such prevarication 
and shuffling as has been shown by no witness they 
have examined during the four years they have been  
engaged in their investigations; and for the evident 
purpose of avoiding the admission that he was fully 
aware that the Indians massacred so brutally at Sand 
creek were then, and had been, actuated by the 
most friendly feelings towards the whites, and had 
done all in their power to restrain those less friendly 
disposed.
While the Wade commission did not explicitly 
characterize Evans’s decisions at Camp Weld 
as a leadership failure, it recognized his role in 
exacerbating anti-Indian sentiment in Colorado 
during a delicate period, and identified the second 
proclamation as a pivotal action by civil authorities 
that created the conditions under which the deeds 
committed at the massacre were conceivable to 
ordinary soldiers. It also appreciated that Evans 
had provided no criteria by which settlers might 
differentiate between so-called hostile and friendly 
Indians, nor any way for peace-seeking bands to 
meet the requirements of his proclamations, other 
than what they had done. Concluding, the authors 
wrote, “Your committee most sincerely trust that 
the result of their inquiry will be the adoption 
of measures which will render impossible the 
employment of officers, civil and military, such as 
have heretofore made the administration of Indian 
affairs in this country a byword and reproach.”
On the Resignation of  Evans
By the time the Joint Committee on the Conduct 
of War submitted its report, few military officials 
in Colorado had been spared denunciation. 
Representative Benjamin Franklin Loan, a Radical 
Republican who dominated the hearings, moved 
on May 4, 1865, that a copy of the committee 
report and the testimony be submitted to President 
Johnson. He recommended that
Governor Evans…be immediately removed 
from office, and that Colonel Chivington and 
Major Anthony…be at once arrested and brought 
before a military commission for trial for acts 
unbecoming officers of the United States military 
service, and violating the usages of civilized 
warfare.21
The reality was that Chivington and Anthony 
could not be tried because they were out of the 
military. On May 15, John Palmer Usher, the lame 
duck Secretary of the Interior advised Andrew  
 
21 Roberts, Dissertation, 502.
“No effort seems to have been made by the 
authorities there to prevent these hostilities, other 
than by the commission of even worse acts. The 
hatred of the whites to the Indians would seem to 
have been inflamed and excited to the utmost.”
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Johnson that “the conclusion of the Committee 
is evidently just, and [Usher] join[s] in asking 
that their recommendations be carried out”—but 
Evans was the only official who could reasonably 
take the hit.22
On May 22, Colorado delegate elect Allen 
A. Bradford sent a letter to President Johnson 
advocating for the immediate removal of Evans. 
Reputedly elected with some assistance from 
Copperhead money, Bradford’s critics considered 
him a “bolter”—a Republican who disagreed with 
the current party line. His appeal to Johnson is 
clearly not even-handed. It is a six-point broadside 
on Evans: he failed to carry out any good policy 
for the territory; engaged in private speculation 
to the neglect of the public interest; was too 
often away from the territory; lost the people’s 
confidence; and even (according to Bradford) 
interfered with elections in the territory for his 
own interest. But Bradford’s sixth charge is specific 
as to a clear pattern of actions, in a way the others 
aren’t. It reads: 
In his mismanagement of the Indian affairs in the 
territory [Evans] has pursued a policy that has 
intensified the hostility of the Indians and provoked 
their attacks upon the citizens of the Territory and 
the routes of travel, thus preventing emigration 
and destroying business and trade. He has given 
countenance and encouragement to a Massacre [sic] 
of peaceable Indians and destroyed their faith and 
confidence in the sincerity and obligations of Gov-
ernment Treaties.23 
Here again is a repudiation of Evans’s actions 
in the governor-superintendent role, in the 
terms of nineteenth century western settlement. 
While Bradford’s is hardly the eye of a neutral 
observer, the letter makes the connection between 
mismanagement of Indian affairs, the troubles in 
the Territory, and the massacre. And Bradford, 
with several others, kept up the pressure on 
22 Ibid., 504.
23 Allen A. Bradford to President Andrew Johnson, May 
22, 1865. Photocopy of  original provided by Gary 
Roberts.
Johnson to initiate Evans’s removal. 
Evans had his defenders in Washington, 
notably Ohio Congressman and friend of 
Evans, James M. Ashley, who wrote an appeal to 
Secretary of State William H. Seward on the same 
day Bradford sent his letter to Johnson. Ashley 
denounced the Wade report as unjust, recounting 
a meeting Evans had with Lincoln before his 
assassination in which “this whole matter was 
talked over and satisfactorily.”24 Ashley argued 
that the charges against Evans were orchestrated 
by Copperheads and a few “bolters” from the 
Republican party; moreover, the whole affair 
was unjust because “Gov Evans was not in the 
Territory at the time and could not be responsible 
for the acts of any military officer acting under the 
direction of a Major Genl [sic] of the United States 
army.”25 Ashley’s account of the meeting with 
Lincoln provides an indication that Evans believed 
the administration would protect him. It also 
provides a window into mid-nineteenth century 
patronage dynamics:
The Governor was the personal friend of Mr. 
Lincoln and in my presence the whole matter was 
talked over and satisfactorally [sic] explained, at least 
to Mr. Lincoln [,] and Gov Evans was requested by 
Mr Lincoln to go back to the Territory, with the 
assurance that he would not be disturbed by any ef-
forts which might be made by the ‘bolting’ delegate 
elect [Bradford], and not only so, but the Gover-
nor was assured that his recommendations, when 
endorsed by the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Territories for any new appointments or changes in 
the Territorial officers, should be recognized. It was 
also agreed the opposition Delegate for any of the 
Territories--or Delegates elected by the entire cop-
perhead votes and a few bolters--against the ‘regular’ 
union nominees should not control the patronage of 
the administration, but that the Governors repre-




25 J. M. Ashley to Seward, May 22, 1865, Provided by Dr. 
Gary Roberts.
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Chairman of the Committee on Territories when 
united should controll [sic] all such appointments.
By the end of May, news of the committee’s 
interpretations had reached Denver, and was met 
with a sense of shock and outrage. Partly, citizens 
were angry that the Wade commission had not 
waited until the military commission (the Tappan 
committee) had finished its work. In general, the 
public was defensive about Easterners, who settlers 
felt didn’t know a thing about Indian conflicts and 
made the region appear callous and uncivilized. 
One can also imagine how a public that had been 
angry with Governor Evans for being weak on 
Indians might be befuddled that he was now being 
connected with an event many could not recognize 
as a massacre. Ned Byers from the Rocky Mountain  
News chalked up attacks on Evans to a conspiracy 
among his political enemies.26 
By mid-June dispatches were telegraphed to 
Denver that Evans had been removed and that 
General John Slough had been named to succeed 
him. (Slough had been the first commander of the 
1st Colorado Cavalry and fought at Glorieta Pass 
with Chivington, and partly as a result of that had 
become a personal enemy of Chivington.) Initially, 
Evans asked that the transition take place as soon 
as possible, but as Roberts notes, his capitulation 
was premature. Cyrus Kingsley, the leading 
Methodist clergyman in Denver, and a few others 
tried to save him. But by the end of the summer of 
 
26 Roberts, Dissertation, 505-6
1865 all three investigations had been completed, 
and on August 1, 1865, Evans resigned his post 
under protest. In an ironic twist, he requested 
that the actual transfer of power be delayed until 
he could complete negotiations with the Utes. 
“Though a better man may be my successor,” he 
wrote, “it will be dangerous to the peace with these 
Indians to make the contemplated change until 
after the proposed council as no one can gain the 
confidence of the Indians in a day.”27 Though, as 
we have shown, Evans was an adjunct to more 
than a leader of negotiations with the Utes, these 
words connote a newfound solemnity with regard 
to peace. 
At the same time, Evans remained determined 
to clear his name of association with the Sand 
Creek affair. He submitted his rebuttal to the 
Wade report, asserting that his “vindication shall 
be full, clear and triumphant.” The local papers 
continued to issue irate editorials condemning 
the findings of the Wade Commission, and other 
American papers that had seemed to support it. 
Only the Denver Gazette, edited by Fred J. Stanton 
and long critical of the Evans administration, 
seemed to relish the plight Evans faced. Evans 
published his Reply in September, and most 
Colorado papers supported him. The Reply 
got a bit more of a hearing before the Doolittle 
Commission, but in the end, it couldn’t save Evans 
from the pressure to resign. 
 
27 Roberts, Dissertation, 507.
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Did John Evans ever have second thoughts about 
the Sand Creek Massacre or his role in the events 
leading to it? We have seen that when facing 
the federal investigation committees he had 
trouble recognizing the massacre as especially 
out of bounds, and could not understand why 
his name would have been connected with it at 
all. But after the dust settled on his resignation, 
and his influence in Colorado proved sufficiently 
resilient to survive political catastrophe, did 
the situation ever begin to look different to the 
Methodist citizen and physician, who saw himself 
as a humanitarian and who left Colorado settler-
colonists a profound legacy of economic and 
educational institution-building? On this question, 
the interview conducted in 1884 by the famous 
American historian and ethnologist Hubert 
Howe Bancroft, who in the late-1800s gathered 
statements from scores of figures involved in the 
settlement of the West, is telling.
This interview includes a biographical arc of 
Evans’s origins in Ohio, his careers in medicine, 
his founding of Northwestern, and his many 
successful business enterprises. Evans is then asked 
about his role as governor and superintendent in 
Colorado Territory during the events surrounding 
the Sand Creek Massacre. In those sections Evans 
reiterates his insistence that an “Indian war” had 
been planned for the spring of 1864, detailing 
the ostensible attacks Natives committed and 
the sources of his information about them. 
He interprets his August 11 Proclamation as 
organizing settler-colonists “into a company 
for defense … right in front of my house here,” 
and speaks approvingly of his ability to get his 
“company of cavalry” authorized, with Chivington 
as “commander.” He notes that some “Indians that 
wanted to remain friendly,” and had decided to 
“come in and surrender.” Yet strikingly, given the 
intervening two decades of hindsight, he insists 
that the camp at Sand Creek “was a refuge for 
Indian warriors who were at war with us.” 
After disclaiming any connection with the 
massacre, Bancroft noted, Evans “cited the fact 
that this war resulted in the removal of all the 
Indians from Colorado, except the Utes…” 
“Concluding,” noted the interviewer, [Evans] said, 
“so the benefit to Colorado of that massacre, as 
they call it, was very great, for it ridded the plains 
of the Indians (sic), for there was a sentiment that 
the indians (sic) ought not to be left in the midst 
of the community. It relieved us very much of the 
roaming tribes of Indians.” Here we see a second, 
more profound rationalization of the long-term 
outcomes that began at Sand Creek.1
In another typescript of this interview 
dated 1889, Evans reminisces about the Indian 
population he met in Colorado when he arrived 
in 1862:  “Indians were considered friendly, their 
disposition being to big and pilfer; they had up 
to that time maintained peaceable relations.” 
Witnessing a congregation that he believed was a 
“war dance” (in fact, the dance was a celebration 
of an expedition in which hand-to-hand combat 
took place, but without Cheyenne casualties), he is 
“impressed…with the savagery of the Indians.”2  
 
1  “John Evans,” Bancroft Interview, 1884, 89.
2 “John Evans,” Bancroft Interview, 1889 typescript, 16.
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“I never saw the ridiculous nature of it 
until I got to see the consequence of 
teaching [Indians] that the country belonged 
to them and then robbing them of it.”
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He presents himself as coming up with the idea of 
getting Indians “to raise sheep and cattle as well 
as horses and herd them on the plains until they 
accumulated something to live on instead of living 
hand to mouth as they did…” In fact, this idea 
was not new, and some Indian groups had been 
breeding and raising horses for decades. 
When Evans reviews the failed council of 
1863 his views about Indians seem to flow easily 
from his mouth. This section is worth quoting 
at length, as it perhaps sheds the greatest light 
on the worldview that seems to have motivated 
Evans’s reasoning during his years as governor and 
superintendent. Speaking of his failed council 
attempt with the Cheyenne and Arapaho in late-
1863, he says:
They refused to go [to make a treaty]; said they did 
not want to have anything to do with the govern-
ment. This was their country, and by the way, let me 
remark that the idea that this country belonged 
to them in fee gets its most ridiculous aspect from 
the proposition that a country a thousand miles 
long and five hundred miles wide, one of the most 
fertile in the world (sic), should belong to a few 
bands of roving Indians, nomadic tribes (sic) in 
fee as their own property.3 (Emphasis added)
Here we see that Evans thought the idea of 
Native land ownership anathema, despite this 
being the legal reality he faced as superintendent, 
and the reason he was mandated to negotiate 
treaties. Attributing the idea of Indian land title 
(erroneously) to William Penn, he declares, “I 
never saw the ridiculous nature of it until I got to 
see the consequence of teaching people that the  
country belonged to them and then robbing them 
of it.” 
Plainly, Evans regarded the idea of Native  
 
3 Ibid., 21-2.
peoples as original owners as “a mistake.” From 
Evans’ point of view, this mistake resulted in 
“nearly all the Indian wars,” because “the Indians 
took in the doctrine which was acknowledge (sic) 
by the U.S. government that the country belong to 
the Indians and that we had to buy it of them by 
treaty or purchase.” He erroneously presented “the  
British government’s” “doctrine” as one that “they 
had a right to hunt on the land, but that that right 
must be subject to the higher occupation of the 
land, for a larger population and for civilization. 
Their wildness been impressed upon them from 
the beginning.” Evans admitted, on the one hand, 
being “strongly impressed with the injustice that 
the Indians suffered and with a desire to civilize 
them,” but asserted on the other that they had 
no right to defend themselves and their land. 
Rather, only Evans’s settler-colonists had “the 
right to defend ourselves.” This attitude was a step 
back from even Chief Justice Marshall’s decision 
that creation of the United States did, in fact, 
come with an acknowledgement, conveyed from 
the colonial British, that Native peoples whose 
existence is recognized by the U.S. Government 
also have rights to territory. 
Evans’s attitude, expressed most clearly in these 
two interview transcripts, does indeed anchor 
his defense of the Sand Creek massacre and his 
unrelenting insistence on an “Indian war” in a 
philosophy that did not accommodate cultural 
diversity, indigenous rights, or even the most 
rudimentary tolerance of ways of life that are “not 
us”, and denigrates them with the commonest 
epithet of the time: savage. For all that we have 
argued in this report, we must remember that 
Evans’s way of thinking was—despite some mid-
nineteenth century challenges to it—common 
to the settler mindset in the American West, and 
indeed most of the continent.
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Reassessing Culpability: Departures 
from the Northwestern Report
En route to Washington, a few days before the 
massacre, Evans wrote to Secretary of War Edwin 
M. Stanton, “A portion of the tribes of the 
Arapahos & Cheyenne Indians want peace and 
have gone to Fort Lyon under an armistice or some 
arrangement of the kind with Maj Wynkoop.” As 
mentioned in our introduction, this statement 
indicates it was unlikely that Evans anticipated the 
attack. It is interesting, though, that he does not 
name these Indians by band leaders, in contrast 
to other points in his correspondence at which 
time he does so consistently as, for example, in his 
reference to “Spotted Horse” and “Little Horse”.1 
The Northwestern report concluded that he could 
not have possibly known about Chivington’s 
plans for the massacre, and evaluates Evans as 
“small-minded,” preoccupied with his personal 
reputation, but also “consistently honest and hard-
working,” if also “condescending and sometimes 
uncomprehending.” They imply that his 
condescension and incomprehension resulted in 
his not acting “in a manner that befitted an official 
with a federal duty to look out for the tribes,” but 
that such a failure may be excusable.2
This is a critical point. Even though the idea 
that the head of a largely disorganized population 
with a barely working, raw governing structure 
might actually have some legal responsibility 
for a different group of people with a history 
of organized politics and law seems somewhat 
parochial, this was, nonetheless, the attitude of 
U.S. authorities. A fiduciary relationship is one 
of trust and responsibility. The fiduciary “is held 
to a standard of conduct and trust above that of 
1 Roberts, “Thoughts,” 15; Evans to Gerry, June 10, 
1864
2 Northwestern Report, 89, 86
a stranger or of a casual business person.” The 
fiduciary has the power and obligation to act for 
another, the beneficiary, and “extends to every 
possible case in which one side places confidence 
in the other and such confidence is accepted.”3 If 
looking out for the tribes was indeed a fiduciary 
relationship, Evans clearly violated it.
Nearly every situation involving Native people 
in Colorado—from the confused and neglected 
situation at the Upper Arkansas Agency; to the 
failed treaty council of September, 1863; to the 
orchestration of the only successful treaty signing 
during Evans’s tenure as superintendent, which 
occurred without his involvement; to the inability 
to scale back suspicion and hostility toward the 
Cheyennes and Arapahos in order to ensure their 
security and rights; to the outright rejection of 
conciliation—reflects Evans’s superintendency, 
as a function of his governorship, as a failed 
undertaking. In utilizing Republican Party loyalty 
and commitment to abolitionism as the primary 
indicators of suitability for appointment to high 
office, Abraham Lincoln erred substantially in the 
case of Dr. Evans. When compared with Nye and 
Doty, it is clear that Evans never should have been 
appointed Colorado’s Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs.
In 2013, Gary Roberts characterized Evans 
as “well-intentioned at the beginning of his 
tenure as governor,” but with little concern for 
3  This idea of  the United States as “’guardian’” over 
its Indian “’wards’” is traceable to Chief  Justice John 
Marshall’s ruling in Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’In-
tosh, 1823, covered above. Gerald Hill and Katherine 
Hill, The Peoples’ Legal Dictionary, 1981-2005, Fine 
Publications, accessed July 30, 2014; West’s Encyclo-
pedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale 
Group, Inc. Accessed July 30, 2014.
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Indian affairs, while also regarding him as “not in 
lock step” with Chivington.4 The Northwestern 
Report goes even further and implies that 
Chivington wanted to kill Indians just for the 
sake of killing Indians, whereas Evans had no 
such desire, claiming that Evans neither knew 
about the impending Sand Creek massacre in 
November 1864, nor by extension, did he approve 
of it.5 Roberts concludes that Evans lacked an 
understanding of the importance of his position 
as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, abrogating 
the responsibilities to seek peace as a specification 
of that position, and incapable of balancing 
his responsibilities to both settlers and Native 
peoples which were necessarily at odds. He further 
evaluates Evans as being not a cold and calculating 
official, but as nonetheless promoting “a climate 
of fear and hatred,” in which he routinely blamed 
others “for every misstep.” 
In the three federal hearings conducted that 
called Evans to account, he consistently denied 
knowing anything of Chivington’s plans and 
intentions. Although Roberts concedes that 
Evans may have known that Chivington was 
going to march on Fort Lyon, he does not assess 
the possibility of that knowledge as a conspiracy 
between Evans and Chivington, noting that 
Evans could not have possibly condoned the 
killing of women and children, nor could he have 
anticipated “the extremes to which Chivington and 
his troops would go.” Despite these concessions, 
Roberts concludes that Evans was nonetheless 
“responsible more than any other, for creating the 
atmosphere for Sand Creek, and therefore being, 
“by design or by weakness...deeply culpable for the 
Sand Creek massacre,” through the role in which 
he “promoted the inevitability of an Indian war...” 
On this crucial point, the authors of this report 
agree.
In a statement “To the Public” issued from 
the Executive Departments, Area Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs, CT, Denver” on August 6, 
4 Roberts, “Thoughts,” 13
5 Northwestern Report, 86
1865, just prior to the end of his term, Evans 
noted, “...[I]t will appear in evidence that I 
had no intimation of the direction in which 
the campaign against the hostile Indians was 
to move, or against what bands it was to be 
made...” and further insisted, “by every means 
within my power, I endeavored to preserve peace 
and protect the interests of the people of the 
Territory.”6 For Evans, neither the words “people” 
nor “community” could include Indians. Twenty 
years later, in an interview with historian H. H. 
Bancroft, he averred, “...the benefit to Colorado, 
of that massacre, as they call it, was very great, 
for it ridded the plains of the Indians, for there 
was a sentiment that Indians ought not to be in 
the midst of the community. It relieved us very 
much the roaming tribes of Indians.”7 The clarity 
of expression in which this idea was offered ran 
directly counter to Government policy of the 
time—that the “destiny” of Native people “must 
be determined and worked out where they are.” 
This is to say nothing of the obvious disunity such 
a statement has in relation to the testimony and 
public statements Evans made concerning Sand 
Creek in the immediate aftermath of the event. 
We are left with the question, then: What did 
Evans do that he thought would excise Indians 
from “the community;” rid the settler colonists 
of the roaming Indians; and make the Sand 
Creek massacre merely the culmination of a 
series of actions that would have made it a logical 
conclusion to his vision as Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for the Territory of Colorado? There, 
between the idea and the reality, the motion and 
the act, is the shadow that seems to appear as a 
resolutely logical progression of events that lead 
inexorably to the answer we seek.
6 “To the Public,” Aug. 6th, 1865, 226 Evans Box 6/17 
FF 64, Governor’s Papers
7 Quoted by Ned Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 215
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Our review of the evidence and our 
comparative analysis of Evans’s leadership with 
adjacent leaders Nye and Doty, suggests the 
following core conclusions regarding culpability.
1. As Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
Evans abrogated his duties. He did not 
take seriously his mandate to negotiate 
a new, viable treaty of peace to which 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho who did not 
support the Treaty of Fort Wise could 
agree. A comparison with contemporary 
governors and superintendents of Indian 
Affairs in Utah and Nevada suggests that 
Evans began his tenure with a stance 
that distinctly did not acknowledge 
Indians’ territorial and subsistence rights. 
Evans did not expend the same kind of 
effort that his contemporaries did on 
fulfilling his obligation, communicated by 
Commissioner Dole, to continue efforts 
at conciliation and peace. His efforts were 
desultory and at his convenience. He 
made few efforts to understand, and he 
rarely reported the tribes’ viable concerns 
about settler and military trespasses to his 
superiors. In not exerting a greater effort, 
he left Native people in Colorado to fend 
for themselves in trying to deal with settler 
colonists who had intruded, disrupted 
bison and antelope movements, taken 
springs and camping spots, and sometimes 
even appropriated ponies. He let matters 
drift and thereby allowed conflicts to 
go unaddressed, and even to escalate. 
Close attention to the correspondence 
he maintained as Superintendent reflects 
increasingly inflammatory language 
connoting an increasingly bellicose attitude 
toward Indians; and an unusual degree 
of intimacy, initiated entirely by Evans, 
with military personnel. In not acting on 
the complaints of the Native people in 
his jurisdiction—who were instructed to 
address serious complaints to him—he 
added to the probability that Indians as 
well as settlers would take matters into 
their own hands. The subsequent aggressive 
actions he took in 1864 were beyond the 
pale for any superintendent of Indian 
affairs. 
 
Related to this, Dole did not send “unclear 
and sometimes contradictory instructions,” 
as the Northwestern Report asserts.8 
Dole’s October 15, 1864, letter to Evans is 
neither a mixed message nor ambiguous. It 
is as a reprimand and a last-ditch effort to 
get Evans to do things differently. Dole lays 
Evans’s “terrible Indian war,” “the largest 
Indian war this country ever had”9 straight 
on Evans’s head; clearly criticizes Evans’s 
deliberate placing of civil authority “in 
abeyance” as a dereliction of duty; and will 
not let him off the hook in his presidential 
appointment as Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. By the time Evans had deferred 
to the Army, he had already trumped up 
all the reasons he had done so and left 
Dole no choice but to accept the runaway, 
renegade unfolding of events that Evans 
communicated to him. 
2. Evans used his position of territorial 
leadership to accelerate war, rather 
than to apply every effort to promote 
peace. By claiming from December 1863 
on that a coalition of tribes was either 
planning to wage war on white settlers on 
the plains, or was already doing so, Evans 
directly influenced the conditions in which 
virtually any and all military attacks on 
Indians could be launched and justified.  
The attacks in April and May by Downing, 
 
8 Northwestern Report, 88.
9 Evans to Dole, August 10, 1864, Governor’s Papers
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Davidson and Eayre, and the killings of 
Lean Bear are examples. He acted oblivious 
to Natives’ rationale for retaliations against 
egregious attacks on their respected, 
peace-seeking leaders and made no effort 
to address their concerns. Moreover, 
from late December 1863 forward Evans 
interpreted every strike on the plains as 
a sign of a general Indian war and he 
campaigned aggressively for troops to 
fight that war. His June 27 Proclamation 
ends with a threat of war, and his August 
11 Proclamation not only announces 
war but endorses a vigilante campaign 
of aggression against all Native people 
in the territory not designated (by some 
mysterious, unnamed criteria) as “friendly.” 
His rejection of the conciliation efforts at 
Camp Weld, his remarks that winter was 
his time, and his insistence, confirmed in 
Dole’s October 15 letter to Evans, that his 
own civilian authority over Native people 
had somehow been handed over to the 
military all reflect a desire on Evans’s part 
to announce to the tribes, to the military, 
and to the citizens that these Indians were 
“hostile.” 
3. In his role as governor (but without 
the legal authority to do so), Evans 
authorized the kind of indiscriminate 
violence against Native people that 
would invariably lead to the slaughter 
of noncombatants. The Northwestern 
report argues that Evans “never favored 
killing Indians for its own sake or 
regardless of age or gender.” Even his 
most aggressive comments, the report 
asserts, “should be read in the context of 
his statements about the larger purpose 
of waging war.”10 We see this as a flawed 
assessment. Evans’s notions of a just war 
10  Northwestern Report, 86.
do not excuse actions that amounted to 
dereliction of his duties as superintendent. 
Nor do such ideas relieve him of having 
far exceeded his authority as governor in 
giving citizens the widest possible berth to 
attack indiscriminately. Evans deliberately 
and specifically distinguished between 
“hostile” and “friendly” Indians, not only 
in his two proclamations, but also in his 
correspondence with the Indian office in 
Washington D.C. on June 14 and 15. This 
was not an unusual move to the military 
and its nearly 100-year history with Native 
Americans, but it was not in accord with 
the Indian Office’s instructions to him. 
This indicates that Evans did not take 
those instructions to negotiate peace very 
conscientiously; and what he did was just 
the opposite of what Doty did, which was 
to persuade openly declared hostile Indians 
to join the peace-seeking ones. 
 
Evans never specified criteria for 
distinguishing between “hostile” and 
“friendly” Indians except that he wanted to 
“subsist” the friendly ones. His decisions 
thereby threw all except a few Native 
people into the “hostile” category. It goes 
without saying that in baring the families 
of hostiles from coming in, according to 
the June Proclamation, Evans gave carte 
blanche for no distinction to be made 
between engaging warriors and massacring 
innocents. Once he issued his August 11 
Proclamation all except the bands under 
Roman Nose, Friday, and the families of 
Spotted Horse and Little Horse became fair 
game for attack and robbery by vigilantes, 
at the endorsement of the governor. Given 
that the 3rd Regiment was formed late in 
the summer, it was highly unlikely that 
any of those volunteer soldiers would not 
be aware of the proclamation and may 
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well have considered themselves to be 
fulfilling its mandate when they attacked 
on November 29. After all, the regiment 
had been formed at Evans’s behest and 
urging; why would its members not 
consider themselves obligated to fulfill the 
vigilante mandate? With all women and 
children never having been designated as 
protected and effectively, by the language 
of the proclamation, lumped with warriors 
as “hostile,” why would the soldiers of the 
3rd not consider slaughtering women and 
children to have been pre-approved? In 
effect, through his lobbying, receipt of, 
and support for the 3rd Regiment, Evans 
did the equivalent of handing Colonel 
Chivington a loaded gun. 
 
Again, the comparison in this report 
is instructive: Evans did indeed handle 
Indians the way some of his predecessors 
in other territories had done in the 1850s; 
but as of 1858 things had changed, and 
the way authority figures Doty and Nye, 
not to mention Dole, handled Indians 
marks Evans not as a moderate, or even 
consistently in step with Indian Office 
policy as established by Denver and by 
Congress and continued by Greenwood 
and Dole. Rather, he presents as 
favoring whatever approach the military 
(Chivington) favored, and he allows the 
military to be charge from August 11 
forward. He endorsed the Bear River 
massacre and was thrilled when (he 
thought) Connor might get to lead the 
3rd. Evans wrote to Brig. Gen. Connor 
on October 24, 1864, saying “I am glad 
that you are coming. I have no doubt 
the Indians may be chastised during the 
winter, which they very much need. Bring 
all the forces you can; then pursue, kill and 
destroy them, until which we will have no 
permanent peace on the plains.”11148We 
believe this letter must be understood in 
the context of Evans’s escalating fever for 
war, and that such comments cannot be 
dismissed under some putative theory 
of “Just War,” for the latter prohibits the 
slaughter of innocent civilians.  
4. Related to the above, we strongly 
disagree with this conclusion from the 
Northwestern report: “The extant evidence 
suggests that he did not consider the 
Indians at Sand Creek to be a threat and 
that he would have opposed the attack 
that took place.”12 The first clause is true 
according to two pieces of evidence: Evans’s 
ostensible efforts to prevent vigilantes from 
attacking the Arapaho camp at Camp 
Collins; and his telegram to Stanton while 
he was en route to Washington, D.C.. 
That he would have opposed the attack 
at Sand Creek if there had been any 
suggestion of “hostiles” in the camp is 
belied by Evans’s entire pattern of actions 
in 1864. His histrionic and inflammatory 
verbiage in correspondence with just about 
everybody he wrote to indicate a keen 
enthusiasm for a ruthless, “punishing” 
winter attack on Indians, under conditions 
in which they would precisely be gathered 
as family groups. His aggressive responses 
to the overtures made by the Cheyennes in 
the Camp Weld meeting indicate that he 
was not in the habit of opposing attacks 
on Indians; indeed, he made clear to them 
that he planned to attack. There were also 
numerous attacks between mid-1863 and 
mid-1864 that included killings of women 
and children. Did Evans ever step in or 
take a stand against them? Finally, as  
 
 
11 Evans to Connor, October 24, 1864, Governor’s Papers
12 Northwestern report, 85.
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pointed out earlier, even after decades to 
consider it, Evans defended “what they 
call a massacre” as having had a “very great 
benefit” to Colorado in the long run, for 
“it relieved us very much of the roaming 
tribes of Indians.” 
5. Evans was not just “one of several 
individuals who, in serving a flawed 
and poorly implemented federal 
Indian policy, helped create a situation 
that made the Sand Creek Massacre 
possible.”13 Rather, he was the top 
political authority in the Territory and 
central to creating the conditions in 
which the massacre was possible and 
even likely. While we agree with the rest 
of the finding on page 87, we conclude 
differently that this is an unnecessarily 
muddled framing of culpability given 
Evans’s coterminous position as governor 
and superintendent of Indian Affairs. The 
“Several” NU mentions include Colley, 
Curtis, officials in the Indian Office (such 
as Dole and Usher). Usher was pitched 
into the Secretary of Interior post by 
happenstance. Curtis, after winning a 
stunning victory against Confederates 
in Missouri, had nothing more to do 
except pursue Indians. The accusation 
by Indians that Colley was corrupt (see 
above) was never investigated. There is 
no indication that Dole did anything to 
help the situation that made the massacre 
possible, and in fact, Dole’s position was 
consistently in favor of conciliation and 
peace, until Evans basically hamstrung him 
by de facto giving civil authority over to 
Chivington.  
 
We agree with the NU Report that Curtis 
certainly seems to give Chivington carte 
13  Northwestern report, 85.
blanche to conduct search-and-destroy 
campaigns against Indians. His dictum that 
he “want no peace with the Indians” must 
be taken in context. Curtis had command 
of the Department of Kansas, including 
Kansas, the Territories of Colorado and 
Nebraska, and Indian Territory. There 
had already been altercations involving 
Kiowas, possibly Sioux and probably 
Comanche in Kansas, Nebraska, and the 
boundary separating Texas, Kansas, and 
Indian Territory. He was also pursuing 
Confederate troops in Missouri and 
actually, in October, 1864 led an army of 
Kansans to victory over the Confederates 
in what was the largest battle in Missouri, 
which saw the largest number of battles 
of the Civil War. So what is interpreted 
as a command to have no peace with the 
Indians until he declared it may well have 
been an off-hand comment that a fail-
safe position had to be maintained on the 
western front while he concerned himself 
with Confederates in the eastern part of his 
command, and also an assumption that he, 
Curtis, was now in charge because in fact 
Evans had given over civilian authority to 
Chivington. 
6. It is not clear how Northwestern’s 
conclusions about Evans’s deliberate 
abandonment of responsibilities and 
deserving of blame can be attributed 
merely to his small-minded preoccupation 
with his personal reputation.14 These 
conclusions do not square with 
Northwestern University’s speculation 
that Evans may have believed he was 
negotiating a limited truce in a cycle 
of recurrent warfare. There WAS no 
cycle of recurrent warfare; here were far 
fewer skirmishes in Colorado Territory 
14  Northwestern Report, 89.
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than had occurred west of South Pass in 
Washington, Utah, and Nevada Territories. 
Not only does his conduct “after the Sand 
Creek Massacre” reveal “a deep moral 
failure”15; it is his conduct before the 
massacre that does so. It is not his response 
to the Sand Creek Massacre that was 
“reprehensibly obtuse and self- 
 
 
15  Northwestern Report, 90.
interested,”reflecting “indifference to 
the suffering inflicted on Cheyennes 
and Arapahos,” it is all the actions he 
undertook and the attitude that he 
maintained before the massacre that not 
only reflected “indifference to the suffering 
inflicted on Cheyennes and Arapahos,” but 
promoted the suffering.
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John Evans surely came to Colorado 
hopeful that he could make a positive impact. 
He was a man of recognized intelligence, 
ambition, inventiveness, and will; many of his 
close contemporaries regarded him as deeply 
humanitarian and a true miracle-maker when he 
put his mind to something. Evans never imagined 
he would become embroiled in a massacre that 
would live in infamy as one of the worst atrocities 
in United States history—no small distinction 
in a settler colonial society that often prefers to 
“forget” the human and environmental costs of its 
achievements.
The Sand Creek Massacre is unique in 
American history, but not because it was a 
massacre of Native people. Sadly, there are scores 
of assaults that follow a similar pattern of brutality, 
and there are other massacres of non-Natives (such 
as Colorado’s Ludlow Massacre) in our record 
books. The Sand Creek Massacre was a criminal 
attack on a people who had made every effort 
for peace when they lacked any political power, 
a people whose leaders entrusted civil officials 
and then a military that had done very little for 
Native people, because they felt they had no viable 
options left. That military turned on even their 
children in the most vicious ways imaginable—but 
even that does not set it apart.
The massacre is unique in that three federal 
investigations found the deeds committed at Sand 
Creek to be profound violations of nineteenth-
century standards of diplomacy and warfare. These 
inquiries led to the ouster of a standing territorial 
governor. Finally, this massacre is distinguished by 
being the lone military campaign against Native 
people at the hands of American soldiers that the 
United States government officially recognizes as a 
massacre.1  
Evans could not have anticipated such 
dreadful infamy, and he certainly cannot be held 
responsible for it from the grave. Nor has the 
intention of this committee been to defame his 
reputation. We do believe the evidence amply 
supports finding Evans seriously culpability for 
helping creating the circumstances that led to the 
Sand Creek Massacre. But we must never invest so 
much in the question of culpability that we lose 
sight of the broad, complex picture that surrounds 
both Evans’s decisions in the 1860s, and our 
conditions as today’s occupants of what had been 
Cheyenne and Arapaho homelands.
A century and a half later, as an educational 
community that has inherited Evans’s positive 
legacies along with his deadly decisions, we have 
the opportunity to face this history honestly. It is 
impossible now to celebrate the founder with the 
amnesia we have shown in the past, but we can 
see him—and perhaps ourselves—more accurately 
situated in the complexity of history. The Massacre 
changed the course of existence for Arapahos, 
Cheyennes, and many other people who lived 
in what we self-referentially call Colorado, but 
which was just one part of a beloved landscape 
that stretched from New Mexico all the way to 
southern Canada, that other human beings knew 
as home. Even so, these are resilient people, today 
part of dynamic, persistent cultures despite all  
 
1 Ari Kelman, A Misplaced Massacre: Struggling Over the 
Memory of Sand Creek (Harvard University Press,  
February 2013).
Conclusion to the  
Main Body of the Report
96   Conclusion to the  Main Body of  the Report
Tokens of remembrance at the Sand Creek Massacre National Historical Site   |  Original photograph by Paula Bard.
they’ve endured. Understanding the story of John 
Evans and the Sand Creek Massacre offers a rare 
opportunity to call upon our moral, intellectual, 
and spiritual resources to understand how ordinary 
leaders can, under the influence of exclusionist, 
supremacist worldviews, and wielding the tools 
of conquerors, justify horrendous atrocities. 
We urge wide-ranging, substantive, and serious 
discussions of these findings and our committee’s 
recommendations, within and beyond the 
University of Denver Community.
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